No Army? No Problem: Defending the Home Front in Ancient Greece
historytoday.com
historytoday.com
Here's one I found: http://demonax.info/doku.php?id=text:how_to_survive_under_si...
I especially liked his guidelines and best practices for passwords usage and a kind of early form of 2FA.
It will only cost you a few thousand dollars per hour.
But it's worth it. Who knows, you might even face retroactive jail time in ancient Greece for such infringement...
In mid-fourth century BCE, was writing a book really sharing with the general public? They had no printing press. How many would read a book? Who was it really written for?
Books were very precious. A 5th century monthly salary of a scribe was enough to buy a house.
Yet, 99%+ of written data from Greece, and Rome is lost. We lost both archival data, and literature. First to rot, second to book burning.
Literature was state sponsored for most of classical period, and "casual" writing all about propagating Greek culture to "not-so-Greeks" (Thracians, North Africans)
Literature was subsidised not so much for elites, but to create more elites
Luddites, and book burners are your typical strongman elite who rule by swinging a club.
Were Luddites pro-elite, or anti-elite? Factory technology was definitely something both hated, and intentionally propagated.
Violent conflicts were fought by different stacking frame manufacturers for making them cheaper, and more efficient than one other.
Similarly Saddam attacked Kuwait on the premise of selling oil cheap, and diluting his power.
Knowledge, sophistication, and culture was an alternative to "eliteness" given by having the biggest stick around.
What Greek, and Roman elites realised naturally 2000 years ago, and what we do not now is that knowledge, and culture were power, and that power must be prevented from being monopolised.
Scholars, historians, artisans, and scribes were patronised by the state to prevent "eliteness" being monopolised by clans, and powerful families.
A good way to prevent a man with the biggest stick from seizing power is to give more sticks to other people. And similarly "cultural eliteness" was kept accessible to foreign gentry to drag them into Greek society, so they don't try to reach "elitness" by swinging the stick.
Today, we talk about "information bubbles", but it seems the effect is that we've simply carved up this imaginary space into little city states so that two people of the same age from the same town can disagree on who won the last presidential election.
> most people uninterested in history
No need to denigrate people who don't know some things that you do! Thanks for sharing it.
Not the worst insult ever, but why even go to the place of presuming things about other people? Still, I hope I expressed my objection proportionally to the comment; sorry if I didn't.
https://acoup.blog/2019/09/20/collections-this-isnt-sparta-p...
That straight wins/losses analysis leaves something wanting. Which were defensive battles and which were offensive ones? Could their reputation have prevented defensive battles which they would have otherwise subsequently won? And maybe more important, if it would have prevented battles they would have lost. The "If" reply being of course the famous example.
It also doesn't really make much sense to say that Sparta's reliance on its elite core lead to its eventual subordination to Macedonia. Macedon under Philip and Alexander was also built around an elite core -- the Companion Cavalry supported by the sarissa-armed infantry, which were relatively lightly armored compared to traditional Athenian/Spartan heavy infantry. It also doesn't really make that much sense to try to draw clear ethical distinctions between the Macedonians and the Spartans. One of the most common lines to read in the Campaigns of Alexander is "all the men remaining in the city were killed, and then the women and children were sold into slavery."
What's clear is that Spartans gained the reputation for having the most elite heavy infantry during the time period, at the time when heavy infantry proved to be the most important type of fighter on land. Then, in a generation or two, elite heavy infantry became a lot less important, and Sparta had demographic difficulties in replenishing its numbers, particularly of its core elite fighters. Light infantry with significantly less training became more important, as did light cavalry (no stirrups invented yet). Naval fighting became a lot more important also. So, what they were the best at became of decreasing relevance, and also their intensive training methods abetted by extreme social stratification didn't scale to the intensity of the conflict during the Peloponnesian War. To win, they had to make a bunch of massive adaptations and ally with the Persians.
It should be noted that, when you compare the descriptions of Spartan military education with modern studies of child soldiers, you realize that's exactly what Sparta was: a society of child soldiers. It's the same procedures of indoctrination and ritual initiation. You want to extol their military life, go to the Lord's Resistance Army or similar counterparts today.
Strip away the romanticism of Sparta, and you're left with a slave society whose military is based on child soldiers that struggles to fight battles next door, which is curb-stomped by next major military force to sweep in (the Macedonians), produced nothing of note in lasting cultural artifacts... but has the best publicists of the ancient world!
