The points are valid. But it's entirely possible to replace 'Bad Economics' with even 'Worse Economics'
If you come up with a new working paradigm to predict macroeconomic variables, and you manage to use it to great practical success, the discipline is not going to freeze you out of publishing or whatever. You can precipitate a scientific revolution.
Of course, the vast majority of critics aren't even pretending they can do this. Instead they'll attack the status quo without having anything better to offer, as if showing the flaws of a theory provide rhetorical justification for believing whatever you want. It's like a secular version of the "god in the gaps" argument.
The reoccurring criticisms of GDP are fundamentally clueless as complaining that gasoline poisons you when you drink it, therefore energy density per volume or mass is invalid. GDP is still power but the things they complain about are applications. The whole point of trade is that you can convert funds from like gold or tourism to tractors and medicine.
Frankly they tend to be childish tantrums calling economists evil for not reflecting their sacred imperatives of how they believe the world should be.
Here is the alternative model proposed by Skidelsky:
"These deep methodological issues do not render economic knowledge utterly useless, Skidelsky suggests. But they do mean economics as we know it may have to be thrown out. [...] We should instead take a more provisional, open, and flexible attitude toward economic phenomena and treat economics as (just) another social science, rather than one supposedly purified of uncertainty by its logical prowess. Concretely, this means we should abandon dreams of an immaculate science of economic life—and stop deferring to those who claim to speak in its name. More abstractly, in place of a discipline that neglects the 'mesoeconomic' level—the institutions, firms, unions, banking systems, social movements, digital platforms, states, and other social entities that shape our behavior—Skidelsky proposes an approach 'which is more modest in its epistemology and richer in its ontology.'"