I highly doubt that any of NATO's members will veto an application from Finland (or Sweden).
Edit: Here is some thoughts one it: https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/28337/on-what-g...
None of that is violated by kicking someone out before they are attacked.
I have to wonder to what extent the development of these alliances might have been influenced by the concern you raise though, you raise a good point.
Article 5 is the shield that drastically decreases the amount of nuclear weapons European nations need to deploy, because USSR / Russian inventories are balanced out by American inventories, if it comes to all-out war.
Consequently, the world as a whole is a lot safer because {flight time Russia-US} >> {flight time Europe-Russia}, which allows for additional fail-safe guarantees on weapons that there wouldn't otherwise be a time budget for.
The US stations some of its nukes in Europe, so the flight time is less than you think.
Also, it is widely believed that the US has an “understanding” with certain European countries that in extreme circumstances (aka World War III) the US will hand those nukes over to the host countries, and then the host country governments will decide for themselves what use to make of them. In part, this helps discourage nuclear proliferation-Germany or the Netherlands don’t need to make their own nuclear weapons because they know if they ever really need them, Uncle Sam will help them acquire them real real fast (“here’s the keys to the safe, good luck”)
As far as I know, the US hasn't stationed M/IRBM or nuclear cruise missiles in Europe since the early-60s Jupiter MRBM [0] and GLCM [1] were withdrawn.
[0] https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/the-rea...
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGM-109G_Ground_Launched_Cru...
In practice, however, closing the Straits has a much more negative impact on Russia than NATO, since the major NATO naval powers (US, UK, France) were never likely to send ships near Ukraine anyway, and as non-Black Sea states the Montreux Convention subjects them to special limits to which Black Sea states are not subject. In fact (according to some sources), the Straits are still officially open for the US/UK/French/etc navies, so long as they don't directly join the conflict – although I imagine they'd be rather hesitant to exercise that right at the moment, due to the risk Russia might interpret such an act as hostile.
If it is true they allowed some Russian ships through before closing it–that could have been simply the slowness of government decision making, plus the legal complexities involved, rather than a deliberate "balancing" act.
If anything, I think this conflict has caused Turkey to turn away from the "balancing" and move more firmly into the NATO column. Reminding NATO of their value helps silence the ongoing "can we expel Turkey?" debate, refusing to do so would have given it more steam. Turkey has been selling its TB2 drones to Ukraine, which Ukraine has been using to great effect against Russia – not a very good example of "balancing". Ukraine's successful use of Turkish drones is very helpful to Turkey, because it gives them more information on how they perform in an actual conflict (which they already had to some extent with the Syrian civil war, the KPP, etc, but Russia is a very different kind of adversary from the Syrian government or the Kurds), and also helps attract potential buyers.
I don't think the Barayktar has such a significant influence, but it could be a smart move from Ukraine to have add some difficulties to the balancing part of Turkeye.
Not sure about the last part though.
Not only they were likely, they actually did that in 2020 and 2021, as a part of joint war games with Ukraine. According to what I read, some 30 ships participated.
Putting that aside, even the official parties to the war are allowed through the straits to return their ships to their home ports (unless Turkey is directly involved in the war, in which case Turkey can block all enemy vessels, even those returning to their home port). Since the only coastline and naval bases of Bulgaria and Romania are on the Black Sea, that rule covers their entire navies. It only really disadvantages Russia, since Russia is the only Black Sea state (other than Turkey) with naval bases outside of the Black Sea. It means Russia can't send reinforcements to the Black Sea from their Pacific, Baltic or Arctic fleets.
In a scenario in which Romania or Bulgaria actively joined the war, it would be a direct Russia-NATO war, including Turkey. In such a dire scenario, Turkey would likely announce the unilateral suspension of the Montreux Convention for the duration of the war, and allow NATO warships unlimited passage. Russia would consider such a unilateral suspension of the Convention to be an act of war, but in such a scenario Turkey and Russia would already be at war anyway.
> Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of Article 25 of the present Convention [no longer applicable] , and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Covenant. https://timinhonolulu.files.wordpress.com/2022/02/montreaux-...
So basically, if (a) Turkey declares that there's a war and (b) Turkey is not a party to that war, then (c) Turkey is authorized to close the straits to warships of belligerent parties.
There's some exceptions in there about ships returning to their base, but it'd be a pretty big loss of face for the Russians to beg Turkey to agree that a sudden rebasing of ships qualified.
I'm Romanian, I live in Romania (Bucharest), so as I'm geographically close to this I've been following this particular Danube issue closer than the others, but the thing is that the situation on the ground is still pretty muddled. For example, just as the war started the Romanian authorities had suspended commercial navigation on the Chilia Danube Delta Branch, the one on which the Romanian-Ukrainian border is situated, for fear of Russian bombs. Presumably the navigation has been allowed to resume, but nothing official has been made public in the Romanian mainstream press, the only related news was something about the Ukrainian authorities being unhappy with us (Romanians) asking for navigation-related customs taxes that were seen as too high, so I assumed that commercial navigation had, in fact, resumed.
