Why do pilots still die from not knowing which end is up?
airspacemag.com
airspacemag.com
This statistic is the aviation equivalent of the "Bill Gates is going to give you $5" email forward.
The study was in 1954, not 2004, and the pilots that were tested had zero instrument time (at least three hours are required to get a license now). They were put into Beechcraft Bonanzas, aircraft that none of the test subjects had time in; Bonanzas aren't tough to fly but you definitely have to transition into them, especially if you're not used to planes with more horsepower than a Cessna 172...they get ahead of you way faster.
That said, if you're a VFR pilot and you knowingly proceed into Instrument Meteorological Conditions, you're probably in for some unpleasantness.
[1] http://aviatorcollege.wordpress.com/2010/06/25/why-is-the-“d...
http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/Jour...
While you are right that it is from 50 years earlier than stated, it seems like a solid study. No, it's not actually "life expectancy", but I was impressed on how well designed it was. It makes for sobering reading, but the conclusion is actually positive: with only six hours of direct experience training, they could teach people how to make a safe 180 degree turn with a high percentage of success.
They explain the choice of the Bonanza, saying it was the most complex plane that a non-professional pilot could be expected to fly. The emphasis of the study was that simple training could save lives, and thus they wanted a high bar. "In sort, the assumption was made that if the subjects, none of whom had soloed a Bonanza, could master the technique in this airplane, they could master it in any single-engine airplane under 3,000 pounds gross weight."
And it's not quite true that the pilots had zero instrument time at the time of test. The first lesson included a very small amount of time to familiarize themselves with the instruments, and were given a second try if they lost control within only a few seconds. How much of a difference this is from the current 3 hours, and how far short of the recommended 6, seems worthy of discussion and likely a more modern study.
It is, provided that context is given when statistics from the paper are mentioned...which rarely happens.
To fly a Bonanza you have to have a private pilot's license, a high performance endorsement (required to fly anything with HP > 200), and a complex endorsement (required to fly anything with a constant speed prop, flaps, and retractable gear). This takes some time...and good luck getting insurance coverage (the real factor in what you do/don't fly) if you don't have an instrument ticket.
Furthermore there's a world of difference between zero or a few minutes of instrument experience and three hours. I don't have any study to back this up but I'm a pilot and can tell you from experience that the first time you go on full instruments it's sheer sensory overload. Three hours doesn't prepare you to do a decoupled IFR approach or anything, but it give you enough to do a 180.
Here's another important factor about the study that never gets mentioned: in the study the attitude indicator (artificial horizon), heading indicator, and vertical speed indicator were covered, simulating a partial failure of the vacuum system as well as a partial failure of the pitot/static system. No pilot is going to take off these instrument in failure, and should they fail in flight most pilots are getting down, now. I know I would be heading to the nearest field if I saw partial failure of both instrument systems.
So instead of saying "VFR pilots are toast in 178 seconds if they go into clouds" quotes should read more like, "if you happen to be Dr Sam Beckett and you find you've quantum lept into a Bonanza that has partial instrument system failures and you've flown into a cloud, you better hope Al can jump your ass back out within three minutes."
'Most noninstrument pilots can be placed in one of the three following categories: (1) the noninstrument pilot who knows he could not fly instruments and takes every precaution to avoid instrument weather; (2) the noninstrument pilot who "knows" he could not fly instruments, takes every precaution to avoid instrument weather, but believes his knowledge and experience would enable him, if caught, to fly out of instrument weather; (3) the noninstrument pilot who believes, primarily through ignorance of the problems involved, he could fly through instrument weather.'
Are you instrument rated? Have you taken further training beyond the requirements? What's your confidence that you could successfully perform a 180 degree turn out of cloud in the plane that you fly the most? Would you keep your hands on the controls or not?
in the study the attitude indicator (artificial horizon), heading indicator, and vertical speed indicator were covered, simulating a partial failure of the vacuum system as well as a partial failure of the pitot/static system.
Again, I think this makes sense in the context of the study. The goal wasn't to simulate failure, rather because those were (at least at the time) not required to be installed.
