The Food Bubble (2010)
theglobalrealm.com
theglobalrealm.com
1) Large institutional long investments in a certain type of wheat future (Chicago soft red winter) started crowding out the real customers of physical wheat, such as bakers.
2) Because wheat varieties are moderately fungible/exchangeable, the downstream bakers started to use a different brand of wheat (Minneapolis hard red spring) and changed their recipes accordingly.
3) This second class of wheat is very widely consumed, and bidding up its price caused riots and food shortages around the world (or so the reporter states. He didn't provide specific examples, as this predates the Arab Spring).
The overall effect is if a particular food staple suddenly became a fashion item, with wealthy people buying it off the market for non-dietary purposes at such a rate that poor people could not afford it.
However, the key bit I don't understand, and which the reporter doesn't explain, is how commodity fund investors didn't lose their shirts by betting on wheat to keep going up. If they did lose their shirts then this bubble is unlikely to repeat in the near future.
From another article I'd read before (which I linked to down below, and which is gone now), the funds made quite a bit of money in the rollovers by charging a fee to every investor who wanted to roll it over. Since none of their investors actually wanted a dump truck of grain showing up in their driveway, and since the price kept going up and up and up, they paid the fee to roll it over each time.
Somebody probably did lose their shirts, but it sure wasn't the funds, and the funds won't have any trouble doing this again, because there will always be more customers eager to park money somewhere to make more money.
Is there really any confusion as to who lost their shirts?
What happened whe the Soviet Union gained control of the Sahara desert? For five years, nothing, then a shortage of sand.
It seems we can replace Soviet Union in such jokes with Investment vehicles.
A free market means a free market. When one monolithic organization with access to controlling capital makes its goal not to preserve the freedom of the market, but to extract value from the rest of the market for itself and its shareholders, that's not a market. That's a centrally planned economy.
The bankers have turned Communist oligarchs in all but name.
Nope, just a regular capitalist enterprise
Get outta here with that.
Then you can ride away on your unicorn.
The western world doesn't have food monopolies. The 2nd world occasionally does, but they're created by their govts.
Of course, it doesn't help that the US govt decided to raise corn prices by subsidizing corn ethanol.
I'm against payments to farmers other than by folks voluntarily buying said farmer's output. That's a special case of a more general rule that applies to every work product.
So I'm against "pays farmers to grow one thing" if it isn't money paid by folks who want and get said thing in exchange for said payment.
That's the only difference; in neither case do the people who wind up actually eating the food, i.e. everyone else, have a choice what to pay.
You're trying to draw this distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" payments which doesn't exist in the real world. I guess taxes are supposed to be involuntary, while food purchases are voluntary? Except that in the real world, if you don't buy food you die, and when one group of people who know they will never be hungry have the power to raise food prices across the board... That's a very twisted idea of "voluntary."
That's because, as I pointed out, you didn't actually express a point to challenge. You blathered some vague description and an accusation.
Now that I can see what you were trying to say, the error is clear.
The "food investor" spends his money, not mine. If he's wrong, he loses his money. Moreover, the food investor doesn't stop someone else providing food. Govts do that all the time.
Moreover, govts tend to go all-in on their decisions - so the amount lost when they get it wrong is much larger. Investors aren't monolithic - some get it right, some get it wrong.
Yes, you need food, but unless govt gets involved, you have considerable choice about how to aquire it.
> Except that in the real world, if you don't buy food you die
Speak for yourself. The "square foot" folks have shown that it's possible to grow an amazing amount in a very small area. And yes, poor people have the time.
> when one group of people who know they will never be hungry have the power to raise food prices across the board
Govts are the only group with that power. If I don't like the prices from ADM, I can buy elsewhere. If I don't like the food prices set by govt, there is no "elsewhere".
For some reason I thought I read this article about how between 2005 and 2008 investment into grain futures pushed the price of real grain high enough that hundreds of millions of people across the world starved, while hundreds of millions of bushels of grain sat in silos, resulting in inflated food prices everywhere which still have not returned to what they should be, meaning people at the margins who starve every single day.
But I guess I must have imagined that. It's good to know only governments have that kind of power here in Bizarro World.
