The problem with that is that a single error in the fine grained mechanism anywhere in the entire system can quite easily cause complete system compromise. To achieve any safety guarantees requires achieving perfect safety guarantees across all arbitrary code in your entire deployed system. This is astronomically harder than ensuring safety guarantees using virtual memory protection where you only need to analyze the small trusted code base establishing the linear address space and do not need to be able to analyze or even understand arbitrary code to enforce safety and separation.
For that matter, fine grained permissions are a strict superset of the prevailing virtual memory paradigm as you can trivially model the existing coarse grained protection by just making the fine grained protection more coarse. So, if you can make a safe system using fine grained permissions then you can trivially create a safe system using coarse grained virtual memory protection. And, if you can do that then you can create a unhackable operating system right now using those techniques. So where is it?
Anybody who claims to be able to solve this problem should first start by demonstrating a mathematically proven unhackable operating system as that is strictly easier than what is being proposed. Until they do that, the entire idea is a total pipedream with respect to multi-tenant systems.