The interesting part to me about the study (I'm not a pilot, but have played with simulators such as XPlane and probably plan to get a license some day when I can afford the time and expense) is that none of the test pilots were able to perform a life saving maneuver when starting, and after 6 hours of direct training all were able to. And yet, oddly, this isn't (to my knowledge) part of the current pilot training. Why not?
Basically in order to get your PPL you have to not just be able to turn a 180 on instruments, but demonstrate some level of precision in other maneuvers...so I think that while the study demands six hours, the FAA has determined that the job can be done in three.
As to your questions for me: I'm not instrument rated. I've taken about two hours of instruction on instruments beyond the required 3.0, most of that time was on the flight were I got my high performance endorsement...in a Bonanza, coincidentally. I'm confident I could do an instrument-only 180 in the Piper Cherokee I fly most frequently because I've recently done instrument work in a more challenging aircraft. A month from now with no further instrument work I'd be significantly less confident.
Hands off the yoke? Probably not all the way, but I've been trained to keep a very light touch as anything more, at least in cruise flight, means you need to check your power/pitch settings (eg throttle/trim).
The completely "hands off" (the yoke) startled me. They concluded that this was the safest approach to teach: all turns with rudder, and a predetermined trim and power. Post instruction, they allowed pilots to try their own approach, and say that the two who tried to control oscillations with the yoke "realized almost at once [that this resulted in more extreme oscillations] and both subjects immediately released the yoke and continued through the remainder of the steps with 'Hands Off'."
Having just read Langewiesche's Stick and Rudder, with the emphasis that all turns should always be coordinated, I found this very surprising. The study suggested that the instructor use this explanation: "Bear in mind that this whole procedure is a 'gimmick' designed to save your life. If it is easier and safer for us to make a 'sloppy' turn in order to get the job done, then that is the best way under the circumstances."
You know, the hands off 180 definitely something I'm going to try next time I'm up with a CFI/I. Also if you get the opportunity in this life to learn to fly, do it. It's expensive as hell but it's also a very rewarding and fun challenge and is a great way to travel.
The Turn
At the very heart of winged flight lies the banked turn, a procedure
that by now seems so routine and familiar that airline passengers
appreciate neither its elegance and mystery nor its dangerously
delusive character. The author, a pilot, takes us up into the subject.
It was at this point, after autopilot turned off and they
worked to change their course, that a stall warning
sounded, meaning that the airplane wasn't generating enough
lift. The report notes the co-pilot grabbed the controls
and lifted the plane, which, according to aviation experts
is contrary to normal procedure during a stall, when the
nose should in fact be lowered.
I wonder what kind of hard limits do exist in the current avionics. For instance, is it possible to roll a Boeing/Airbus upside-down? If yes, why?
Sensors can lie, equipment can break. Your software may have no better idea of the true situation than the pilot.
In the end it is a judgment call and if you limit the ability of those judgment calls to a bunch of software then you are saying that those in a different time and place have a better idea of what to do than those with their feet in the dirt.
It looks like in this case someone made the wrong judgment call. False positives in warning systems in commercial aircraft are happening with some regularity, in the end the pilot has final say.
EDIT: You can down-vote, but this is already the direction that cars have gone. For example, there is no way to stop any Mercedes after 2009 from automatically applying full brakes in an impending collision.
http://www.daimler.com/dccom/0-5-1210220-1-1210348-1-0-0-121...
Studies in N-version programming (such as used in Airbus planes) show that software written by different teams often fail in the same corner cases (with differing outputs).
Eventually you might have software with "situational awareness" that can be trusted to make fewer mistakes than humans, but we're not there yet.
If you were to take this specific speed sensor issue, I'm more concerned there aren't different types of systems being used to try to cross-validate the numbers. The pitot-static system has its own backup on the plane, but if there is an inherent weakness of that particular system (e.g. ice), there is no other way to measure speed that is not susceptible to icing. Surely that particular problem is within our reach, no?
Perhaps GPS ground speed data with previous wind estimates could at least help with establishing that "something must be wrong with the airspeeds".
http://travel.usatoday.com/experts/cox/story/2011/05/Ask-the...