This is a very figurative claim, yes? It seems untrue otherwise. I've never heard of Sparta having a propaganda organization, least of all an outward facing one. Obviously their social structure indoctrinated their own into itself, but that's not the same thing as having a PR agency. As far as I'm aware, everything known/believed about the Spartans today comes from people who weren't Spartans, like Xenophon and Plutarch. The Spartans didn't write about themselves, or if they did, those writings didn't survive.
The rare first hand accounts seem most suspect of them all; Julius Caesar's [ghostwritten?] Commentaries on the Gallic Wars is flagrant propaganda. PR in the truest sense possible.
On the other hand you have Scipio Africanus, who like Julius Caesar has a reputation for being one of the greatest generals ever. But anything he wrote about himself is long gone; his reputation was built by other people writing about what they think he said or did. The archeological record (the 'actual historical record'?) backs up some basic facts about the Second Punic War, but doesn't say much specifically about Scipio Africanus.
Which ancient men with lofty reputations can be said to have their reputations without "PR"?
[EDIT] Now that I think about it, it's got some parallels with some American and British elites' infatuation with Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, at least until the wars started and/or the news of atrocities became irrefutable (and sometimes, even after that)
Yes, that's my take as well. Xenophon particularly stands out in this regard. Xenophon's laconophilia was the result of his personal experience with the Spartans, not the product of Spartan propaganda.
> Now that I think about it, it's got some parallels with some American and British elites' infatuation with Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia
Some parallels, however there is ample evidence that Nazi Germany did have an aggressive propaganda campaign (the Spartans may have, but there's no evidence for it.) The degree to which American/British nazi sympathizers were influenced by Nazi produced propaganda rather than their personal experiences with nazis is hard to ascertain. I think it was probably a mix of both.
Now it's just a little blue passport book.
That's interesting because:
- it's not good to go to war OUTSIDE country borders
- power are balanced: the State can count (perhaps) on army, but if it goes against the people they are trained and armed, with less heavy weapons, but much bigger numbers
The last missing parts is ERASING military-industrial complex or having weapons ONLY built by the State in State-owned factories out of State-only research, with conscription for manufacturing industries IF we need to scale for a war, but ONLY in this case and ONLY in emergency mode.
These are the basic tools to maintain a Democracy avoid dangerous shifts.
Then the displaced farmers revolted (this is why the war is sometimes blamed on climate change), then the Libyans came, then ISIS and Russia and the whole mess we see today.
Though I do see your point, many people like to cherry-pick parts of conflicts that serve their worldview and ignore other parts, so it may appear to you that was what I did as well. Both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict love to discuss certain events and limit the discussion to only those periods during which their favoured side was "right".
So that was in fact not my intention. You are invited and welcome to mention the Western factors that you see relevant.
While I won't deny the Russian or ISIS involvement, the US was also always involved.
Oh, and you conveniently ignore Russian factor too - they were the ones targeting hospitals and ranking up civilian causalities as a strategy.
Nah.
Gaddafi, we enforced no fly zones and called on NATO to help the the Muslim brotherhood oust Gaddafi. In WikiLeaks cables, Clinton bragged about taking out Gaddafi, as well as in public, and Blumenthal even discussed investing in an arms company in order to profit from the conflict.
In Syria, we watched no fly zones being established that protected ISIS, while ISIS was condemned publicly by the same politicians that protected them. Then the CIA sent arms to "moderate rebels" that were simply rebranded IS groups. Some of those groups, after receiving arms, went public with their allegiance to IS.
Don't forget Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, another group that the US had a heavy hand in creating in order to creating.
And we've done stuff like this on every single continent. Patrice Lumumba got too friendly with the Russians and communism. Haven't even gotten to South America.
And I'm someone that would consider themselves very anti communist, but I can acknowledge that the US has been involved in some incredibly destructive behind the scenes foreign policy. This stuff isn't really disputed.
BUT they know being unite is needed and they choose carefully to distribute power around groups to make hard one being able to rule others or some unite against others and they choose a language no-one use (Latin) as a good symbol of "we are unite, but we are all different and together"...
IMVHO this model is not accepted by most countries is because anyone like or dream power and in this model there is no absolute power by anyone so any decision need to be discussed and lobby can't do that much. Oh, it's not perfect, we see recent schizophrenic referendums rows, sure Swiss is not poor anymore, the poorest mercenaries of big European powers of the past, so they can count on being a safe harbor for anyone else etc. BUT try to compare Swiss to Lebanon (the ex-Middle-est Swiss almost anybody forgot)...