There was also our prime-minister meeting with the Bulgarian side (with which we share hundreds of kms of the Danube) and making a statement afterwards about how the Danube should be made easier to navigate (i.e. a strong hint made to the European Union to send us money to do that). If that indeed were to happen (i.e. if the Danube would be made easier to navigate) then the Ukrainians would be able to send a large part of their exports to Central and even Western Europe (via the Danube-Mainz-Rhine canal) via fluvial ships, at a fraction of the cost they now have to pay doing that using rail and road-transport. That's why (among other things) the Russians have set their eyes so strongly on the Budjak region (i.e. the Ukrainian region just North of the Danube's Delta) and that's why they have bombarded this bridge [2] that leads to that region at least three times in the last few weeks.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Commission_for_t...
[2] https://www.google.com/maps/place/Pidyomnyy+Mist/@46.0749075...
Sail an unarmed NATO-flagged vessel to the Azovstal Steel Plant and evacuate troops?
What's special is that they are really good drones for their price.
That is not how people of Ukraine see this.
Either way, this is a just a matter of how you choose to define the term.
The important point that I'm trying to make is that, while Ukraine is of course fighting for its own sake (not trying to claim here they are only a puppet or something - as is Palestine in the other example), it's also clear that NATO is massively involved in the conflict, with its own aims for the war which may or may not be entirely aligned with Ukraine's (or Ukrainians') best interests.
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_proxy_co...
But it doesn't change the fact that the colonies wanted to be free.
Also, I think that it does matter who started the war. Those who are fighting, those who provide support or neither of them (that is, the other party of the war).
> Sixty percent of the colonists either were neutral or opposed to the Revolution.
From https://www.econlib.org/archives/2016/12/bruce_bueno_de.html
> Bueno de Mesquita claims, quite plausibly, that a huge part of George Washington’s motive for fighting the Revolutionary War was to protect his substantial, and critically placed, landholdings in the Ohio Valley.
> An excerpt about GW’s wealth:
>> His last position, just before becoming President, was President of the Patowmack Canal Company–the Potomac Canal, as we know it, from the Potomac River. What that canal did was bring, make it possible to bring produce from the Shenandoah Valley–which George owned–up to the port in Alexandria, which had been built by Lawrence, by the Ohio Valley Company, in which George had a direct interest, and shipped goods out. So it was a very profitable undertaking–or so he thought it would be, in the long run, for him. And that’s what motivated him. Most people think of Washington as–besides a great hero, which he certainly was–as kind of a gentleman farmer. Economists have estimated the worth in real dollars adjusted for inflation, not appreciated, of George Washington’s estate, in contemporary terms; and it’s about $20 billion dollars. He is by far the wealthiest President. He is the 59th wealthiest person in American history. Three of the American founding fathers are in the list of the top 100 wealthiest Americans in all of history: Hancock, who was wealthier than Washington–made his money smuggling; and Ben Franklin, who was not quite as wealthy, who made his money because he had a monopoly on the printing press. These are the folks who led the Revolution. These were not the downtrodden. These were not the oppressed. These were people who stood to lose huge amounts of wealth because of the King’s policies. And so they fought a Revolution. Which was, by the way, not very popular. Sixty percent of the colonists either were neutral or opposed to the Revolution.
However, public choice theory has a--perhaps similarly--dim view of politics.
One observation I would make is that, for a social revolution to occur, you actually need a lot of people from basically every corner of society to want it to happen: even elites. So when they have occurred, it has generally been because the preceding situation was so awful that basically nobody, even the relatively privileged in it, felt it was tolerable. China and Russia both clearly qualify, but also countries like Haiti, or France. People tend to forget the mess preceding the revolution, and focus on the mess during and after.
Germany had a revolution that ushered in the Weimar Republic. Both countries had essentially just lost a war at that time.
> I guess there's a traditional division between 'really existing socialism', which is often messy, and marxism as a body of work for understanding society.
Marxisms is pretty useless for that. Useless in the technical sense that knowing just mainstream economics is as effective as knowing mainstream economics plus Marxism.
(Not useless in the more absolute sense of knowing nothing vs knowing Marxism. Basically, wherever Marxism deviates from modern mainstream economics, it's useless.)
I think there are two dimensions in which marxism, whatever your politics, will never be useless. First, a lot of it is a body of work authored by people in the midst of extremely bitter social struggles, civil wars, and revolutions. So you tend to get a pretty clear idea of how these things work, from the inside. Second, I think Marx is just a phenomenally clever and insightful thinker. I'm not particularly wedded to the economics (actually, neither was Lenin), but his thoughts on how economic and physical forces shape us as political actors are really good.
After the successful attack on Moskva I'm not even sure it's beneficial to NATO or not. Of course it is in the best interests of Ukrainians to keep these ships at bay, but from NATO's point of view this could be an excellent occasion to make some significant blows at Russian fleet.
This is kind of like seeing WW2 pre PH as a proxy war between the USA and Germany....
Ukraine is clearly a part in this war, as they have shown by their heroic ability to resist.
Nato is clearly on Ukraine's side.