Something scary from a Boeing pilot in the comments:
Loss of all airspeed indications is not something we train
for. It's always assumed in transport category aircraft
that redundancies built in will always give us at least
attitude, heading, and airspeed.If your software is making the decisions, then the pilot can't make an educated response to unusual decisions. Big commercial aircraft are already largely run by software, but the pilot is there for unusual situations because there's often a lot of conflicting issues.
There's a lot I don't understand about AF447, like, why couldn't a simple GPS receiver have saved them? GPS does a relatively poor job at reporting altitude, and is obviously useless at reporting airspeed, but it's certainly capable of telling you that you've dropped 10,000 feet over the past minute or two. I can understand how pilots could become disoriented, such that they don't know "which end is up," but I can't fathom why they shouldn't even know whether they are climbing or descending, which apparently was part of the AF447 scenario.
Which is sad.
From your link: [quote]Brake Assist PLUS uses two radar systems. Both of these radar systems are very good at not only registering objects up ahead but also calculating the distance from these objects and their relative speed. If the distance between the vehicle and the registered object is so small that there is a real danger of collision, Brake Assist PLUS issues a visual warning on the instrument cluster display and sounds an alarm over the car speakers. While this is happening, the electronic system calculates the braking deceleration necessary to avert the collision. If the driver then hits the brakes, the braking pressure needed to bring the vehicle to a stop before impact is immediately provided automatically. Ensuring that an appropriate braking force is not exceeded gives those driving behind more time to react.[/quote]
A human would be quick to notice that the reason for why the car in front is braking is because of the impeding concrete wall. The computer however doesn't know that and would only brake in order to not hit the car in front and thus ensuring that both cars hit the concrete wall at equal speeds, great! (I truly hope that it respects my choice if I really wan't full brakes).
What if there are slippery conditions? The collision might easily be avoided by changing lanes but changing lanes in muddy snow while braking could be suicide. What if I just started changing lanes when the computer feels like it needs to brake?
What if the reason for why the air-speed indicator is malfunctioning (reporting wrong, a complete loss of velocity is too easy to check for) is because the plane just flew into a flock of birds, it might be obvious for a pilot why the stall-warning was issued and the pilot might opt to to pull back the stick - just to avoid an collision...
Unless the sensors truly get the whole picture and the complete state of the aircraft/car (and I doubt we can do that before being able to implement a true AI) the pilot/driver must always have the last word. Assistance can be great, especially in cases where a human wouldn't have the time to react but you should always be able to override it.
The assistance should be clear and specific enough so that the pilot/driver really thinks twice before overriding anything (this requires that the pilot/driver respects the system). And if the pilot/driver can't handle the vehicle despite that then he/she shouldn't be allowed to drive it.
Also:
The pilot may have no better idea of the true situation than your software.
All that matters in the and is not who is more awesome and versatile but who crashes less planes.
A very similar phenomenon is how the USAF crashes more drones than the Army since they use pilots that insist on flying them in manual, vs the Army operators that do not consider themselves pilot. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/04/29/young_usaf_predator_...
Commercial flight will become much safer when the persons in the cockpit will considere themselves plane operators vs pilots.
Pilots (and airlines) seem more than happy to turn flying over to the computers, in fact FAA and Airbus are concerned that modern pilots lack hand-flying skills due to over-automation. The AF447 crew did not have training in high altitude hand-flying, for instance.
Until you have a situationally aware computer that consistently beats humans in accident scenarios, we still have to trust humans to do the job, for better or worse.
The kind of damages to take down all systems will probably structurally impair flyability.
For example, in the case of Airbus airplanes, flying in normal law's flare mode provides protection against high angle of attack and bank angle protection.
However, when something bad happens, the plane is usually switched in alternate or direct law, based on the philosophy that the software can fail and the pilot is the only one able to see the big picture and compensate for possible faulty sensor data. It's all a question of who to trust in highly-tensed situations: is the pilot suffering from vertigo or it's just a matter of faulty sensor readings due to external ice build-up?