Starved? Exaggerate much?
What, exactly, kept them from buying something else instead?
> which still have not returned to what they should be
What is this price "that should be"?
If you think that wheat should be sold at a given price, what is stopping you from providing it at that price?
You're claiming that "investors" are buying grain for less and waiting for the price to go up. What stops you from buying at the same price that they buy and selling at a lower price than they demand?
Never mind that, though. If you are seriously trying to draw some kind of moral distinction between a child "literally" starving and a child who goes to sleep every night not having had enough to eat, having a little bit less every night... I don't say this a lot, but God damn you, sir.
The only organization that controls enough capital is govt.
The roiling agricultural commodity prices in the last decade were largely the result of dollar currency devaluation by the Federal Reserve. The same patterns occurred across other global commodities like copper and oil.
For one, there's debate over what actually drove up the price of wheat (http://www.economist.com/node/16432870?subjectid=2512631&...). The author glosses over or fails to acknowledge some of the major counterpoints.
He also seems to have a pretty superficial understanding of futures markets. For example, there's nothing inherently "hysterical" about contango (future prices higher than current prices). It's a perfectly natural state for many commodities (browse some prices on http://www.cmegroup.com). He also paints a pretty rosy picture of the history of futures markets, but people have complained about speculators causing wild price swings since the beginning, long before index funds came on the scene. And there's nothing new about the way index funds maintain their long positions. Speculators have always had the option of rolling their contracts forward.
Index funds have opened up investment opportunities for a lot of people. Imagine if you had to buy and maintain a server for every app you wanted to put on the web (this is like buying a futures contract directly). Now compare that to a VPS/shared server (this is like buying an index fund). Not a perfect analogy but pretty fitting.
Speaking generally, if people are investing foolishly (i.e. mispricing something) well then they're investing foolishly. This can happen in any market. They'll either adapt or get weeded out. What's the alternative? Does Big Brother or anyone else know what the "correct" price of something is at any point in time?
Perhaps I am not intellectual enough to appreciate the empathy hiding behind this analytical ruminating about the problem - but I wish that I got the impression that there was more reaction happening than "Wow, what an interesting phenomenon in the commodities market- how do all of these moving pieces fit together?"
To quote the sometimes poignant Jack Johnson: "Why don't the newscasters cry when they read about people who die? At least they could be decent enough to put just a tear in their eyes"
And those conversations have generally not gone very well.
So I've recently started giving up. HN is just not the place for that sort of thing. It's a place where the audience-participants want analysis, they want technical details, they prize expertise, and they can't discuss value unless there's a hard real-world number involved.
That's not altogether bad, but I do hope that somewhere there is a group of smart people who actually think about the real-life problems that other people have, and try to do something about it. If there is, I don't know of it yet.
The sort of community of which you speak does certainly sound like an exciting and powerful one. I hope that it exists, and I hope that it finds you - and maybe me.
That may not be through pushing a cause or donating to a charity, but by getting myself into a position of greater power and authority to make a real impact when I can make an impact.
I see articles like this as cards at my disposal, that I will refer back to when the time is right and the chance is there, to make a dent.
The sentiment seems to be that "we" need to somehow control these prices and markets, which has worked horribly in the past (and present).
The creation of the index isn't the problem. Wild speculation is. When you speculate the wrong way, you need to lose. But the precedent has been set --not only on the top level with the huge banks, but with main street citizens speculating on second homes and mortgages-- that the bet should be upside only.
It's not a coincidence that you're disturbed by the comments. Wall Street entrepreneurs and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are fundamentally very similar in mindset and outlook.
Entrepreneurs are trained to have a laser focus on their own issues and to look at everything in terms of dollar value.
Recently, it is becoming more clear to Silicon Valley entrepreneurs that short-term windfalls are preferable, so they try to pump up the speculative value of their companies and dump them before anything bad happens. Pumping and dumping your own Silicon Valley start up is surely one of the easiest ways to get very rich right now.
What if Silicon Valley discovered today that they were putting millions of low-skill Americans irreparably out of work. Would this motivate them to modify their libertarian ideology, or lobby for free educations for the poor?
