Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem
acoup.blog
acoup.blog
So, having failed at a complicated, fast campaign, Russia has moved to a simpler form - bring up many troops and artillery and slowly pound the opposition into rubble. It's like WWI. That kind of war can go on for years if enough resources are available. It seems to be working for Russia.
"Working" to the extent a country with a GDP smaller than California's is in a war of attrition against NATO.
When we say the US lost the war in Vietnam, we obviously don’t mean the Viet Cong rolled tanks down Pennsylvania Avenue. The Mujahideen didn’t hold a giant missile parade in Red Square. For those groups, winning didn’t mean taking the enemy superpower’s capital, it just meant making the war costly enough for long enough that the enemy (who had far less skin in the game, it not being their country) gave up and went home.
For an occupying force, the victory condition is much more onerous—you must occupy a country (potentially far away) and pacify the local forces who have a lot of skin in the game and can make this whole ordeal very costly for you for a very long time even if they have no hope of being a threat to your homeland. And you must do this indefinitely. At some point it’s just not worth it.
Zelensky doesn’t need to hold a victory ball in the Grand Kremlin Palace, he just needs to make the war so costly, with no breakthrough in sight, that Russia can’t or won’t sustain it.
The better metric is how interested you are in pursuing a war for the length of time necessary--it's a lot harder to get people to care about a war halfway across the other world than it is when it's prime farmland just next door.
(Note that the author here also has a series that touches on this topic--the Fremen Mirage.)
Which every politician profits from. “The state will pay!” as said Macron, borrowing an additional 600bn until 2048.
More recently, the Levy and Campaign series[1] tries to seriously address the kind of pre-modern logistical problems that are discussed by the OP. You have to feed your troops, and can get food by hauling it with you (in which case you need to acquire the necessary transport) or by ravaging the local countryside (which has other side effects).
Generally speaking, there just aren't many pre-modern tabletop wargames (World War II is by far a more popular topic), and most of the ones that do exist are "tactical" games that deal only with single battles, and so bypass all the logistical issues.
This thread[2] on boardgamegeek may be of interest, there are probably other similar threads there, too.
[0]: https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgamefamily/80/series-operatio... [1]: https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgamefamily/72536/series-levy-... [2]: https://boardgamegeek.com/thread/2265815/games-about-logisti...
As per the linked article:
> Reviewer Luke Winkie pointed out that "If you and your group meets for three hours at a time, twice a month, you’d wrap up the campaign in about 20 years.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Campaign_for_North_Africa
https://web.archive.org/web/20220608080417/https://www.spiga...
Advanced Squad Leader has more pages of rules, especially when you add the campaign options.
Indeed, the game is a full time job.
The PC game takes some short cuts for ease of use (improvements to the base dropship the merc unit is using) and is assuming spares and consumables are readily available. It is covering the basic principals rather well so.
War is sad but it's funny that many of the things that I saw on Wargame are also happening on the Russia x Ukraine war. Like suicidal helo rushes, combats quickly protracting, bloody urban combats, advanced tanks being wrecked by cheap ATGM, artillery spam, counter-artillery duels and ammo reserves quickly running out. Though no game ever gets closer to the scale that is real war.
ISTR that the big strategic/operational tabletop games of the 1980s often had semi realistic depictions of at least the importance of logistic (at least supply); things like WWII European (or Pacific) Theater of Operations from SPI, Avalon Hill’s Empires in Arms (which I just learned has a still-actuvely-maintained official computer version), etc.
The logistic parts involve building and maintaining a strategic on-road/rail logistic network (that moves everything necessary for production too, not just food/fuel/ammo for the troops),
and a comparatively simplified, but still critical in success/failure, operational logistics range spreading outwards following terrain from the road and rail hexes. (Limited air supply is available too.)
https://www.wargamer.com/shadow-empire/review
A sillier video-review : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSHuHCrW4KE
Its predecessor, which I hear also has some of this and some kind of 4X mode :
http://armchairgeneral.com/advanced-tactics-gold-pc-game-rev...
(Also would explain why ShEmp still seems to be very WW2-like ?)
The logistics we're talking about concern the problem of having about a hundred or even a thousand times more soldiers move large distances away from their base, and avoid having them starve.
A couple of times I watched friends play a game that had been going on for a few years at that point. Some of the various charts were pinned to 4x8ft sheets of insulation board.
Essentially, this is where the code-breaking efforts of Bletchley Park had a major result. The reason that Rommel had such shortages of fuel, according to Yergin and other sources, was that Enigma intercepts allowed the Allies to destroy several critical fuel convoys, limiting Rommel's maneuverability:
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/egee120/node/242
> "General Rommel was committed to a war of movement and boldness. In addition to his talent for tactics, he could also improvise. One thing he could not do, however, was fake the fact that mobile warfare was absolutely dependent upon ample supplies of fuel. Fuel supplies had to be delivered along very long supply lines."
> "The grand strategy failed due to a number of reasons including, Allied attacks on German fuel supply lines, the fierce Russian resistance, and Allied code breakers. Clearly, the bitter lesson learned by Rommel is illustrated by his statement, "The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to haul them around."
In particular see: https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/29/archives/the-ultrasecret-...
> "During the campaigns in North Africa, Ultra kept Gen. B. L. Montgomery informed fairly exactly of Gen. Erwin Rommel's order of battle and, in some cases, of his plans. It also enabled the British to know when supply ships would sail from Italy - and to sink them, thus eventually starving Rommel of vital fuel."
My grandfather was shipped into North Africa after Rommel's defeat as part of the US Navy SeaBees construction battalion, to prepare for the Allied invasion via Italy. Ever since I learned about this, I've wondered whether without those Enigma intercepts and those sunked fuel tankers, how things might have turned out.
I’m worried for Europe. Russia will lack a lot of things, but it’s a race on natural resources.
And the Mid to North African pipeline projects will be supercharged now, but how long will they take ?
(At least, the first German methane vaporization terminal should be up and running this winter ?)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32052302
Finally, not «unlimited» - this shows yet again (and we knew this for nearly 70 years now), that it was foolish to rely medium-term on fossil fuels - only viable if your goal was medium-term survival as a polity against industrialized polities - and I have the suspicion that the oncoming decade of industrial recession and freezing will push public opinion even more towards short-, rather than long-term comfort and survival...
https://www.idlethumbs.net/3ma/episodes/empires-and-imperial...