And if the software were to override pilot decisions, just think about liabilities in case something goes wrong, which is a Pandora's box for aircraft manufacturers.
In a stall you want to recover your speed asap , you dive and apply full throttle till you are able to level off with normal speed. Windshear usually happens when you encounter heavy wind changes on approach or take off, usually caused by heavy thunderstorms. Your speed will increase and then sudenly decrease to stall levels. It can very easily throw you to the ground.
As you are very low, the stablished procedure is to apply full throttle ( as in a stall) but PULL your controlls full up ( the software limits the nose up position to around 25 deg nose up in airbus models). You flight at the minimum speed ( airbus airplanes will not allow you to fly below that speed at least if you are at low altitude, a plane using both engines at go around power will climb). The point is that as they entered the thunderstom ( that previously was avoided by preceding airliners) and had that pitot icing, they reacted with a windshear procedure when it was unnecessary ( there is a procedure to flight without reliable speed indications just trusting your artificial horizont and thrust position for a given speed, they should have applied it in a perfect world[it is very easy to say what is the solution afterwards of course]).
At those altitudes the engines have no power left to perfor a windshear, so the speed started falling till they entered a deep stall. That stall was recoverable( this is a supposition) for lets say 2 minutes, but they still were aplying full up controlls thinking :why is this procedure that I have practiced thousand times in the simulator not working?( not understanding they were in a common stall)
It seems that the other flight officer may have known what was happening but failed to take the controls.
All this is my supposition based on the preliminary documents pblished and my experience with A320 aircrafts wich have pretty similar flight controls logic ( I am an airline pilot with 12 years experience flying boeing, douglas and airbus). Something completely diferent could be the final cause.
Windshear is a primary maneuver to practice and master due to the extreme danger that it represents for any kind of plane ( maybe not for fighters). Stall is seen as a improbable danger due to the airplane software protections. Both are practised but the windshear is more enfaticed at least in europe, also the stall is seen as a basic flying skill, something not practical to practice in an expensive simulator with limited training time for all that complicated failures.
To reply your question, you can not induce a roll to an airbus airplane ( not past 45 deg with normal conditions) unless you have lost some flight computers. You could for example with MD 80 or 737 as there are no computer protections. I don't know about 777 or other fly by wire boeings, but I guess they got some kind of protection.
Sorry for all the typos and spelling! I am writting on a van on my way to the airport.
One of the precursor experiments was attaching electrodes to the hand that were tied into a compass. The subjects were able to eventually feel North.
A similar device could be attached to something like an altimeter or other instrument.
That is a chilling statistic.
As a VFR pilot, I often wonder what would happen inside a cloud to make me react and rip my plane apart in under 3 minutes.
As a VFR pilot, you've received basic instrument training. Remember that training, trust your instruments, and you'll make it though.
Untrained, never having touched the cockpit of a plane, I can get the meaning from these instruments. Is it simply that pilots fly without these, or that they simply disregard them during flight?
As the original article pointed out, the first reason is that the sensations are so compelling that doing what the instruments tell you will feel VERY unnatural and you will keep thinking that your instruments are broken or stuck (hence you HAVE to trust your instruments). And even if you remember not to trust your instincts, you will still often unconsciously apply slight pressure to the controls.
The second reason is that for every change in the plane's orientation and speed, several instruments will start moving at once. Without training it is very hard to integrate what the 6 instruments are telling you into a complete mental picture of what's going on with your airplane.
People driving cars in simulators also do worse than in the real thing - a simulated car doesn't have all the ways a car tells you that you're driving close to the envelope.
One of the reasons it's done this way is to teach you to ignore inter ear cues and trust your instruments. Your inter ear senses acceleration, not absolute motion. Couple that with the centrifugal force during a turn changing your perception of which way "down" is, and your body responses become one of the main reasons you get into trouble.
It's similar to banked turns on car racetracks. When you're in a banked turn, "Down" for you is no longer towards the center of the earth, it's at an angle, perpendicular to the speedway. You also loose the sensation of turning once you're in that banked turn long enough (specifically once the fluid in your ear settles down and stops moving). If you were driving with a blindfold, you wouldn't be able to feel how steep your turn was.
