Notably, most of the attacks from Mordechai's lab describe low-bandwidth channels for deliberate data exfiltration. These attacks would only apply in unusual situations where an attacker can run arbitrary code on a machine, but the machine is isolated from the outside world. (Scenarios like Iranian nuclear facilities come to mind.)
And the range is VERY low for normal PC's that have had to pass EMC tests. For an all glass gamer RGB PC the things will be different.
Not with this - it’s a one way channel
So, in short, it only affects ineptly managed secure environments.
Yes.
> It's irrelevant to users who have intentionally enabled any kind of network communications on their computer
No, there are lots of use-cases at least for LAN communications.
> it's also irrelevant to users who have robust controls on what code is executing on their system, or who run untrusted code in an environment which isolates it from hardware (like a virtual machine).
No, it's relevant in those cases too, as part of a defense in depth strategy.
What I'm trying to get at here is that bizarre sidechannels like fan noise or SATA EMI are only relevant when the system administrator has thoroughly locked down all other possible channels of communication. If the system is connected to a wired network, it can communicate with other systems over that; if the network is connected to the Internet, even indirectly, there are probably ways to get data out through there. If the system has a WiFi card or Bluetooth adapter, that can be used to transmit data, even if there isn't an applicable network in range. Etc, etc.