Some institutions (eg famous ones) have near 100% overhead. Overhead sounds reasonable for example to maintain IT and core facilities, but I have a suspicion that a lot of it is wasted in a black hole of unknown function generically labelled “admin”
https://www.collegeraptor.com/college-rankings/details/Endow...
A surprising amount of overhead goes to employees in accounting who perform some black magic so that everyone on staff is payed by some combination of projects. Whether someone actually works on said projects is irrelevant of course.
The overhead rates are supposed to reflect the University’s actual costs and are negotiated with the government, so I suppose you could try to make a FOIA request for them.
If I had a factory with 100 people assembling my product, or a sales team with 100 people selling it, I'd be quite happy to only budget for the cost of another 100 people to pay my rent and run my IT, payroll, accounting, janitorial services, maintaining my machinery...
I get the impression that modern universities have five or ten other employees for each teacher/researcher, which assuming everyone gets the same pay implies 500-1000% overhead, or subsidy from sources other than grants.
This doesn’t paint the whole picture though as sometimes additional overhead costs (eg. healthcare benefits) can be budgeted as Fringe Benefits for personnel working directly on the project. In that situation, the F&A rate would stack on top of those costs.
(It's not, especially for disciplines like CS and math.)
As for math and CS, I am quite positive at least in Math most work is done by individual professors/post-docs/students without much involvement of grants. In fact, a lot of universities do reduce the overhead charged to purely intellectual pursuit with no major facilities usage kind of departments. Not sure all math or cs research will qualify for that because of the HPC requirements, but the option is out there. Universities as signals for funding and research success really appears to me like the best of a bad option set.
To me this sounds not as a critique of the proposed system, but rather defense of the current system.
Science is underpinned by the scientific method which essentially is "form hypothesis -> create controlled environment -> test hypothesis". I do not want to start debate around expected outcome rations, but negative result (hypothesis being false) is perfectly normal outcome of the scientific method. Current system tries to defend against rent seeking by being heavily biased towards positive outcomes. This encourages heavily incremental research, which a bit paradoxically can be also seen as rent seeking. Furthermore, it also encourages low quality science (like p hacking and similar stuff) and discourages publication of negative outcomes, possibly leading to hitting the same dead ends multiple times.
Blind grant proposals could reduce bias towards "past performance" decreasing ratio of positive results, and encourage "riskier", more brave hypotheses to be formed and tested.
Past performance as a metric in grant application encourages research optimization. Some may see this as a good thing, but it discourages early-to-mid career researchers (and even late in their careers) from pursuing something non-obvious. Safe science is more often than not optimization and edge case/condition testing.
However, your argument is still orthogonal to grant blindness itself. Mere affiliation with with research institution does not guarantee (although highly increases the likelihood, I can agree on that) access to certain research instruments.
This is the thing I have tried to explore in my previous comment. Current model practically revolves around researcher "fame" and grant board "knowing" their [lab's] ability to execute technical part of the research. This creates some perverse incentives. Naturally, grant boards become more inclined (consciously or not) to favor certain institutions and researchers, giving more grants, further increasing "competitiveness". Researchers become disincentivized to publish negative results and are incentivized to resort to data hacking and irreproducible science. This sure does give rise to the OP's mentioned Twitter prof or "trust me bro" science. There is much more politics in science than we publicly admit.
Current process does not actually evaluate grant proposal on technical ability to execute, this is left for institutions "underwriting" proposal. We could start evaluating technical ability regardless of whether grant applications are blind or not. If peer review meant "peers got roughly similar basic results in basic reproduction" instead of "someone in the field looked at the final draft" I guess we could have blind proposals with advantages of current system without its major political disadvantages.
I can agree that open process does help filter out researchers underqualified to do the research in question, but it does come at a certain cost. Ability to weed out underqualified teams does not necessarily require current process, i.e. this can be achieved by other means.