SV Entrepreneur types, as a generalisation, are more like the farmers in this article selling there wares than the WS Bankers. Sure people are money obsessed but they do it either by being profitable or by selling equity in value creating businesses.
I think the Google slogan of "Don't be evil" is the best summation of the average tech entrepreneur these days, generally because they are smart respectable human beings. They are looking to solve a problem that exists, for people willing to pay.
Of course there are always bad apples.
There is nothing broken about demand and supply, only the steps in between are broken, which the financial institution's such as Goldman saps on.
I single out Hacker News as being psychologically different from normal software engineers. The focus on Hacker News is money, and many people here see profit as inherently virtuous. Social darwinism, eugenics, authoritarianism, and other extreme right political views are overrepresented on Hacker News, and given surprising amounts of leeway considering the swiftness with which other views are scrubbed away here.
Obviously these are healthy steps in the progression of some businesses, but at times it seems HN focuses on them to the exclusion of whether a startup actually contributes something worthwhile. It is probably arguable that those things represent a reasonable proxy for the value created (or expected to be created) by the business. Then again, there are plenty of funded (and acquired) business models which are based on cynical exploitation of the less-educated for the benefit of the business owner, at a net cost to society as a whole.
If an SV entrepreneur-type is more focused on getting funded or making an exit than creating net value to society, I think it is fair to draw ethical comparisons with the WS banker-type.
The whole GS franchise is built on their role as a go-between. Need hyphens? You might not understand the hyphen farmer's strange accent, but the merchant has been dealing with him for a long time.
The technical analysis I've seen here seems to hover around the question of why the investors were not automatically screwed. In a more efficient market the price collapse would have been obvious, the bubble would not have happened, and no one would have starved.
This doesn't directly address the inhumanity involved, but the analysis is important.
How many more people have to die needlessly before this theory is reexamined by those who practice it?
The reason people aren't reacting to human suffering is because we can see that it isn't a real factor in this story. We're talking about a small change in the world's supply of food here. It would be very difficult to image (or prove) that anyone actually died of starvation as a result of this. It's more like a loaf of bread that used to cost $4.50 now costs $6.00. That extra $1.50 can be enough to make an unpleasant life significantly less pleasant (believe me, I know), but I don't think it equates to the starving human beings.
tl;dr - Capitalism is a dick move. Don't blame the flaws in the system on the people who benefit from them.
What usually happens is a country at a large scale imports less subsidized food commodity, and this limits government distribution of that commodity -- they usually stop some feeding centers, which makes the marginal trip more difficult or impossible for some people.
It might also lead to scaled back or eliminated aid programs.
Your emoting and four bucks will buy a cup of coffee. It's not going to help anyone eat.
You have to understand what's going on before you can make things better. So yeah, how the "moving pieces fit together" matters more than how much anybody cares.
It takes both to take any meaningful, equitable, decisive action. Analysis without motivation leads us to scholarly indifference.
Your point is taken when it comes to empathy without logic.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/world/july-dec11/food_09...
More controversially, some blamed this on the Fed's inflationary QE2 policy (printing money), as food prices went up across the world in real terms. In the US this was an inconvenience, but abroad it was something else.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8492078/How-the...
Much like Paul, most actual people are genuinely shocked about this. It is one hell of a story. The general population does not understand how markets work.
Billions are hungry. The streets are full of protesters worldwide. Retirement funds are gone. Markets are failing. Countries are failing. These are humans, who just want to eat. And for what? To turn $100 million into $200 million?
This is not "how things work". This is not "what good bankers do". This is what greedy sociopaths do. It is reprehensible and disgusting. These people are malicious and should be in prison.
Second - it is how things work. Not just in commodities, but in everything Goldman's does. There is always an angle which greatly reduces risk. That angle might be insider trading, advanced statistics, or just a rigged market. Goldman's is doing nothing illegal that I am aware of or anyone can prove. ...it is just how things work.
We don't know how bad it's gotten. If you really think it's reprehensible, it's well past time you (and other insiders, not to single you out) spoke up.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american...
Then there is his other article, on why no one went to jail:
Over drinks at a bar on a dreary, snowy night in Washington this past month, a former Senate investigator laughed as he polished off his beer.