You are right that NATO benefits greatly from still having Turkey on the team, though. Also, I think Turkey is not super supportive of Putins's attempts to annext territory by force and/or vassalize their neighbours through invasions.
Next time, they could annex Georgia, and I'm pretty sure that would be seen as a grave threat by Turkey.
The closest thing to kicking someone out of NATO would be all the other countries simultaneously withdrawing and forming NATO 2.0.
Mr Orban also said that 'do not listen to what I say, watch only what I'm doing'.
https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech...
"in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc.. But it does not make this ideology a central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead."
https://miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speec...
"Let us confidently declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal." (Orban then stands that up on three pillars: prioritizing Christian culture, being anti-immigration, and the Christian family model.)
(There are almost assuredly more speeches.)
"Please don't use Hacker News for political or ideological battle. It tramples curiosity."
"Eschew flamebait."
Worth keeping in mind that Americans and Europeans (especially Continentals/non-Anglophones) may have rather different definitions of “liberal”: “American conservatism, with its Lockean roots, is—from a Continental point of view—not really conservatism, but rather, old-school liberalism.” [0]
Similarly: what’s the difference between a “neoconservative” and a “neoliberal”? The terms have a lot of overlap, many people could be equally described by both: but if a neoconservative can also be a neoliberal, then what’s the difference between “conservative” and “liberal”?
And then I remember that I come from a country whose main “conservative” party is called the “Liberal Party of Australia” (or just “the Liberals” for short). Many of its members and leaders will defend the apparent contradiction by saying “We are conservatives, but we are also classical liberals”-a line I’ve also heard from right-of-centre Americans.
See also “conservative liberalism” [1] - which of course is obviously a very different thing from “liberal conservatism” [2]
Tis all as clear as mud
[0] https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/the-big...
whereas in Europe it means anti-authoritarian
https://hvg.hu/itthon/20110906_orban_wikileaks_ne_figyeljene...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3nfpuOoHdI
Anyway, the point is that he is unrealiable, unpredictable, misleading. Apart from the above obvious ones there are countless further examples when he pretended, lied, mislead, did not do what he told will do. It would take very long time to compile a fairly comprehensive list from throughout the years, these are just rapid and random selections. He is basically communicate and act similar to Putin.
Hungary is on the wrong side of the conflict at this point in history.
Russia has a UN veto and uses it, because they can weather the consequences.
Could Hungary piss off all of its allies, trade partners, basically everyone but Russia? Doubtful. Hungary is playing a skillful, if somewhat devious, game of balancing between Russia and the West. But an outright FU to a (clearly) US-sponsored NATO expansion? I can't see them weathering this.
Signalling a veto is often rather a negotiation step.
It's not a coincidence that von der leyen wants to change the voting system from hunanimity to majority. They don't like to lose, and the rules are fine only as long as they can do what they want.
So vetoes have more power than you would let us think.
I can imagine Finland/Sweden being very different. Who benefits/loses from Finland/Sweden joining? These countries are very well-armed, with large, well-trained armies, so they are a welcome addition for most. Baltic states must be delighted. Germany must be realising that hugging Russia for decades hasn't paid off, but it is in a clinch; its army has had decades of peacetime budgets, while they find themselves on the gas/oil hook. Hungary's own immediate neighbours, Romania and Slovakia at least, are quite wary of Russian threat and will welcome at least a diffusion of Russian targets in the area.
Would there be consequences to ruining the plans of US, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia and Romania, and many other countries? No doubt, and beyond what Hungary is prepared to pay.
But then what do I know? I'm an armchair strategist.
But only one is blocking.
This may be true or not. Doesn’t matter. Those others waited. Hungary didn’t.
You can add Norway and probably Denmark to that list. With Finland and Sweden in Nato, all of Scandinavia becomes significantly more defendable. This would enable all Scandinavian countries to combine their defensive efforts, and would it make it extremely hard for Russia to attack any individual country.
And keep in mind that Stoltenberg is Norwegian....
Btw. the ruling party - practically means Orbán himself - is more like protecting personal interest than the contry's, likely (very likely) financial interests of self while the country's interest is completely elsewhere concerning both financial and the big picture.
The question would of course be if EU/NATO want to do that. It's part of the usual political horse-trading game.
For sure, in the extreme scenario if US/EU/main partners really wanted Finland and Sweden to join and Hungary vetoed, it could be made to pay an unaffordable price.
But Sweden is already member of the Cuture Combat Air System (FCAS) initiative to create a 6th gen air war system of systems, alongside nato members. And this kind of colaboration will be even more natural when/if they join Nato.
Also the real question would be, would Hungary see it as a credible threat. Were they to go ahead with that, they'd find themselves with no airforce and unhappy allies. That sounds like a raise they couldn't afford to raise.
https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220405-top-eu-body-laun...
In such a case, Nato could in principle invoke Article 60 of the Vienna convention, and if all other members agreed, they could expel Hungary from Nato. Similarly, if their conflicts with the EU continue to escalate, they may be expelled from the EU in a similar fashion.
This would be a catastrophe for Hungary.
Not that I believe that it would ever come to this. Just a hint of this from key Nato/EU countries should be enough to make Hungary back down.
