- Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath, chapter 25
- Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath, chapter 25
Many other countries have historically avoided famine in part because their political systems depended upon and heavily favored local agricultural interests--not the laborers, but specifically the financial security and opportunities of the agricultural land-owning classes. And when and where they didn't, e.g., Ireland in the late 19th century or China in the mid-20th century, things played out in predictable fashion.
Such emphasis doesn't create an optimal state of affairs for maximizing overall wealth and economic equality, but it's one way, however primitive, to buffer volatility and minimize the chances of catastrophic food failure; and helps explain why such seemingly unfair socio-political favoritism, often with seemingly perverse side effects, persists today, let alone in the 1930s.
Only since the 1920s and commercial fertilizer use has food become abundant to such a degree, and logistics so sophisticated that we could fathom supplying excess food to multiple entire countries.
It is doubtful that the people who conceived plans for providing such aid foresaw all the consequences of their actions, because there was simply no historical precedent for such a scale of intervention. Food was scarce. Countries usually didn't have enough of it. It only seemed like the best way to alleviate that was to just _give people food_.
As it turns out, maybe that wasn't the best way, but it was lieky a lesson that needed to be learned the hard way.