[1]: http://sportys.com/pilotshop/category/864 "View Limiting Devices"
I guess what I was getting at was not so much that you could survive with your inner ear, but that you get a lot of feedback from a vehicle that you don't in a simulator. That's not relevant to this study if they didn't use a simulator, though...
Dramatized:
I'm sure a pilot in dense cloud has the potential to make a whole host of mistakes. First I'm sure without instrumentation a pilot would quickly lose gauge on how level they're flying, or second guess how level they're flying and try to adjust. If you get caught in a cloud with a very low ceiling, there's probably not much time between exiting the cloud and that "Oh shit, that stuffs the ground". Or a slight climb and not enough thrust could easily compromise your speed and put you into a stall.
I'm quite sure 3-dimensions of travel is a real bitch when you're blind and can't stop.
If it is higher than 6.6L/100km then I'm going up, less is down.
If you don't have a fuel consumption indicator then that will not work but lots of cars have them these days and I think using them as a level is a useful unintended application.
They are ~everywhere~ for a long time around me. Quite a lot of driving instructors (specializing in 'reduced fuel consumption' trainings) use them as a general guideline to "see" how your behavior drives the consumption up.
Heck, mum and dad use that thing for years and drive even slower since they first saw that they could make their car use less gas.
You need to get a new car.. :)
EDIT: What about fuel sensors in the wing? If the computer knew the volume of the remaining fuel and the altitude was not dropping, it could determine the orientation of the plane if there were sensors inside the tanks to detect which were submerged.
As ADIRUs (navigation computers) improve to better integrate GPS and inertial signals in all conditions even when all air data is lost, weather-related instrumentation failures will decrease. Next, putting a worldwide terrain map in the navigation system will let it compute whether it will hit the ground if the course is maintained - again, even when ground radar is not working.
Next, heads-up displays or helmet-mounted displays with better warning systems will make sure that the pilot receives the warning. And most importantly, when the pilot feels that they don't know how to react to the warning, they will be able to push a button to let the autopilot return the plane to wings-level flight.
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/09/29/wrong-button-s...
I imagined that pilot training is mostly to make people ignore the spatial feelings and stick to what they see through windows or on instruments.
That said, the article may be mistaken in the sense that the research, while applicable to pilots, appears to have actually been motivated by his work with patients suffering from dizzy spells. (BTW, he received the 1914 Nobel Prize in medicine for this research).
According to a 2004 study, the average life expectancy of a non-instrument-rated pilot who flies into clouds or instrument conditions is 178 seconds.
At that rate, I'd imagine it didn't take long after the first plane flight for pilots to notice that there was a big problem with, say, closing your eyes or otherwise getting distracted while flying. Or perhaps a pilot or two tried flying into a cloud -- it's the sort of thing you'd try to do if you could, right? -- and their remaining colleagues then started wondering why flying into clouds was such a sure-fire way to die. Death sure does have a way of crystallizing such questions.
The other point I'd make is that fixed-wing aircraft research probably had obvious potential military applications even in the prewar age of 1906. Perhaps this research was funded so early for much the same reason that astronaut-physiology research was well funded even before the first astronaut reached low-earth orbit.
Remember, the Wright brothers first flew in 1903.
As another reply points out, it was likely blimp, balloon or some other form of aviation that spurred the research on vestibular effects.
Europe definitely didn't believe it was a hoax, in fact there were lots of people working at attempting powered flight.
That does not diminish the accomplishments of the Wright brothers in any way, but to make it seem as though Europe did not believe powered flight was possible is not true.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_history
The time was simply ripe, lots of the bits and pieces had been developed by those that had gone before, such as Lilienthal (who built some pretty amazing gliders) and many others.
You can hear that warning here
Perhaps an alternative would be to use a belt that vibrates differently depending on the angle of the aircraft. Humans are good at integrating data without conscious thought. This has been used with compass direction on the ground to dramatically improve spatial awareness without any conscious effort http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.04/esp.html.