More likely, if Hungary wants to buy some favour from the Kremlin, they would drag out the expansion process by a few months.
I don't think anyone wants that big hole on the alliance's border. Hungary might not be as critically positioned as Turkey, but it's still in a pretty awkward place.
But as you say, Orban could drag his feet a bit. Chances are his party enjoyed direct funding from Moscow, like others in their orbit all over Europe.
Without a shared border with Russia, Hungary's usefulness in a conflict would be relatively limited for Russia. On the other hand, for it would be highly dangerous for Hungary to willingly align with Russia, as that would make it likely that a future conflict would be fought on their territory.
As long as Sweden and Finland remain neutral, they are at risk. Putin has shown that he is willing to use military force to grab land. Should he grab Finland and Sweden, he would effectively control the Baltic sea and also have bases that can reach Western Europe much more easily than he can at the moment.
On the other hand, with Finland in the alliance, Nato has a highly defensible (for Nato) shared front with Russia, in the case of a conflict.
Also, keep in mind that Finland + Sweden together has a greater population than Hungary as well as maybe 5x the GDP, and that while Hungary is moving towards totalitarianism, Sweden and Finland both have long democratic traditions, low corruption, etc.
Very different ones.
Sweden has been independent forever and a democracy since 1921.
Finland was first a part of Sweden, later an autonomous part of Russia. In 1917 it became independent and a democracy. However, a bloody civil war followed. Although it did not last long, consequences in politics and society remained visble for generations. Between 1945 and 1990 there were limitations to the democracy. They would only do what was assumed not to annoy the Soviets too much. Party leaders and prime ministers were chosen according to that principle. Freedom of the press existed only as long it was not too negative about the Soviet Union.
While it changed with the end of the Soviet Union in 1990, they could join EU 1995, applying for NATO marks only the real end of that period that they could not freely determine the direction of their country.
But that is not what I mean when I say "democratic traditions". Especially for countries that introduce democracy gradually and (mostly) peacefully, I consider the whole transition period to be part of those traditions. A country like Sweden had more than 100 years (1809-1921) of public discussions and political manouvering to build up the institutions, culture and education that provide stability, legitimacy and public support to such a system.
Finland underwent a similar development from the end of the Civil War to 1990, which mean that in 1990 the democratic institutions and traditions had already been built.
Other Warzaw pact countries had varying amounts of democratic traditions at that point. Some (like Hungary) had seen little democracy. Others, such as Czechoslovakia had been mostly democratic in the interwar period, while most had seen some democracy and some authoritarian rule in that period.
I would argue that those traditions from 100 years ago play a part, even today. And in the case of Sweden vs Finland vs Hungary, Sweden and Finland both have very strong traditions for democracy (even if the age of those traditions are different), while for countries like Hungary and Ukraine, those traditions are still shaky.
More realistically, they could just spin up an alternative alliance between US, Finland and any other willing current NATO member (but excluding Hungary). And over time move more and more importance to this new NATO++, and perhaps even eventually drop out of old NATO.
There's no provisions for kicking countries out of NATO. But everyone else leaving the club is equivalent to kicking one country out.
But even if not, in the most extreme case, everyone else could leave NATO and simultaneously join NATO++, which is just NATO without Hungary, but with Finland.
(And because that kind of process is possible in theory, I would suggest that any organisation with a voluntary exit clause might also want to have a clause that allows the unanimous vote by everyone else to expel one member. Maybe..)
This is all speculation about the most extreme consequences. Other commenters wrote more realistic things about trade in weapons being disrupted.
And, of course, you could set up 'NATO++' as an alliance between US, Finland and other willing nations, without shutting down old NATO. Just like Ukraine receives a lot of assistance from NATO countries these days without being in NATO.
Nobody is Putin's friend. When you join his club he send the military in to make sure it goes his way.
Orban’s party won reëlection. Orban is popular [1]. We can crib about disinformation and this or that, but holding Hungary accountable for his decisions is perfectly acceptable.
[1] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-viktor-orban-europ...
I love the use of the diaeresis.
1. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-curse-of-...
Co-operate is much more common than na-ive (which I've never seen). But both cooperate and naive seem reasonably well accepted.
There is a close enough express in English that it translates. "Do what I say, not what I do", is something parents tell kids when the parents want the kids to behave better than the parents do! For example, if a parent smokes, they may tell their kid "don't smoke, do what I say not what I do."
He's not unique in this regard. Every national leader has to consider the interests and perceptions of their domestic power base when negotiating with international leaders. Very often a mismatch between their rhetoric and actual behavior indicates that they are trying to sell an unpopular but necessary international agreement to the people back home, or that they must accept an international reality that does not match their domestic political framework.
For example, Putin finds himself in a difficult position right now because he has convinced his people that the Russian military is invincible and the Ukrainians are dominated by a small number of Nazis who need to be removed from power. Meaning, his domestically acceptable "win set" only includes scenarios in which Ukraine cedes large swathes of territory and makes at least some notional concessions around governmental reform toward "de-nazification." Anything else admits the political framework he uses to justify his power is premised on falsehoods and risks destabilizing his regime.
