This shouldn't even be evaluated until it has a section on Sybil attacks.
Literally nothing proposed here is new, and it is manifestly uninformed by the experience of others.
Literally nothing proposed here is new, and it is manifestly uninformed by the experience of others.
However, the "mitigation" already demonstrates a potential attack for the proposed algorithm, namely, that once a bad actor does get some reputation score capital (e.g. by investing some money/effort on genuine good content) then they get the effective ability to invest that reputation into spawning a self-reinforcing farm with a large quantity of reputation bots (using the mechanism of periodic replenishment of rating tokens) who do not need approval from any good actors if they get initially boosted/sponsored by the bad actor, and they can then indeed take over the whole system by maximizing their effect of the rating process/investment which real users simply won't do.
> To bootstrap the system, an initial set of Actors who share the same core values about the to-be-created reputation each gets allocated a bootstrap Reputation Score. This gives them the ability to receive Rating Tokens with which they can rate each other and newly entering Actors.
So basically it assumes there is an initial set of trusted Actors.
But even with this assumption there are potential issues (e.g. good Actors may be bribed).