> what about your friends retweeting.
You are able to block the account and then you wouldn't see retweets. If they screenshot something then you could shrug and get on with your day in the knowledge that you'd stopped most of the stuff, or block your friend. I'd give users more tools, like the one Twitter itself has, to rate accounts and shape the kind of tweets one can see.
> it's also about public good and legitimate intention to stop attacks on the foundations of our republic and stop the spread of dangerous (imho should. be libelous under law to combat) lies.
If stopping lies comes at the cost of undermining free speech for everyone, then it would be the thing undermining the republic, far more than a known liar lying.
I rely on Mill for my views on bad men speaking bad things:
> It is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. This mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true?