These positions are of course not consistent with reality and therefore not within the Ukrainian win set, and so no agreement will be reached until something changes. I suspect that is why Russian journalists/propagandists have recently started recasting the war as a conflict against NATO, because that will make defeat more palatable to the Russian people. Getting beat by NATO doesn't mean the Russian military was horrifically incompetent and their government deeply corrupt, but rather that it was an unfair fight sprung upon them by evil westerners. It feeds their sense of grievance while excusing Putin and his lackeys from any personal responsibility for the widespread military failures.
But with zero reasonable arguments for blocking the membership, Turkeys position doesn't seem to be sustainable.
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/croat-p...
I mean, from TFA:
> Croatian President Zoran Milanović on Tuesday said he would block the admission of Sweden and Finland at the NATO summit in Madrid if he is the one representing Croatia
If he is representing Croatia, and the country's decisions are made by Parliament (the President "has a say" in foreign policy), then isn't his job there only to re-present what Parliament has decided?
Thankfully, Croatia doesn't have any real influence in NATO so nobody will be obliged to listen to that stupidity.
Source: I live in Croatia.
Unfortunately, same applied when that drone with explosives fell in the middle of Zagreb. Deafening silence from NATO.
Had that happened in any other nation surrounding Ukraine that would have been the case, too; it's odd why they let that slip. Are we really to believe that if Serbia decided to attack again on some absurd notion of Russian loyalty or whatever they wouldn't defend Croatia despite being a NATO member?
But: that was then, and this is now.
Russia escaped sanctions for a long time, for many things, because of EU countries giving it the benefit of the doubt, and because of oil and gas.
Edit: Not Schengen, that is something more specific; but the Treaty of Accession from 2011?
Croatia really has natural beauty. It has gorgeous beaches. Those beaches are usually overcrowded and in many places turned into concrete slabs. It has good life, unless you can't find a decent job. It has free healthcare, in which you wait a year for an urgent medical examination. It has low taxes (10% capital gains tax! 0% LTCG!) but extensive red tape and extremely inefficient bureaucracy and judicial system.
Corruption is a way of life (ask your grandma if it's decent to visit a doctor without a gift). Politics is a joke to such an extreme Boris Johnson looks like a Stoic philosopher. He partied during COVID restrictions, right? Well, our Minister of Health partied during COVID restrictions he invoked, and nothing, whatsoever, happened.
We're like that country in Tropico (the game), only in real life. Even on a map, if you squint, we look like a banana country.
Still, we've free speech, we're fairly well integrated into the EU (barring some unforseen problem, like, dunno, a war on a doorstep, maybe we'll even adopt the Euro next year), we're pretty safe. Child-care is inexpensive, schools are okay for the most part, public universities are free, and if you work in a well-paid industry (like tech, which is booming), it can be a good life.
So, a banana country with benefits?
Besides capital gains and corporate income, Croatia has some of the heaviest income taxes in the world (up to 45%), and i think the highest VAT tax in EU (25%)
The big questions are over Hungary and Turkey; Hungary because Orbán is somewhat pro-Russian and has opposed some EU and NATO moves already wrt Ukraine, and Erdogan for somewhat similar reasons, and because he has publicly stated that he is not in favor of Sweden and Finland joining.
OTOH, I think the general expectation is that those are surmountable issues.
I can't imagine anybody vetoing Finland's membership. In fact, the more the merrier^Hstronger.
Hungary is also a NATO member and yet its president (Mr. Orban) has been quite chummy with Putin.
https://bigthink.com/pessimists-archive/germany-nuclear-powe...
There is more "evidence" that Merkel is a long-term Russian intelligence asset, recruited from her youth in East Germany,[1] than that of Trump being the same. One guess on which claim is incessantly repeated by the bien-pensants of the chattering classes.
Bonus: Trump and Stoltenberg argue on camera (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vpwkdmwui3k>). Who turned out to be right? Who turned out to completely, totally, 100% wrong?
[1] Something else never talked about is how her parents moved from West to East Germany when she was a baby
https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/62559-milanovic-...
Especially, the original core alliance was very aligned after WWII, politically. However as NATO expands east, the potential for issues down the road grows.
Look at the Ukraine. Let's imagine that this horrible war never happened, Russia never attacked, and that the Ukraine would join NATO in 2023.
Now fast forward to 2030. Russian political games, and influence, has caused the Ukraine to become more aligned with Russia.
What then? Now, the alliance has a detractor of its goals within!
And what of other geopolitical issues? Who will be China's best friend, in 2030?
With the alliance at its original members, it was more tightly aligned.
Now? NATO is becoming far more political.
Perhaps this is apparent to many, but I feel this is not as apparent as it should be. For as NATO becomes stronger physically, with more members, it becomes less strong politically/actively.
An example. If someone attacked Canada or the UK, the original NATO members would have responded instantly.
What about Croatia? Would the response be the same?
https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-fr...
Yes, without a doubt. Perhaps a little slow, but ultimately the response would be the “same”[1]. The US and UK have existential interest in maintaining NATO.