"Everything's fucked up, and nobody goes to jail," he said. "That's your whole story right there. Hell, you don't even have to write the rest of it. Just write that."
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-stre...
I worked in commodities and read the article. What happened?
Are you talking about the forced long money? Yeah, we and every hedge fund on the planet skimmed that pool. The dumb money doesn't move the market these days.
The fact that the bankers among us can't see anything odd about this, let alone shocking and disturbing, is still more food for thought for those of us who care to live through the winter.
This doesn't actually protect the buyer. Rather, the buyer was protected (for a while) by the continuing influx of new capital into commodity indices which led to a continuing rise in prices -- in other words, it was effectively a distributed Ponzi scheme.
I get the feeling that there's really only one bubble, but it moves from one sector of the economy to the next, leaving destruction in its wake, kind of like Bugs Bunny used to tear up the ground as he burrowed through it.
This seems like a nice insight, can anyone with financial experience comment on it?
I'm thinking maybe if you analysed it you'd find the same subset of traders following the bubble around.
> Then, like all speculative bubbles, the food bubble popped. By late 2008, the price of Minneapolis hard red spring had toppled back to normal levels, and trading volume quickly followed. Of course, the prices world consumers pay for food have not come down so fast, as manufacturers and retailers continue to make up for their own heavy losses.
The article still isn't clear (at least to me) on who took the losses for the speculators.
Though it raises some interesting ethical questions. Is it better to have the farmer subsidize the poor by not turning a profit, or is it better to have the farmer turn a profit (the goal of the business) at the cost of starvation of others?
Over the last few decades the real problem has been food is too cheap. First world governments are subsidizing food production to the point that a farmer trying to grow rice in southeast Asia can't compete with imported rice shipped from California. So that farmer moves to the city and gets a job making Nikes.
When there's some disruption in food production thousands of miles away all of the sudden people are starving because everybody is making shoes instead of growing food.
Investors who bought the Goldman products did eventually lose money, however not soon enough to stop millions of people from starving.
For me, the takeaway here is that tremendous wealth and power inequality creates conditions where the stupidity and inattention of a wealthy elite can easily cause the starvation, death, and suffering of the people they financially dominate.
This story has repeated over and over throughout history. Usually, it happens when a powerful person like a King or Emperor behaves irresponsibly and causes terrible suffering.
I'm reminded of Nero watching Rome burn or Stalin starving the Ukrainians.
Concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the few is a bad idea because their slightest indiscretion causes mass suffering.
http://www.google.com/finance?q=AMEX%3AGSG
There's a lot wrong with this story. I'm amazed that most people here are just eating it up. Compare to the reaction to science news: if an article claims that X causes Y but the data only shows a correlation but not causation, people will always point it out. Why not be a little more critical here too?
For instance, how do we know the commodity index prices caused an increase in the price of the actual commodities, or if something else caused the price increase and the commodity index price was merely reflecting it?
Other things the article gets wrong or doesn't explain:
* the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index is just an index (and it's not even owned by GS anymore, it's owned by S&P). It's not a fund. There are funds that track it, but just creating an index doesn't do much to the market.
* he says that bankers started making financial products out of food products in the early 1990s, only to contradict (and correct) himself later but without explaining that contradiction.
* "the bankers had figured out how to extract profit from the commodities market without taking on any of the risks they themselves had introduced by flooding that same market with long orders". This is exactly what every mutual fund manager does, whether it's stocks or commodities. There's nothing new here. The fund manager will only flood the market with orders to the extent that his clients are putting money into the fund.
* "By the time the normal buying season began, drought had hit Australia, floods had inundated northern Europe, and a vogue for biofuels had enticed U.S. farmers to grow less wheat and more corn". How in the world does that support the claim in the title? Droughts and floods decrease the supply, prices go up.
I'll stop here, but there's more data about this in the Economist:
http://www.economist.com/node/16432870?subjectid=2512631&...
Also, wasn't this on HN a while ago? Or did I see it somewhere else?
(Aside: this is one reason why I have so little trust in the web as a long-term historical medium.)
Although that article focused primarily on oil futures, it also discussed commodities futures, and specifically addressed the rollovers. Unfortunately, I neither understood it well enough at the time, nor remember it well enough now, to regurgitate it. Maybe someone else will come along with a cached copy.
