What link do you make between Sybil attacks and centralized authorities? And btw the only decentralized sybil resistance component to blockchain things was proof of work, which is being deprecated by most people who believe Web3 is a thing (which afaik Bitcoiners don't).
P.S. PoS protocols are also Sybil resistance mechanisms. Look into Tendermint and compare it with, say, PBFT.
> This paper shows that the situation with BFT CRDTs is very different from BFT consensus: it is possible to guarantee the standard CRDT consistency properties even in systems in which arbitrarily many nodes are Byzantine, e.g. where the Byzantine nodes outnumber the correct nodes. This makes the algorithms immune to Sybil attacks, allowing them to be deployed in open P2P systems that anybody can join, without requiring proof-of-work or proof of any other resource.
[0]: https://martin.kleppmann.com/papers/bft-crdt-papoc22.pdf
P.S. Also commented about the paper here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30561786
The simple intuition is that because his CRDT's are associative and everyone else is not using associative data types, he simplifies the space and the impossible becomes possible.
1. This impossibility theorem is proved in a really broad setting (assuming a “broadcast communication cloud” and a P2P channel). If he wants to circumvent the impossibility theorem he should clearly specify the system model and say how it differs from Doceur’s. There are other instances where by playing with the model you go around an impossibility theorem, but you have to specify the differences. Especially since this theorem is so well known/cited.
2. Some claims in the old paper are just plain wrong. Like, you can’t say it’s Sybil resistant just because it tolerates arbitrary number of Byzantine nodes. Dolev-Strong also needs just one honest party, but it requires a CA.