Croatia and Hungary would be kicked out of NATO before Sweden and Finland would be prevented from joining. At the point of Finland announcing that they will apply, all of the negotiations and box checking are done beforehand. They don’t leave things like this to chance.
Some say “but there is no mechanism for kicking out a member”. It doesn’t matter. The primary NATO members will just have a vote and say you aren’t part of NATO anymore and that would be that.
[1] I’m using “same” here because an attack on the UK or Canada could never be treated as equivalent to an attack on Croatia given the circumstances needed to be attacking those countries and the kinship of the US with those countries. A better way of phrasing would be if Croatia was legitimately attacked and invoked Article 5 of NATO (the mutual defense clause) the U.S. and others would come to Croatia’s defense. There is absolutely no doubt about this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Russian_Sukhoi_Su-24_shoo...
IMHO Erdogan still owes Putin a favor for being tipped off on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt.
Do you mean the war that Russia wages against Ukraine?
But they didn't. Turkey only upheld the conditions of the Montreux Convention:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montreux_Convention_Regarding_...
> Around February 27–28, Turkey refused permission for 3 of 4 Russian warships to enter the Black Sea, as 3 did not have a home base in the Black Sea.
"pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Turkey cannot block Russian warships based in the Black Sea from returning to their registered base."
Turkey was under no obligation to do anything. Yet they closed the straits to Russian ships to the extent that they possibly could.
Either they stop this now or it's all over anyway. This is reckless - we need to start a path of de-escalation - give Putin an offramp. Get to back to calm waters.
Then let diplomats do their little dances until there is a hopefully more reasonable people in power on both sides.
Nobody wants war.
Finland might feel safer once they're in NATO.
The rest of NATO (and non-NATO states in Western Europe), perhaps not quite so much. Surely the risk of NATO being involved in any conflict only increases as NATO grows?
No, it diminishes. NATO is a defensive alliance. The more members it has with credible military spending (which Finland has) the higher the cost for Russia to invade.
And the lines we now draw between NATO, Russia and China could well be the lines of a WW3 within a decade. Hopefully not though.
Being cut off from nearly all advanced technology and with a terrible economy doesn't sound like a recipe for improving much in that sense either.
A similar line of argument about alliances and treaties preventing war was used before the First World War. We all know how that ended.
It also doesn't appear to be a very accurate description of the things NATO has been getting up to since the end of the Cold War.
"[NATO] has been involved in military operations in the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa"[0]
You don't have to be a spin doctor to realise that what seems like "defence" to one person is another's war of aggression.
German defence minister Peter Struck memorably said in 2004 that "Germany was also [being] defended on the Hindu Kush".[1]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO [1] https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede...
Almost like "defensive weapons". Almost, because that's even worse.
NATO was formed with that in mind. A single treaty document publicly ratified. No secret pacts. No back-alley alliances.
Let's imagine we're France.
What's the actual risk of us being directly attacked by an enemy country, starting a conflict?
Now imagine we're France, obliged to join in a conflict by NATO's "collective defence" Article 5. This conflict was already started by an enemy attacking any one of the other 29 NATO members. Particularly murky that now NATO claims cyberattacks count for article 5, and since 2001 we know terrorism can count too.
What's the risk of the latter compared to the former?
I don't see Article 5 as the providor of peace that so many appear to assume it is. Now that the Cold War is long-gone, and it's no longer as simple as "NATO vs Warsaw Pact" in which is was fairly easy to see which side you'd want to be on, I also don't think Article 5 is worth the paper it's written on.
For instance, would your country's citizens be happy to join a war over Taiwan?
What shall we give Russia this time? Then when they come for Poland or Romania, who do you suggest we offer to rape and murder?
This continued escalation can't help but lead to nuclear war, our leaders are playing an extremely dangerous game of chicken.
If anything, Russia's botched invasion of Ukraine should show other countries in the region that there isn't so much to fear from them, and that NATO can be counted for help even without having to risk triggering Article 5 against a nuclear power.
And make no mistake: a hot NATO-Russia war is the worse possible outcome for everyone involved. If it came to that, it would be objectively better to become a vassal of Russia than living through a nuclear war, for the vast majority of the population.
Interesting with all the down votes, wonder if Russian bots have reach even on HN? The fact is that this is happening, and Sweden is joining too, and I'm glad we are.
You need some very twisted Russian logic to see sovereign states joining of their own accord, with majority support in the population as a valid excuse for Russia to attack us.
> If steps are taken to establish a de facto permanent military presence, power-projection capabilities, or a military installation, the delegation noted that the United States would then have significant concerns and respond accordingly.
Note that the Solomon Islands is also a sovereign nation, and that it is > 10,000km away from the US border, and >2000km away from the border of the closest US Ally, Australia.
My point is not whataboutism, it is that sovereign nations have an interest in the military alliances of other sovereign nations, and that the security of one state doesn't stop at its borders. Joining hostile military alliances or massing troops at a shared border is logically viewed as a security threat from another nation, and sovereign nations have a right to attempt to prevent such actions.