One is founded on libertarian ideals. The other one is founded on state-mandated pluricultural sectarianism.
In switzerland, plurality is represented via multiple presidents and they can represent any canton.
In lebanon, plurality is state-mandated: must have a president that is of X religion. A prime minister of Y religion. This is "representative".
The swiss has very strong traditions on union out of necessity (to face external threat).
Lebanon has no tradition of unity, it is a state unified effectively out of fear (and a bastard child of french palestinian mandate).
The swiss culture of unity is long: they worked 800+ years to establish their union and it was carefully balanced over many iterations of conflict, even internal ones.
Lebanese culture of unity is very weak. They basically were friendly with all neighbors seeking to influence internal policy. For example, all public works depend on a sponsor (saudi, qatar etc), to fund the project. Money buys influence. Imagine if FL depended on Venezuelan treasure to build roads. Very weak internal unity.
Lebanon was only the switzerland of the middle east because it was the most free of countries in the region. But the regional bar is very low. As it turns out, that only gets you so far.
And time ran out for lebanon... a while back:
When? I think Black september sealed the fate of lebanon. They had no internal unity to reject the palestinian refugees like Jordan did (via authoritarian methods). That permanently and irrevocably set them on the path they are today.
In summary, calling lebanon the switzerland of the middle east is a romantic idea for the lebanese that lived thru a somewhat prosperous but short time period of 15 or so years. Nothing suggested it could be long lasting. It was always an empty vessel. A student that cheats on every exam, will eventually get caught.
The rest as they say, is history
> They basically were friendly with all neighbors seeking to influence
> internal policy. For example, all public works depend on a
> sponsor (saudi, qatar etc), to fund the project.
I had no idea! Was this because they were unable to collect taxes from the populace? Where could I read more. > When? I think Black september sealed the fate of lebanon. They had no internal
> unity to reject the palestinian refugees like Jordan did (via authoritarian methods).
Was there no way to handle the palestinian refugees without authoritarian methods? Honest naive question, most people who voice an opinion on the subject seem to have extremely one-sided and narrow viewpoints, your comment demonstrates otherwise. I would appreciate a candid opinion from someone who sees the larger picture.I don't know where this practice comes from or how long has it been around.
I do know however the public works bidding is a cartel, and there is so much corruption at all levels, from deputies to private enterprise, that it would make Brazil's petrobras corruption scandal (lava jato) look minor in comparison.
>>>>Was there no way to handle the palestinian refugees without authoritarian methods?
Im not sure. Displaced populations had to go live somewhere. The palestinian issue is rare because they were forced to leave, which is atypical for "total war" conflict.
In total war conflicts, the result is winner takes land with resources, and loser state is (a) integrated into larger empire, with either assimilation, or massive civilian casualties, or (b) else loser state is left with minor pop and land.
With Palestine, there was no leftover "loser" state, there were no resources changing hands, and no civilian wipeout.
I dont know of any democratic country succesfully managing refugees at that scale. Total war is not rare historically, what is rare is democratic states existing at the time total war was still prevalent.
The question is interesting. Id like to give it more thought.
That being said, history tends to put everyone in their place. Jordan may still implode due to royal malfeasance, but lebanon already did.
> Im not sure. Displaced populations had to go live somewhere.
This is the crux of the issue. Jordan was a strong nation that was able to protect its national identity and existing citizens by subjugating the refugees. Even today, two out of every three people in Jordan are descendants of those displaced in 1948-1949. We might not like what Jordan did to those people, but protecting its citizens is quite the major function of government, is it not?Of course I am referring to the period up until 1967. The PLO actions after 1967 changed the dynamics of the situation and any rubric for judging policy in the period before that year is not valid for judging policy in the period after that year.
That is one if the ongoing big questions worldwide, isn't it?
The EU solves it by paying Erdogan and co. to do most of the dirty work of keeping them away.
There is no nice way, to turn someone desperate away. You can either integrate them well, or you push them out.
Or you can work towards solutions, that bring prosperity to the poor, exploited areas of the world. Ending wars would be a good start.
> You can either integrate them well, or you push them out.
