If there were such a permission scheme, such as in Facebook's now likely defunct cryptocurrency idea, you would not need proof of work. You'd just have a list of authorized signers of new blocks and if someone does something bad you kick them off the list. This is basically how the web PKI system works with browser certificate whitelists.
Lots of cryptocurrency critics over-argue their case by denying that this was a novel innovation, but yes it was novel. It has big downsides but it works. Personally my big issue with crypto other than the energy waste is that the cryptocurrency ecosystem itself is toxic and full of scams and other trash.
Are you saying that the incentives provided for successfully mining a block in crypto's isn't necessary to their security? I can't think of a single expert that agrees, or an example in the space of that working. Block reward is typically thought of as a tradeoff between security and inflation.
It's a really interesting space to research for economists or political scientists. It's also a lever to turn government, social, financial and other systems into software.
All that to say, yes, PoW and PoS are not necessarily tied to blockchains or DLTs.
You can use PoW as a sort of captcha, for example. If it costs a little bit of CPU to submit a request to a website it's not a big deal for a human. However, if you're running a bot-net suddenly it starts to hurt!
True, it won't solve the problem of malware botnets, but PoW or PoBandwidth schemes can make it too expensive to run botnets on cloud services so the only place left to go is illegal botnets.
So if I lock up a secret with bcrypt today and require 100k rounds of hashing, it will still require 100k rounds of hashing to unlock for any brute force attempt of the ciphertext for the rest of time. A server (or blockchain network) could evaluate a PoW submission 50 years from now and determine that difficulty should be raised to 100T rounds instead of 100k rounds.
That's exactly what HashCash was conceived to do (to fight email spam). It was a neat predecessor to Bitcoin.
Blockchains are unique in their design to be self-sustaining decentralized cryptocurrencies; the self-sustaining part is what, in my mind, distinguishes them from the other technologies which rely on external incentives to keep them running.
In ideal worlds as designed for PoW and PoS everyone has roughly an equal stake and equal incentives. Reality differs.
IBM talks about private blockchains, but it kinda seems like without spending a lot of computing power to make it infeasible to re-compute, you're relying on trusting that people won't. If I control all the machines in the private blockchain and the cost to compute the hashes is low, presumably I could replace nodes that I want to remove or alter and then just recompute.
For example, let's say that I'm trying to create an immutable ledger of emails sent for compliance purposes and I have 10,000 emails. Later, I want to hide 5 emails sent and alter 5 email's contents. I replace the remove/alter the nodes and then just re-compute the chain storing the new version of the chain on the servers I control. I then tell regulators that those emails never existed and we have the immutable block chain to prove it!
Even if a blockchain is public, what is protecting against someone disputing history? If it were computationally cheap, I could come up with a longer chain than the current Bitcoin chain with certain transactions altered to favor me. The reason I can't do that is because the proof-of-work makes it infeasible for me to re-compute a block before the network has already put a new block on the chain (presuming I control less than 51% of the compute power in the network). To recompute 10 blocks, I'd need to control an overwhelming majority of the compute power in the network.
But if the data is important and we're not giving people a big reward for mining the chain, it seems like it would be vulnerable to alteration. Sure, you could say "I saw the chain with 1,000 links and then I saw the chain with 1,100 links, but this new chain disagrees with some of the original 1,000 I had. Someone is doing something sketchy, but is it the first person trying to rewrite history and not being able to mine fast enough or is the second person rewriting history and has enough compute power to become the longest chain?" Again, with Bitcoin this isn't such a problem because PoW makes it infeasible to re-compute that stuff. However, if we're talking about a blockchain that isn't secured by PoW (or PoS), what is preventing that?
If I want to create a public ledger of all my shipments with blockchain and there are 10-50 shipments per day at various unknown times, it seems insecure. I put up a piece of shipment data to be added, and then it gets added to the chain. That's the good scenario. Now I want to rewrite history so I go back and re-compute some stuff and then for the next 20 shipments I privately compute the signatures before broadcasting to the network so that I'll have a chain 20 longer than everyone else which will replace the old chain (and with it the data I'm looking to alter).
I could just be missing a piece that makes this comment void, but it's always seemed like Bitcoin's resistance to history-rewriting is the PoW. Without that, I could simply re-compute the history, create a longer chain, and replace the current chain. Yes?
Also, it's not clear to me whether you're asking about PoS security too, but if so, the reason one person can't go back and rewrite a bunch of it is because the right to create blocks is spread out randomly across the entire active set of stakers. So if an attacker only controls a small fraction of the total stake, then their signature would only be valid in building a small fraction of the chain they would need.
Pics or didn't happen.
The effort we invest to encourage thoughtful dialogue is paid back in the long run by keeping the quality of discourse high(er) and making less work for dang.