Automating flight has quite a bit of low hanging fruits and Airbus has become the first harvester out there. The rest opposed at first, but the only logical path forward is automating people out of the systems. Yes, we had the 737MAX thingy but even then arguments for re-humanisation of aircraft controls didn't catch much traction.
Is that sure?
Autonomous cars are hard because of “surprise”. Other drivers, kids, bicycles, randomness intersecting the street that has to be dealt with.
By and large, aircraft have the way cleared for them by ATC, and objects that may intersect with them tend to be on a path that is neither “came out of nowhere” nor erratic (UFOs aside!). Weather is a challenge, but autopilot deals with weather already. Arguably there’s much less surprise for a sky bus than a road bus, and arguably the fact it’s a big airliner instead of a crossover SUV doesn’t make it particularly harder for a machine.
TL;DR: Planes seem “nearer” than cars and some cars pretend to be automatic already.
I'd imagine there would be a many-decade long period of overlap where pilots would observe the plane flying before the plane can fly solo.
If MCAS _actually_ worked, you and I wouldn't even know about it. But as tribute to how poorly it was designed and delivered, we know about MCAS because it killed over 300 people.
Just an absurd point you're making.
Airbus are an engineering firm, so they are doing clever engineering things. Boeing was an engineering firm that has been run by bean counters the past few decades.
It wasn't "opposition to automation" it was opposition to innovation for the sake of short term profit.
Boeing's executives should all be hanged :) hundreds of people dead for no reason whatsoever.
Boeing was going to start a clean sheet small aircraft. And then American Airlines announced they were going to buy 100 of a new 737 variant.
The MCAS system was built to work on a very buggy angle of attack sensor. They are notoriously unreliable. The max kept one on each side of the plane (the airbus equivalent has 3 on each side). Further compounded by the fact that the (this was true at the time and theyve joined systems now) pilots computer only used the left side of the plane instruments and the copilots computer only used the right side.
So no. Boeing fucked up in the first place by trying to stealth fix a hardware problem (stalling at a new lower angle of attack in the "same model airplane") with software. And then lying through their teeth about the impact of this.
The equivalent military 737max with MCAS simply allowed the pilot to more forcefully adjust the flight control stick to turn it off. So they knew better.
Companies attempting to skirt legislation in the face of better profits is always going to cause issues here.
The entire max disaster was an attempt by management at Boeing to get pilots to be able to fly all 737s with basically no retraining.
> only used the left side of the plane instruments and the copilots computer only used the right side
These aren't really "pilot" and "copilot" computers, but two redundant computer systems (each with redundant processors) that take turns running every other flight.
> trying to stealth fix a hardware problem (stalling at a new lower angle of attack in the "same model airplane") with software
Actually, trying to stealth fix a human-related hardware problem (stick feel and overpitching tendency, not stall) with a crappy software approach.
> And then lying through their teeth about the impact of this.
A big factor here is that runaway trim was considered a serious problem but also one that flight crews regularly train for and are tested on and are expected to handle. But MCAS gave this exam to pilots far more frequently than runaway trim had happened before and we found that crews often fail the test.
The system design didn't try very hard to prevent this occurrence, because it was thought that flight crews could handle the problem when it occurred.
> The equivalent military 737max with MCAS simply allowed the pilot to more forcefully adjust the flight control stick to turn it off. So they knew better.
It's not really the same system, and it's not a "military 737max"-- I think you're referring to the KC-46, which is built upon the 767, and has a pitch feel control system also called "MCAS" that solves a related problem but overall operates very differently.
> The entire max disaster was an attempt by management at Boeing to get pilots to be able to fly all 737s with basically no retraining.
This worsened things, but the main issue is that there is a certification requirement -- https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173 -- for pilot pitch feel on climb which is hard to meet with larger engines under the wing.