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Comment by Gwypaas | Hacker News Reader

> Can any Germans on HN explain why Germany finds it preferable to give up their energy independence in nuclear and instead buy it from their potential adversary in Russia?

Because the only method shown to prevent war in Europe is co-dependence. EU is founded on integrating the belligerents of WW2 close enough that it would be unthinkable to happen again.

The same method, which at least has worked previously, was tried with Russia and now 30 years later, or more likely in 2014 with the invasion of Crimea we can conclude that Russia is different in some core way of thinking. Not too different though, looking at how the Baltic states have developed when given the choice and chance.

The alternative scenario, with a Russia still riding on the tail ends of soviet military might in steep decline not even given a chance in the early 2000s seems like a recipe for an even worse outcome than we have today.

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> Because the only method shown to prevent war in Europe is co-dependence.

> The same method, which at least has worked previously

it was a common theory prior to WW1 breaking out, then WW1 broke out and falsified it

and now Russia has falsified this theory again

(the threat of the Soviet Union plus nuclear deterrence prevented war in Europe, not the EU)

You may want to look into how many conflicts between how many parties there were in Europe prior to WWI, and since.

Surely that can be better explained by the European countries being fatally weakened by WWII (there were plenty of European conflicts after WWI), which allowed the US and Soviet Union to become the two uncontested hegemons? They very much did not want their European buffer zones to reduce their effectiveness by squandering military resources on infighting, so they enforced that their militaries remain small and, more importantly, dedicated only to defense (while remaining available for the imperial adventure of the hegemons). Both the Soviet Union and especially the US (being the prototypical ocean empire) have found plenty of excuses to get involved with war with an eye to their own benefit. Meanwhile, the European militaries have rotted to the point where most barely have any weapons to send to Ukraine. (Eastern Europe, not being under the thumb of the US for as long and being closer to Russia, has retained a stronger military.)

Gerhard Schröder certainly demonstrated that there is good money to be made in testing this theory.

Economic interdependence before WW1 wasn't even close to how much it is today.

But it was still higher than it ever had been in World history, and yet still did not prevent the Great War from breaking out. Why should we assume that this time economic interdependence is high enough to prevent a war?

Who knows how high it can go. Maybe in the early 22nd century someone will argue that economic interdependence before WW3 was nowhere near as they have it then...

> Because the only method shown to prevent war in Europe is co-dependence.

It’s a bit unilateral. As long as Russia can save enough money or have other buyers for its gas and oil it can just shut the supply in the middle of winter. Germans can of course refuse to export their products to Russia but people freezing in the middle of winter is a bit more dire than not being able to buy the latest Mercedes.

So, like other sibling comment pointed out, it turned more into dependency than co-dependency.

I could see, in the previous years, maybe the Germans wanted to move way from NATO and integrate with Russia but seeing Russian behavior since the Chechnya war https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Grozny_(1999%E2%80... I wonder if anyone warned the Germans not to get in bed with the Russians. That was 20 years ago.

Germany doesn’t allow separatism. Most other European nations don’t allow it too. Spain jailed Catalonia independence movement leaders for 9-13 years in 2017.

I'm not sure where that leads? Should the Austro-Hungarian Empire be reestablished?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austria-Hungary

How is fighting separatists that aren’t recognized by any UN state should lead to reestablishment of Austria-Hungary?

How is jailing people after trial (but not extraditing the Catalonian European delegates), equivalent to the utter destruction of civilian occupied Grozny?

Or are you suggesting that in 2008 Germany should have supported Georgia in South Ossetia?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russo-Georgian...

> How is jailing people after trial (but not extraditing the Catalonian European delegates), equivalent to the utter destruction of civilian occupied Grozny?

The equivalence is in aversion to separatism. I think if the leaders of Ichkeria would agree to be jailed, the Russian government wouldn’t destroy the city. I am not sure what alternative you propose for a country that wants to ensure its internationally recognized claim to a territory.

> Or are you suggesting that in 2008 Germany should have supported Georgia in South Ossetia? > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russo-Georgian...

There is a well-recognized contradiction between the principle of sovereignty and self-determination in the international law. What one should do is not clear if you agree with those principles less so if you don’t recognize them. So it is a quite complicated question. So those things almost always devolve to realpolitik.

> Not too different though, looking at how the Baltic states have developed when given the choice and chance.

The Baltic states were gobbled up by the Soviet Union during WWII, and accrued significant Russian minorities during the Cold War, but they are culturally and ethnically distinct from Russia, with their own languages and histories going back centuries (just check out the Grand Duchy of Lithuania).

Completely agree. Been to all three, very different culturally, both within and compared to Russia, but still with a noticeable Soviet heritage.

Especially Tallinn is becoming a hugely interesting city with the mix of centuries old history, some soviet heritage, new and tech.

They still make an interesting thought experiment since they actually were wholly integrated into the Soviet Union. The other examples near EU are Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova which have ended up on completely different paths.

In comparison to the former East Block nations which more were in the Soviet sphere which was a similar but different existence.

While that strategy in general makes sense, energy is much more critical for the buyer than the seller and that ultimately gives Russia leverage over Germany instead. You want codependency that harms both parties as equally as possible

> Because the only method shown to prevent war in Europe is co-dependence.

What is this, 1910?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion

It was a theory. It was tested. It didn't work, not with Russia, not with the rest of Europe.

I would argue that is only half-correct as an argument (not whether the German people believe it to be true or not).

The EU was of course promoted primarily to avoid the repetition of the World Wars, and it is indeed succeeding at it within its scope, and has also so far been a great influence outside of it as well.

However, it is a mistake to believe that economic interdependence is the reason for its success, or that interdependence is a disincentive for war. The period from the late 19th century was highly globalised, with much international free trade, and increasingly so up until the 1910s. However, that didn't stop war breaking out between wealthy military powers over nationalistic grudges, and neither would it in the 2020s.

I am not knowledgeable enough to fully understand how the EU has broken the cycle of war between European nations, but it has been something much more profound than economic interdependence. Germany was probably right in not wanting to keep close relations with Russia, especially before 2008/2014, but shot itself in the foot by naïvely assuming that co-dependence—or rather, German dependence—would in any way stop Putin's regime from aggressive expansionism.

> we can conclude that Russia is different in some core way of thinking. Not too different though, looking at how the Baltic states have developed when given the choice and chance.

Please do clarify. I am intimately familiar with one of those Baltic states, but fail to see what you mean.

In 1999 the Russian prime minister was flying to the US with a diplomatic visit. While he was flying to the US he was told that the NATO started bombing Yugoslavia. He reversed his flight in the middle of the Atlantic and came back to Russia.

So what same method are you talking about?

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