I'd love to see a similar effort at ensuring boot integrity for Linux, but way too many distros can't even handle Secure Boot with Nvidia/DKMS. Though even more practical features, one being (f)TPM-backed FDE, are very cumbersome and underutilised.
I'd love to see a similar effort at ensuring boot integrity for Linux, but way too many distros can't even handle Secure Boot with Nvidia/DKMS. Though even more practical features, one being (f)TPM-backed FDE, are very cumbersome and underutilised.
"Looking at the various firmware images we were able to obtain, we assess that the modifications may have been performed with an automated patcher. If so, it would follow that the attackers had prior access to the victim’s computer in order to extract, modify and overwrite the motherboard’s firmware. This could be achieved through a precursor malware implant already deployed on the computer or physical access"
While Secure Boot + BitLocker with TPM and PIN would have prevented an Evil Maid attack (at least would have triggered a PCR change and a Windows Recovery prompt), a preliminary infection (I understand by it a supply chain attack before it reaches the user for the first time, but maybe I'm extrapolating a bit what the report is saying) would have stayed undetected in most scenarios (depending on how Intel Boot Guard is configured).
Regarding the Linux part, ANSSI did a pretty great job with their CLIP OS implementation: https://docs.clip-os.org/clipos/boot_integrity.html, but it's really "for the masses" :(