Put better, I think the statement would be "There appears to be an entity, embedded within my body, which creates a sensation of subjective thought, and I infer from that, without a great deal of additional data, that others have that same kind of subjective thought, and further, that subjective thought likely demonstrates the existence of a brain which has agency and free will, which can be applied to attempt to understand the true nature of the universe in an objective way and to do so is not futile. But I also accept that my experience may be an entirely artificial experience, like a movie projected on a screen, or that my brain might not be capable of comprehending the objective nature of the universe, or that even the concept of 'I' in this entire statement may in fact be objectively meaningless."
This is the content of the second meditation. Because you can be deceived, you are a thinking thing. In other words: there is no meaningful sense in which the concept of "deception" could be applied to you, were you not a thing ("a thinking thing") that could be wrong about your sense-experience, the universe, even your sense of "I".
That's what makes it a philosophical statement. You of course don't have to agree with the truth-value of it, but it's not clear that you've deflated the status of the statement itself.
We're really not that far from building such a system and from what I can tell of several leading projects in this space, we should have a system that an expert human would have a hard time distinguishing from a real human (at least, in a video chat) in about 5-10 years minus 3 plus 50 years.
I actually accept your claim: I genuinely believe that it's possible that we'll create something that's indistinguishable from a Cartesian agent. But I'm not a Cartesian; I put much stronger restrictions on agency than Descartes does.
He begins by discarding all beliefs which depend on anything else in order to determine that which is both true and does not depend on any thing else for its truth value.
As the poster above posits, he eventually works towards what he argues is the only fundamental and tautological logical statement, cogito ergo sum.
He then attempts to demonstrate what else must be true using deductive logic stemming from that single axiom, with greater or lesser success.
I find the meditations interesting and compelling up to cogito ergo sum, and thereafter less so. It's clear like many modern western philosophers he has the aim of connecting his thinking in some way to the sensibilities of Christian theology. A fascinating rhetorical exercise but a less principled attempt at a priori reasoning. It seems like you agree with this last point.
> It's not a philosophical statement. Please define think, and am, first.
I imagine that whatever definitions were given for these they would involve other terms for which you would demand the definition, ad infinitum. If this is the criteria for a philosophical statement, then no such statement has ever or ever will be made.
Wittgenstein would nod his head in approval.
The jury is out on the Great Deceiver, but ELIZA effect is good fun
(Not original with me but it has been so long since I first saw this that I don’t remember the source. It was part of a longer dialog.)
And while my experience may be entirely artificial (that is, maybe I'm a brain in a vat being fed signals), I still must exist to be experiencing it.
I’m somewhat surprised this discussion got so philosophical in the first place. Sure we can question the nature of sentience and argue about its definition all we want, but the unsettling problem is that we can’t prove anything. As time goes on, we are only going to encounter more, definitely sentient, people who, like Lemoine, are absolutely convinced they are communicating with another sentient being (whether Lemoine is or is not acting faithfully here, in this instance, is besides the point). What do we do?