You can't really drive up the price of an individual crop. If the price of one crop goes up, they all go up. There is only so much land, so if one crop looks to be more profitable, farmers will shift their growing plan to include more of that crop, leading to shortages of the other crops.
Given this article, if true, means that ethanol may have play little to no role in the commodity price increases. I remember at the time it was really only the mainstream media that jumped on ethanol. In the farming communities, investors were thought to be the source of the price increases even then.
Derivatives are actually incredibly useful tools in agriculture because they allow a farmer to embark on the long-term commitment of growing crops with the peace of mind that (s)he'll have guaranteed customers for the final product. This is why the MGEX has been running since 1883: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minneapolis_Grain_Exchange
Food bubble;
Commodity bubble, esp. the
Gold bubble;
Higher Education bubble, esp. the
Student loan bubble;
Health care bubble;
Tech bubble;
China bubble;
Developing world real estate bubble; and the
Luxury bubble.
I read an article in The Economist some time ago about speculative trading in oil markets. People were raising a ruckus about how it raised the costs of heating for the poor. Turned out that the evidence showing causation was extremely flimsy, and many other global trends were much better explanations.
I think burden of proof is on the article to make the case for causation, and I didn't see it (although I skimmed the second half).
At the end of a futures contract term, an actual delivery of physical product has to take place. "Rolling over" long futures contracts does not mean the holder can get out of physical delivery. Exchanges do not raise prices of physical products by themselves. They also provide valuable price signals for producers about expected future events.
Blaming speculators is easy, but a factually incorrect way to see the situation.
A world bank report written in July 2008 stated that "large increases in biofuels production in the United States and Europe are the main reason behind the steep rise in global food prices responsible for 70-75% of the price rise...with higher oil prices and a weak dollar explain 25–30% of total price rise."
It is a common theme these days to blame bankers and market participants for problems created by government policies. Market actors are agnostic. Governments set the rules of the game and should be the ones held accountable.
I think the whole point of this article sounds a bit ideologic. Also, again, no really good data to prove his point.
If you need food in 100 days, you can pay for the futures for that day, or in 100 days the actual spot price, whatever it turns out to be in 100 days. You generate demand for the futures or the actual commodity, not both. By acting early, well in advance, you could get a better price if the price is going to go up. Even if you have zero idea where the price is heading, by buying futures continually well in advance, you could smoothen out the volatility for yourself.
So, why would it make the problem worse?
Whereas if you sell future production into the market now, you realise gains from historically high prices, and hopefully make a profit.
But, if the governments were to short the futures right now, who's to say the price will not increase? It's a risk. If they can be sure, other entities can also be sure and make money doing the same.
But maybe your point is that by doing this they would avoid the transient price spike due to the indexes rolling over in the near months. Which might make sense, but that phenomenon was noticed by traders anyway and you would expect it to be smoothed out because of that.
So while I'm all for more regulations, I think we shouldn't demonize an entire sector without considering that some of what it does can and has be helpful.
It talks extensively about how the markets were set up for exactly this purpose, and that the balance of long and short positions for the futures kept the market relatively stable in exactly this way, until the relatively recent (1990s) influx of commodity indices pushed a whole bunch of money purely into long positions and destabilized the market by, effectively, buying far more futures contracts than there was actual wheat.
Edit: and buy not buying any short futures to counterbalance them.
The author of the article doesn't seem to understand that. He says:
> The managers of this new product would acquire and hold long positions, and nothing but long positions, on a range of commodities futures. They would not hedge their futures with the actual sale or purchase of real wheat (like a bona-fide hedger), nor would they cover their positions by buying low and selling high
But that is irrelevant since there were other market participants selling the futures. The author also fails to understand that rolling a contract implies covering your position at contract expiration and then buying another contract.
Perhaps it isn't in america, where you guys have even more ridiculous agricultural subsidies than we do in the EU.
The people responsible for this shit don't ever look at the prices of things at retail anyway.
Care you tell us your opinion of foraging? Also know as ...trespassing... now that almost every acre of land on earth is owned by someone.