Of course, doing it by force of arms the way Russia did is entirely illegal and immoral. Even the threat of violence is considered unacceptable by the Geneva convention, though of course that is often ignored. But complaining or seeking diplomatic and even economic ways to prevent such actions is not immoral in my view, and it is certainly not unusual.
You may not be against that, but my point was that this is mostly not how world leaders think. Note that it's not just the US - Australia, New Zealand, and I'm sure other countries in the area also came out strongly against this, and similarly explained that it affects their security.
Of course, unlike Russia, they didn't literally illegally and unacceptably invade the Solomon Islands. However, if China were to participate in a revolution-coup combo (as Victoria Nuland and the US ambassador to Ukraine were doing 2 weeks before revolutionaries forced Yanukovich out [0][1]); and then a pro-Chinese leader (even one with popular support) started being armed by the Chinese government, and holding joint military excercises defending from an Australian invasion [2]; then the situation would perhaps change.
It's important to note not just what is morally right and wrong, but also what are the established rules of the world. It's great to fight against those rules as much as you can (and US citizens have more power to change this than any other people on Earth, as the voters in the most powerful country in history which is at least partly democratic), when they are unjust, but that doesn't mean you get to ignore them while they are in place.
[0] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 (conversation transcript published on 7 feb 2014)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Yanukovych#cite_note-2 (forced out by protesters on 21-22 feb 2014)
[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-h...
Russia just wants Lebensraum, which would be ruined by nukes, and NATO would probably not want to seem excessively cruel to Russian civilians when their purpose is supposed to be entirely defensive.
Don't forget that there have already been numerous close calls in terms of nuclear war, without anything close to a conventional war as background.
Putin has demonstrated again and again that he will interpret any de-escalating, sensible political moves as weakness. Any attempt at appeasement or compromise will be seen by him as an invitation to dare the next aggressive step.
I wish I believed that. His credibility depends entirely on his ability to threaten (to poison his opponents, to flatten cities). He's a strong man, and he can't afford to be seen to back down.
Here's the only off-ramp I can see working:
"Mr. Putin, you can keep your yachts and your offshore wealth; you won't be pursued for warcrimes. But you must exile yourself from Russia, and never darken the world stage again."
I don't think Putin would accept that deal; he'd rather go down with his ship. He thinks he's Peter The Great.
Objectively, this is not true. Putin wanted war. Leadership around him wanted war too. They wanted war they will win fast, but even if that succeeded it would be war too.
Thing is, Putin has boxed himself in; he's said publicly that Ukraine is not a thing, that so-called Ukrainians are in fact Russians, and that he aspires to a Peter-the-Great-style Russian empire stretching from Vladivostok to the Baltic.
The only "off-ramp" I can see being halfway-acceptable to Putin would be for Ukraine to surrender their claims to Donbas and Crimea, in exchange for Russian security "assurances". Even that would make Putin look weak; he's declared that one his goals is to "demilitarise" Ukraine. To do that he would have to conquer the whole of Ukraine.
So any promise by Putin to accept a proffered "off-ramp" would be seen with a very jaundiced eye by Balkan, Central European and Baltic states. And by me, actually.
I'm no warmonger; far from it, I've been mostly a pacifist most of my life. But any "off-ramp" plans would either be unacceptable to Putin, or they would lead to a new war.
I'm afraid it looks pretty bad.
He built the Summer Palace in St. Petersburg in emulation of the European palaces he visited on his tour of Europe. But unlike European palaces, in the Summer Palace he installed a torture chamber, in which he personally tortured then murdered his own wife. He seems to have enjoyed torture and murder.
This is the model that Putin so admires.
I don't know that it's yet possible to ascribe any war-crimes to Putin personally. The crimes that I've heard tell of are of the kind that might be carried out by low-morale troops in any army.
Of course, the Russian army in Ukraine necesssarily have low morale; they've been ordered to attack and kill people that their own leader has said are their "brothers".
Low morale in the Russian armed forces is a persistent problem; in WWII Russian assaults, Russian machine guns were positioned in the rear, to kill any Russians that thought to fall back. It's not surprising that in the fall of Berlin, there was widespread looting and rape by Russian soldiers.
All soldiers behave like this, to a greater or lesser extent. But this Russian army has been engaged in city-flattening, rape and murder to a shocking extent.
Personally, I'm not inclined to forgive. But that's not my call; I'm not Ukrainian.
Anything less is appeasement.
Umm ... wasn't that what people thought of the alliances and treaties[0] just before the First World War?
[0] https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-you-need-to-know-about-p...
If we could avoid its equivalent in the 21st century, that would be good.
It only takes one of those to pay off at the right time.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-05/u-s-gives...
When the war is over, it may be that the new-found unity caused by the external threat will be enough for them to reinforce their institutions significantly. This could reach a point that could ensure lasting democracy while enabling them to properly fight/eliminate most corruption. At that point, combined with a peace treaty with Russia, they should be able to Join.
More likely, Ukraine after the war will be a massively destroyed country, with widespread poverty and a constant need for western powers to pour money into - and that breeds corruption. The only way forward - should they survive as a nationstate - would be some kind of grotesquely enlarged Marshall Plan - they would become in the 21th century that what Germany was between 1946 and 1990: A military bridgehead and designated battlefield should Russia get another taste for war, with modest economic growth.
