>Except it doesn't work the way you describe, because all it does is determine the quality of tenant that gets to stay in a housing unit in a shortage.
These protections determine that quality of tenant preferred is higher, thus vulnerably are forced away during a shortage. For those who are accepted, risks mean increased housing costs and thus lower access to the poor.
>Eviction protections are incredibly helpful at preventing people on the margin from ending up homeless, by increasing the friction of evictions for landlords. This is absolutely necessary, because the cost to the tenant of getting kicked out of where they live is enormous. It is incredibly disruptive to their life - much moreso than not being able to find a different place to live.
Eviction protections are incredibly _harmful_ at allowing those on the margin to avoid homelessness, by increasing the friction of becoming a tenant. This is absolutely unnecessary, because the cost of a tenant refusing to leave after non-payment can be _enormous_. It is incredibly disruptive to the housing market -- much more so than not being able to find a different tenant to rent to.
>Remove friction from evictions, and everyone on the margins is constantly at risk of losing their home - and once you do so, your ability to stay afloat becomes incredibly precarious.
I'd argue the opposite, those at the margins who are able to meet their commitment but otherwise look bad at paper are at incredibly higher likelihood to gain a home -- and once you gain a home, your ability to stay afloat becomes much less precarious.
>If, on one extreme, tenancies were for life, and you had no way to kick someone out of a unit, you'd have an 'unfair' but stable distribution of housing. There would be very few life disruptions to people's lives, at the cost of housing being stuck in a local optimum.
This is achievable via something close to the 99-year leases available in many nations, where you prepay the lease up-front. You can negotiate for one of these if you can find a voluntary counterparty.
>If, on the other extreme, tenancies were day to day, and you constantly had to outbid other contenders for your apartment, you'd have a 'fair' but incredibly unstable distribution of housing. Between the incredibly high pain of moving/looking for a new place to live, anyone on the margins would suffer incredibly from this.
That's basically what a hotel is, which those on the margins often end up in due to renter protections that introduce risk for landlords to take in those on the margins.
>Economists rage against a stable but 'suboptimal' distribution of goods. But people whose lives constantly get upended from the instabilities of an 'optimal' distribution of goods are the ones who will suffer.
Renter protections make it look more 'optimal' to rent to the rich and stable. We're actually in a suboptimal state that disfavors the homeless, and allowing a freer market would give better opportunities to the homeless.
>Harm minimization is exactly why there is more friction to throwing someone out of their house than 'the landlord feels like it'.
Increasing regulatory barriers to homeless gaining housing is harm maximization, and should be eliminated. These renter protections maximize harm.