https://thebrakereport.com/brake-fluid-leak-leads-to-ferrari...
"In vehicles with rear disc brakes, the parking brake either actuates the disc calipers (with much less force) or a small drum brake housed within the hub assembly (the inner circumference of the disc is often used instead of a separate drum). This secondary drum parking brake is often referred to as a banksia brake."
https://www.manualslib.com/manual/900232/Ferrari-458-Italia....
Doesn’t sound THAT rare for such a serious issue. Ferrari’s themselves are pretty rare though, so total numbers are low (23.5 K in the states, so 1% affected would mean about 235 cars).
Did it take 15 years for Toyota to acknowledge the defects? Looks like this is limited to 2017 Sequoia and 2018 Highlander, and it's got to be less than 5 years. They also flash a warning light when the problem is detected.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_unintended_acceleration...
Yes, most of these were most likely caused by classic gas-and-brake confusion. Yet, the cars also had mechanical, electrical and software defects that could and did cause UA.
> In an attempt to hide these defects from investigators, Toyota switched to verbal communication on the defect rather than traceable forms of communication. As a result, many new cars were knowingly produced with the same floor mat issues that had been identified as being having the potential to cause SUA problems in association with the defective pedal design.
> ... on March 19, 2014, the DOJ issued a deferred prosecution agreement with a $1.2 billion criminal penalty for issuing misleading and deceptive statements to its consumers and federal regulators, as well as hiding another cause of unintended acceleration, the sticky pedal, from the NHTSA. This fine was separate from the $1.2 billion settlement of a class action suit ... ... Nearly 400 wrongful-death and personal injury cases were also privately settled by Toyota as a result of unintended acceleration.
Big car companies are generally aligned on this front. I don't get it, they're developing and delivering safety critical systems. Why does it take hundreds of incidents before corrective action is taken?
I prefer the NTSB approach (shared by most countries aviation safety councils): Every major incident is investigated to ensure lessons are learned so it isn't repeated.
Unfortunate how low the bar is to be allowed to operate a motor death machine. On average the cause is "driver error".