But what is "integration" when for every one of _your_ citizens, _two_ refugees are coming. At that scale one is not integrating the refugees, rather, one is simply giving the country to the refugees.Of course, those refugees had to go live _somewhere_. The Egyptians rounded them up into Gaza, stuffing 250,000 people into land that could support 60,000 and already had over 100,000. That is why there are no real refugee camps in Egypt today, and why Egypt refused to take Gaza back after 1956.
Actually I will take a stab at the question.
I think Switzerland is a decent example of how to handle refugees while still remaining a free country.
In fact, Switzerland offers a glimpse of a solution: the suisse model of citizenship the municipal level.
In Switzerland, each canton makes its own rules for naturalization. Some cantons have adhoc policies, and refuse granting citizenship for almost any reason. [1].
Now, expand that thesis: - if cantons also had sovereign control of their borders (which they did, during the old confederacy) they could manage refugee crisis while retaining democratic ideals.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/sw...
Being able to turn away _all_ refugees is a luxury that some non-Mediterranean European countries have because there is a buffer state before the refuge is actually on your land. But when the refugees are flooding over your border at the rate of 2 refugees for every 1 of your citizens, how effective such a policy in practice?
Historically, there was a 3rd and even 4th option. Both are extremely antihuman (genocide, slavery) but they were options nonetheless.
And personally I like the swiss approach, too.
I do not prize Swiss at a whole, I'm talking just in terms of defense and Democracy...
https://www.weeportal-lb.org/news/lebanon-imports-85-its-foo...
or
https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/lebanon/2022/03/11/leba...
https://asiatimes.com/2022/01/russia-ukraine-war-could-cause...
I suppose they have big water issues due to constant droughts and bad irrigation systems, perhaps hyper-dense population and constant war-alike status also impact much but...
And do not undervalue the energy part, pumps for instance can run on p.v. but most tractors, farm equipment run on diesel, witch is not produced locally and cost money. Food supply chain/transformation industry need energy, sometimes in important quantities to keep foods cold or to lyophilize them etc.
Energy does not make foods alone, but it's an important piece of the game.
In fact, I did not consider the energy part. I am aware that much Lebanese agriculture, at least in the south, is still very manual.
Switzerland is not even really trying to defend itself. The chief reason it’s safe is because it’s surrounded by countries with an actual army. They rely on France for part of their air defence.
Phalanxes are the kind of thing where a break in coordination by any one man results you all getting rekt. The conflict between the Greeks and the Persians is a pretty good example of what happens when you have specialized men against a much larger force of levied up men of dubious quality. The Greeks won.
[0] https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/26815-no-more-office-hour...
The fallacy here is that conscripts == infantry, when frontline troops account for a minority of the whole force. Sweden had to overturn their decision to abolish conscription in less than a decade.
Mandatory bunkers and scattered cornerstones are not mandatory anymore either, but still shelters must be provided by the public, mandatory long-lasting food supply are there etc
Mined roads are far less mined than before, but still there. So I think Swiss STILL care it's defense. Also my point is about protecting against foreign invasions instead of build armies to invade other countries because that's the point of peace.
If we want peace dialogue is mandatory and a good weapon aside help well, si vis pacem para bellum, BUT being MUCH more able to defend instead of offend is a good stability key.
Long-running conscription could work with advanced tech. Not 1-year-to-train-and-then-back-to-civilian-life. But train-and-then-keep-training-till-40+.
This model works if you've got Team America: World Police keeping sea lanes of communication open and other things that require power projection. If Team America isn't doing it, someone else will step in. Like China.
You can purchase your militia firearm after your service has ended but it must be converted to semi-automatic and you have to apply for a permit - a semi-automatic firearm would fall under the "may-issue" permits which requires justification for why you need said firearm, and it seems that ammunition falls under the same rules. It'd be great if a Swiss person could chime in since I don't know anything more than what I've gleaned from this article.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firearms_regulation_in_Switzer...
"Until now, hundreds of key roads and bridges across Switzerland have held stores of explosives for use in the event of invasion. The policy was developed during the Cold War, because of fears of an attack by Warsaw Pact countries, eight communist states of Central and Eastern Europe." [1]https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/cold-war-defence_army-to-find-a...
Sometimes, your ability to have gun is dependent also on you finishing the service - tho I think that is mostly to stop people from dodging the draft. (In Iran, you are not allowed to have passport without military service. They can deny you driver's license too.)
Edit: Spelling