Still, most countries had rebuilt their economy to pre-war levels before 1955, and in many cases around 1950.
Given the very small size of Ukraine's economy, reaching their pre-war level will not take very much. Should they, as I predict, come out of the war as a united nation, able to get rid of most of the corruption, they may be able to massively outperform their pre-war gdp fairly quickly.
If they return to pre-war levels of corruption, no amount of economic aid will bring their economy to western levels.
Imagine diverting 50% of Russian troops from Ukraine, where they are already struggling, to another special operation in Finland. Can't see it happening.
They'd have to actually declare war to conscript the whole population and what nonsense could Putin say to sell that to his people at this point?
Both Finland and Sweden signed a defence agreement with the UK yesterday. Norwegian newspapers has claimed Denmark, Iceland and Norway are also going to offer Finland and Sweden military aid in case of Russian shenanigans during the application process. That leaves both Finland and Sweden fairly safe, and the only noteworthy risks would be cyber warfare and Russian psy-ops used to turn public opinion against a NATO membership.
As for the application process itself, Stoltenberg pretty much promised a swift handling in the NATO end of things, but as you mention, it has to be unanimous and there is always a chance someone with power might be in Putin's pocket, or oppose the idea for other reasons.
Some agremeents are made through the normal legislative process for each country, and are enforceable by international courts.
These promises by heads of UK and Finland are not that kind of enforceable agreements, as they have not been approved by the legislature. They are just political statements by heads of state.
By attacking Ukraine Russia wanted to "push" NATO away from its borders, but it all went backwards - now they will have a new, 1300 km long border with NATO member countries.
Russian fleet in Petersburg can be decommissioned now, as there is no merit to maintain it while Gulf of Finland can be easily blocked and is under traditional artillery control from Estonia and Finland side (it is just 80-100 km wide).
In fact in case of military conflict Petersburg is lost, can be attacked from the West and the North by land and covered by long range rocket artillery like Himmars (it is just 200 km away from Finnish and Estonian borders).
Same story with Murmansk harbor, it will be very difficult for Russia to defend it against attack from Norway and Finland given the very long and fragile supply line - a single E105 route, 1000 km long or train connection that goes along that route. Imagine famous Kiev 60 km convoy multiplied by 10 and attacked not by post-soviet era weapon that Ukraine had but by state of the art equipment.
Russia will have to put a lot of forces over there to be able to protect new attack line that they have opened by themselves. Build hell a lot of new infrastructure, provide logistic support, etc. The costs will be exorbitant.
When countries like Poland, Romania or Baltic countries became NATO members it was clear that they will need to be protected by western armies (although Poland is quickly catching up with its military potential, other countries is developing too). Right now situation is different: two very strong, well equipped, well trained armies are joining the Pact.
Another 300 modern tanks, Sweden by itself has more than 400 modern combat aircrafts of various types, Finland has just contracted 60 F-35 (with loyal wingman option that doubles the potential in future), plus artillery and other best of class equipment.
Indeed, Putin, Gerasimov and Shoygu are master strategists.
They just want Russia to sink and don't really care about the fate of Europe.
Ah...if I recall, the Germans - with a very large, experienced, and well-equipped army, at the time - assumed that St. Petersburg could be taken fairly easily back in 1941. That turned out not to be the case.
There were also somewhere on the order of 350-400 thousand Soviet soldiers killed in the battles around Leningrad.
It's pretty hard to "take" a multi-million person city if the residents are willing to accept double-digit-percentage fatality rates to prevent it... The big unknown is always whether they will be willing to accept it.
According to Wikipedia [1], the Swedish airforce has only 207 aircraft in total, only 71 of which are combat aircraft (JAS 39 Gripen).
In practical reality, if Russia were to attack Finland or Sweden now, the answer from NATO would be pretty much the same as if they were already members.
Really? Why is this true of Finland but not Ukraine?
"In response to the deteriorating situation in the Donbas, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a conventional invasion of the region. The first sign of this invasion was 25 August 2014 capture of a group of Russian paratroopers on active service in Ukrainian territory by the Ukrainian security service (SBU)."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War#:~:text=In....
The latter is important, NATO is not a hired gun. Finland does have a stable border.
Not to mention Crimea, whose annexation by Russia is accepted by nobody.
Besides, Finland has been a close NATO ally for a long time, shares NATO values, our military is already 100% NATO compatible, and we are strategically and geopolitically a pretty important piece of the puzzle.
Sweden would probably get stronger support for other reasons, like being perceived as an established democratic western country.
That is a problem like eu that need to be handled, especially now that turkey is in the way. I think one has to rethink. The key is what are these military alliance is for. For democracy then we can have an alternative one.
A new alliance covering South Korea, japan, Taiwan, Australia, eu, Sweden, Finland, Canada …. Soviet Union is gone.
Turkey is a liability as it is not a democracy. And it is a problem.
So what? They only have themselves, or rather Putin, to blame. He's forfeited the right for them to have any meaningful input into the decision.