The Logical Writings of Karl Popper
link.springer.com
link.springer.com
While I also advocate a more realist/Bohm-like theory above standard statistical "interpretations", I would differ with Popper in that I find the principle of non-locality to be just fine indeed. My own "theory of everything" operates under the assumption that the fundamental objects of reality are universally defined (ie, over the entire mathematical domain that cosmologists call "the universe"). The big question then becomes how such spread out objects can appear to us a tiny things like hydrogen atoms and electrons. I think the geometric paradigm of Conformal Field Theory is the way to think about that question. Things start entering into the domain of String Theory at that point.
Open Society to me read mostly like a critique of the political philosophy of Plato, Hegel and Marx, with brief mentions of what the open society is actually supposed to be (I recall some mentions of social engineering and other such things). At best it felt like a grounding for the currently dominant neo-liberal social order.
The Logic... on the other hand does seem to bring novel content, but I feel the core of his endeavor is hopeless. Science definitely doesn't and can't work in a perfectly coherent algorithmic way. Science is a human social process that can't be subjected to a strict methodology. On this front I think Lakatos or even Kuhn are much closer to how things can/do work.
He wrote it at a time when fascism and communism were tearing Europe apart and butchering millions. "Neo-liberal" social order was not at all dominant at that time.
I meant our current time, not the time of the book's writing.
Continental philosophy eschews formal logic and focuses more on literature and the arts as the source of philosophical truth. Some insights from Emmanuel Kant are used to justify this ([1]). Can someone explain this stance better than [1] does?
While there has been a great deal of sympathetic interest among analytic philosophers in the idea that philosophy should be continuous in method and subject-matter with the natural sciences -- what is commonly referred to as "positivism" -- Continental philosophy has generally dismissed such ideas as no more than a reversion to a pre-Kantian conception of the philosophical enterprise.
[1] - https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/contine...
For every content criterion that people have brought up to mark the difference between Analytical and Continental philosophy, one could usually find a prominent philosopher in either camp who match or does not match it:
Analytical philosophy: Formal logic? -- The early Wittgenstein is fond of it, but the late Wittgenstein moves away from it.
Analytical philosophy: Problems of philosophy as language problems? -- But Nietzsche and his fans (such as Mauthner).
Analytical philosophy: Importance of natural sciences for philosophy? -- But Cassirer.
Continental philosophy: Focus on hermeneutics? -- But Rorty.
Continental philosophy: Organic thinking (Hegel, etc.)? -- But Quine's holism.
Continental philosophy: Existentialism -- But many on the continent were not convinced. But many in the USA were interested. But Wittgensteins's mysticism.
...
On a personal note, I want to say that I drifted to continental philosophy in my undergrad after studying and appreciating formal logic. I realized that mainstream analytical philosophy had a lot less to do with logic than I had imagined (no symbolization, no commonly agreed upon rules of deduction), and at a certain point the question of "why logic" presented itself. I haven't found many opportunities in my writing to use the more technical concepts of modality or nth-orders, let alone anything from category theory.
e: Replaced induction with deduction, a typo
Intuitionistic: Curry-Howard, Dependent Type Theory, formal methods.
Linear logic: Rust.
Learning Rust is far easier than groking some of his writings.