> The syncing of passkeys in iCloud solves this backup problem.
But then apple has your keys....
But then apple has your keys....
https://www.howtogeek.com/710509/apples-imessage-is-secure.....
> [1]For Messages in iCloud, if you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your messages. This ensures you can recover your messages if you lose access to your Keychain and your trusted devices. When you turn off iCloud Backup, a new key is generated on your device to protect future messages and isn't stored by Apple.
> If you forget your password or device passcode, iCloud Data Recovery Service can help you decrypt your data so you can regain access to your photos, notes, documents, device backups, and more. Data types that are protected by end-to-end encryption—such as your Keychain, Messages, Screen Time, and Health data—are not accessible via iCloud Data Recovery Service. Your device passcodes, which only you know, are required to decrypt and access them. Only you can access this information, and only on devices where you're signed in to iCloud.
In particular, Apple has HSM servers outside their hosting environment for auditable release of encrypted backups. This could be done for a support request for a lost user password or as part of a legal demand (say, family of the deceased seeking access to photo history, or requested by law enforcement with a court order).
The passkeys system uses iCloud Keychain, which is a separate mechanism and is encrypted before being sent to Apple using user-device-private keys. You should need to both get iCloud access _and_ provision a device into the "ring" before you can access passwords or passkeys.
Introduction to Apple security assurance
As part of our commitment to security, Apple regularly engages with third-party organizations to certify and attest to the security of Apple’s hardware, software, and services. These internationally recognized organizations provide Apple with certifications that align with each major operating system release. …
I can't think of any entity I would trust with securing truly sensitive information. For important stuff, do it yourself. For simple things, including bank accounts and such, I see no issue with trusting Apple.
I don’t know I buy the “for truly sensitive stuff do it yourself” line. That’s like saying for the truly lethal substances handle them yourself. Most people aren’t more skilled than the apple security folks. You’re almost certainly going to screw up your encryption or leave some vulnerability unpatched or unknown. Frankly I consider my iOS devices to be some of the most secure systems I have access to, and reading through their security documentation has informed that opinion.
The cynical view, of course, is that Apple's incentive and the Third Party's incentive can become very much aligned for the right amount of money.
> E2EE
If you can lose all your existing devices, and can still restore your data, then that data isn't end to end encrypted.
I'm taking the "end" in e2ee to mean your devices. Nothing but your devices can decrypt your e2ee prospected data. If a new device can enter the circle of trust without an existing device's corporation then there is a backdoor.
I imagine icloud keychain supports synchronization rather than backup
Also, ideally, your syncing passkey solution (whether that be 1password or iCloud Keychain) would itself be a combination of multiple factors before you can get in - in the case of iCloud Keychain, 2fa is on by default on your Apple account, and the keychain is also protected by your password plus the passcode of one of your devices. In general this is already immensely more secure than passwords because the website is verifying a signature instead of the correctness of a shared secret. So, it'd still be possible to have 2fa with the first factor being passkey and the second factor perhaps being another physical security key or maybe verification of an email code, but that would likely be reserved to enterprises and high-security applications.
(I assume Apple themselves aren't going passwordless themselves anytime soon, especially with how that'd work on fresh devices).
This is more abstract than physical possession of a single device with a non-exfiltratable private key. There are synchronization processes (so its one of many physical devices, on a sync fabric which allows devices to be added).
The process for adding a device should require multiple factors as well, but I believe there ultimately is a typically a recovery mechanism like a printed recovery key which would make this considered single-factor.
However, most deployed 2FA is via SMS, email, or backed-up TOTP today. The goal is to build a much more secure system that is recoverable enough to get consumer adoption, not to try to achieve say NIST 800-63 AAL3.
One ongoing proposal is that you get an additional device-bound factor as well. Seeing a new device-bound factor would let you decide to do additional user verification checks if desired.
You can disable iCloud Backups and still use iCloud
What's sort of surprising to me is how much they overestimated public support for their cause.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
But I imagine the FBU wouldn't like an end-to-end encrypted iCloud Photos at all.
If I lost access to my passwords (E2E encrypted), it would be an inconvenience.
There are plenty of non-LE use cases, such as people who need to recover access after a lost password, as well as families who want access to a deceased family member's information after the fact.
Apple has been (slowly) adding support for other recovery systems and for legacy contacts as first-class features. The UX for this currently lists Apple as a fixed option among a list of other options (such as personal contacts).
I expect long-term that Apple will have access to backup recovery for a number of people as a system default, but not for everyone.
iMessage itself is pretty slick but if I want privacy, I use Signal. It also gives me a crossplatform messenger as I prefer Windows and iOS.
Same as with Microsoft Edge. It's my favorite browser now, but I do give up a bit of privacy for convenience. If I want the best privacy I use Tor Browser. Which I always keep installed with Signal.