> 1: Create a seed phrase with dices
You can do that but you'll need a way to generate the checksum for the seed phrase. A 24 words BIP39 seed contains 264 bits (24 x 11 bits): 256 bits for the seed and 8 bits for the checksum.
> There is not an easy way to check if the hardware wallet really has no internet connectivity.
Indeed but you can at least open / disassemble some of them easily (there are even docs by the manufacturers explaining how to verify that the hardware wallet's PCB looks legit).
Seed exfiltration, even without connectivity, is an issue too.
And some hardware wallets are extremely noisy and impossible to use totally offline (there are mandatory firmware upgrades and mandatory connectivity needed to install the "apps" that allow to sign transactions), so you have to trust the vendor.
> There is no way to check if the hardware wallet really uses the seed phrase to create the extended public key.
Yes there is. Use an airgapped/offline computer which has physically no network connectivity options (no wifi / no ethernet / no bluetooth / no nothing), no HDD, booted from, say, a live Linux CD with contains for example Ian Coleman's BIP39 tools. Then you enter your seed and verify that the extended public key / keys derived is the same as the one shown by your hardware wallet. Data exfiltration from such a computer is still technically possible but I wouldn't worry too much about it: you power that computer for a few minutes, turn it off, and you'll be fine.