https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya_and_weapons_of_mass_dest...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_dest...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destr...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya_and_weapons_of_mass_dest...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_dest...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destr...
My view on this is that nuclear non-proliferation is a kind of sacred cow that everyone must be seen to support, but everyone understands that nuclear arms can be a stabilizing factor - they prevented numerous wars already, and prevented wars from getting out of control (e.g. India vs Pakistan). I don't know what the best way to maximize peace is, but it's not in any way clear to me that eradication (but especially reduction without eradication) of nuclear weapons is the way to get there. And it really doesn't matter to me how civilians die, in a Nagasaki nuclear explosion or a Tokyo firestorm.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Ukraine
I'll try to find a pretty good thread, written by a nuclear expert who was part of the 1994s negotiations, that went into greater details and explained why ukraine never had the capacity to keep the nukes or even do anything useful with them.
But not so hard that a nation of 40 million with many thousands of engineers who took part in designing every aspect of that bomb cannot figure it out if they want to. This would simply not be a serious issue.
>But most importantly, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicules are enormously expensive to maintain. Ukraine is already a very poor country now, but there was absolutely no way it could have afforded to maintain a nuclear arsenal in the 1990s.
Hundreds of bombs, no. A dozen - easily. Yes, poor, but the sheer size of it would allow it to maintain a small nuclear arsenal.
>And that's even if they didn't have to reverse engineer an arsenal that it did not even control.
It did control it, because it was on Ukrainian soil, and you greatly overestimate the ability of a large country to reverse engineer or replace some detonators.
If provided with an arsenal of working nukes sans launch control, it would take Ukrainian engineers and physicists maybe 2 weeks to bypass the existing controls and fabricate new ones. It's not like nukes have tamper proof switches.
I don't see how such incentives are possible. At this point, any politician in a nuclear state who chooses to give up the ultimate insurance policy against the kind of invasion happening in Ukraine right now is essentially a traitor. What possible insurance policy can replace a nuke? Even things people consider ironclad security guarantees are very ambiguous and are only a sure thing short-term.
Who's to say how a US or a German government will interpret Article 5 in 2070, for example?
>The Parties agree ... that, if [an] armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...
You can drive a truck through that kind of ambiguity. All options including doing nothing are firmly on the table. If I'm Estonia, I just hope for the current climate of firm resolve to fight against aggression to remain indefinitely. But if I'm Poland or Turkey, I'm thinking long and hard about convincing someone to proliferate.
> And it really doesn't matter to me how civilians die, in a Nagasaki nuclear explosion or a Tokyo firestorm.
I'm pretty sure it's not likely or feasible to firestorm an entire country absent nuclear weapons. Put differently, nuclear weapons are concerning because of scale, not method, of death.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pokhran-II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chagai-I
India and Pakistan then fought a war in 1999.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_War
Preventing a war for a little more than 1 year is hardly stabilizing.
Although, while not being comparable, it's still true that the US's invasion of Iraq definitely hurt nuclear non proliferation, and has remained a driving force in pushing the likes of Iran and North Korea to build up nuclear stockpiles.
What Russia's invasion has done is basically extend the desire for nuclear weapons from what are inarguably bad actors on the global stage (Iran, North Korea) to pretty much every country in the world.
Surprising exactly no-one, regimes with dated soviet equipment and huge armies (north korea, iran, china) started looking around for ways to protect themselves.