> From this it follows that I can create a computer model of a human brain, complete with all the cells, proteins, neurons, etc, and that human brain will be capable of any action (eg, the signals sent by neurons out of the brain) a real human brain is. There would be no way to discern between a real flesh and blood human brain and the simulated one by talking to it. Since a real human brain tells you that it's conscious and has internal experience, the simulated one must tell you the same.
> While the simulated human brain will tell you that it's conscious, it is of course not proof that it is.
I still agree with all of this. A simulated brain could give the appearance of consciousness while not being conscious. It would not have a private conscious inner life, but it could say things that make it look like it did.
> If thoughts and feelings are a thing that don't pass the computability test, but a simulated human brain doesn't have external behavior that differs from a flesh and blood human brain, then no, thoughts and feelings have no effect or even influence on your behavior. In such a case they are a mere passenger. Any effect they have would necessitate that the particles and fields within the brain suddenly behave in a way that violates our model of particles and fields.
I am struggling to follow your point here. Thoughts and feelings are internal experiences which correlate with phenomenal consciousness and are absent in a simulation. Could you give me an example of the effect you are describing and how that would violate our current models?