> In the case of Bitcoin, I'm worried for two reasons. First, in the long term, Bitcoin security is going to come entirely from fees, and Bitcoin is just not succeeding at getting the level of fee revenue required to secure what could be a multi-trillion-dollar system. Bitcoin fees are about $300,000 per day and haven't really grown that much over the last five years. Ethereum is much more successful at this, because the Ethereum blockchain is much more designed to support usage and applications. Second, proof of work provides much less security per dollar spent on transaction fees than proof of stake, and Bitcoin migrating away from proof of work seems to be politically infeasible. What would a future look like when there's $5 trillion of Bitcoin, but it only takes $5 billion to attack the chain?
I can't bold here, but if I could I would have bolded "What would a future look like when there's $5 trillion of Bitcoin, but it only takes $5 billion to attack the chain? ".
which I thought was funny because he's tweaking them a little by saying they're eventually going to have to accept PoS anyway
But if the whole system is at risk due to attacks, I expect that you will be a bit lonely on that chain
I love Bitcoin, but you have to be able to consider hypotheticals like this. Similarly... a tail emission should be on the table. Mentioning it used to be totally third rail [0], but these days folks like Peter Todd are speaking up.
[0] - https://twitter.com/mhluongo/status/1092559017178734594?t=i2...
The difference is if you want to terrorize Bitcoin, you need to find energy and compute at relatively low cost compared to everyone still on the network. With Ethereum, you just need to acquire ETH.
When bitcoin was created there weren't hashpower markets where you could attack a chain without ever having invested in it and then move on the next minute, your hardware investment still earning you money. I think satoshi thought there would only be one chain and the game theory with many is different.
The attack surface of Ethereum’s PoS is pretty huge, and derivative staking already has a runaway accumulation problem. Bitcoin’s entire critique of money is based on not being something like Proof of Stake.
Doesn't a PoS attack require 51% of coin ownership? How would an attacker obtain that without being massively rich to begin with?
Overall I’d just argue that because PoS doesn’t involve external resources to create blocks, the cost of producing a block won’t be well understood and thus there will be opportunities for rent extraction - which we’re already seeing with Lido staking.
He never said that. He said there isn't enough fee revenue. Fee revenue can increase as blockchain space becomes less scarce, and more bytes are sold to transaction generators.
>>that depends on something like Bitcoin’s UASF and thus on people running their own nodes, I wouldn’t trust his predictions much
An Ethereum based UASF by no means requires every one running their own nodes. It just requires people recognizing - via either an upgrade to their own node, or choosing a third party node that has upgraded to pull data from - the chain that slashes the coins of those who are executing 51% attacks.
Would it be bothersome? Yes. Would a globally used bitcoin monetary base layer have complete backing of nation-states using it? Yes. Would people be hesitant to transact during the attack? Probably.
None of these things are of immediate consequence, while the attacker spends its funds rewriting history and getting blowback from everyone online.
Then there is the issue of getting to 51% in the first place, and retaining that 51% once it is clear something nefarious is happening. Many miningpools are conglomerates of individual miners, who certainly have the option of switching to other parties at their whim. I think proof of work is the only viable way currently known to man to ensure a fair, even monetary playing field at global scale. PoS is not proven, and Ethereum does not scale because it optimized for parameters that aren't relevant for a system that is supposed to be online for at least a century, if not longer.
ETC currently has a 6.5 day deposit confirmation time on Kraken because it has had multiple 51% attacks and that hold is even after ETC implemented mitigations [1]. These are not just hypothetical issues.
[1] https://coingeek.com/ethereum-classic-implements-51-attack-d...
Once ETH PoS happens, ETC will be the top GPU coin (at least to start) and the deposit times should go back down again.
One thing ETC has going for it is that the algo is the same as ETH. Very large farms will struggle to retune GPUs for different algo workloads. There is also the issue of different power requirements too.
Might be valid but Vitalik has kind of a lot skin in the game so it's hard for me to take it at face value.
However this interview is PR, not a court.
Vitalik is one of the few people that prioritize the technology over money. He's often been critical of Ethereum, its price, and previous choices he and the rest of the Ethereum development community has made.
I sure would. I'm always interested in what people have to say about their competition. When Steve Balmer said iPhones were a losing idea, did I believe him? No, I thought he was making a mistake, to put it politely. But it was instructive to let me know where Microsoft's mindset was at.
Let's work out an actual attack: I send 1000 btc to an exchange, let it confirm, exchange for something else (Ethereum, let's say) and withdraw. Once my ethereum withdraw is seen on that network, I start 51% attacking the bitcoin chain and unwind the dozen or so blocks that have occurred since I sent the deposit. Maybe this attack costs me 500 btc, but in doing so I get my 1000 btc back. So I effectively bought that ethereum at half price by defrauding the exchange. It needs to be a lot of currency because the 500 btc price of the reorg (made up number!) is a fixed cost, independent of the value of the transaction I'm reversing.
The total market cap of bitcoin doesn't enter into this. The most value I can obtain is the lesser of (1) how much bitcoin I have, and (2) what limit the exchange places on deposits. Exchanges (or other trading partners) can put a hold or delay on high-value deposits, which completely mitigates this attack.
Now the expense of the attack is dependent on the mining revenue per block. So if the mining revenue per block is $300k or so, to use a number from the article, then exchanges and other users of bitcoin should require extra confirmations for transactions > $1MM or so.
I don't know about you, but I think it's perfectly acceptable to say that settling a transaction worth $500MM will require waiting for at least a day's worth of confirmations. And that's all that's required to prevent this attack from being profitable at scale.
But the point is the total market cap doesn’t factor into any of those possible attacks, which is what I said was incorrect about Vitalik’s statement.
Are you thinking of Bitcoin Gold?
As long as there is demand for block space, a market will exist. Also, block size can be increased. Bitcoin will need a hard fork anyway to fix the year 2106 problem (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=760).
They've already chosen, no?
>>As long as there is demand for block space, a market will exist.
Of course a market exists. But the current demand will not be enough to secure the network once the subsidy sees a couple halvings.
>>Also, block size can be increased
Both a block size increase and raising the 21 million coin limit are unacceptable according to Bitcoin's current leadership.
> Also, in 2012, the factorization of 21 was achieved, setting the record for the largest integer factored with Shor's algorithm. In 2019 an attempt was made to factor the number 35 using Shor's algorithm on an IBM Q System One, but the algorithm failed because of accumulating errors.