Podman can transfer container images without a registry
redhat.com
redhat.com
If you want to DIY a container with unix tools, this should help: https://containers.gitbook.io/build-containers-the-hard-way/
docker image save foo:latest \
| ssh pod docker image load
does (the stream is a docker tar archive with layers and metadata).Packages and metadata was all prepared for distribution over nothing more than static file hosting and http(s) to leverage as much existing infrastructure as possible.
The TUF spec (and PyPI TUF PEPs) explains why a tar over https (with optional DNSSEC, a CA cert bundle, CRL, OCSP,) isn't sufficient for secure software distribution. "#ZeroTrust DevOps"; #DevSecOps
What's the favorite package format with content signatures, key distribution, a keyring of trusted (authorized) keys, and a cryptographically-signed manifest of per-file hashes, permissions, and extended file attributes? FWIW, ZIP at least does a CRC32.
We now have the Linux Foundation CNCF sigstore for any artifact, including OCI container images.
W3C ld-proofs is a newer web standard that unfortunately all package managers haven't yet migrated to. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29355786
Because ld-proofs is RDF, it works in JSON-LD and you could merge the entire SBOM [1] and e.g. CodeMeta [2] Linked Data metadata for all of the standardized-metadata-documented components in a stack.
>> [...] Sigstore is a free and open Linux Foundation service for asset signatures: https://sigstore.dev/what_is_sigstore/
>> The TUF Overview explains some of the risks of asset signature systems; key compromise, there's one key for everything that we all share and can't log the revocation of in a CT (Certificate Transparency) log distributed like a DLT, https://theupdateframework.io/overview/
>> Certificate Transparency: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency
>> Yeah, there's a channel to secure there at that layer of the software supply chain as well.
>> "PEP 480 -- Surviving a Compromise of PyPI: End-to-end signing of packages" (2014-) https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0480/
>>> Proposed is an extension to PEP 458 that adds support for end-to-end signing and the maximum security model. End-to-end signing allows both PyPI and developers to sign for the distributions that are downloaded by clients. The minimum security model proposed by PEP 458 supports continuous delivery of distributions (because they are signed by online keys), but that model does not protect distributions in the event that PyPI is compromised. In the minimum security model, attackers who have compromised the signing keys stored on PyPI Infrastructure may sign for malicious distributions. The maximum security model, described in this PEP, retains the benefits of PEP 458 (e.g., immediate availability of distributions that are uploaded to PyPI), but additionally ensures that end-users are not at risk of installing forged software if PyPI is compromised.
>> One W3C Linked Data way to handle https://schema.org/SoftwareApplication ( https://codemeta.github.io/user-guide/ ) cryptographic signatures of a JSON-LD manifest with per-file and whole package hashes would be with e.g. W3C ld-signatures/ld-proofs and W3C DID (Decentralized Identifiers) or x.509 certs in a CT log.
> FWIU, the Fuschia team is building package signing on top of TUF.
W3C Web Bundles + Linked Data for the SBOM and metadata could be a good solution for software supply chain security in general: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29296573 :
>> Web Bundles, more formally known as Bundled HTTP Exchanges, are part of the Web Packaging proposal.
>> HTTP resources in a Web Bundle are indexed by request URLs, and can optionally come with signatures that vouch for the resources. Signatures allow browsers to understand and verify where each resource came from, and treats each as coming from its true origin. This is similar to how Signed HTTP Exchanges, a feature for signing a single HTTP resource, are handled.
Are DNS (DNSSEC, DoH, DoT downgrade attacks), CA compromise (SPOF), and x.509 cert forgery still the significant potential points of failure? What of that can e.g. Web3 solve for?
I don't want to be dismissive, but I hate deploying my applications for this reason. I'm an application developer. I'm not averse to infrastructure as code, and containerization, and I'm happy to do ops for my preferred stack. But I can't learn all this stuff too.
docker trust key generate jeff
# docker trust key load key.pem --name jeff
docker trust signer add --key cert.pem jeff registry.example.com/admin/demo
docker trust sign registry.example.com/admin/demo:1
export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1
docker push registry.example.com/admin/demo:1
docker trust inspect --pretty registry.example.com/admin/demo:1
docker trust revoke registry.example.com/admin/demo:1Running containers on AWS requires uploading an image to a registry/repository, but there isn't any API to actually upload the .json manifest files and .tar.gz layer files they need, even if I have them sat in a folder in front of me (compare this to Lambda, where we can upload a .zip to S3).
The worst part is that the "official" way to upload artifacts to a repository actually requires installing the 'docker' command, running some sort of "login" command in that, piping around some secret tokens generated by the AWS CLI, etc.
The only other approach I could find is their "low level" chunk-based upload API. I wrote a Python script around that (pretty much just a 'while' loop), so I can avoid this docker sillyness.
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/getti...
If I'm starting a project, I want everything small, simple, and self-contained within my project directory. If, right out of the gate, I'm supposed to already have a daemon running (as root it seemed for a while?) which will do the building and execution, and a "registry" set up somewhere, I've already got pieces I likely don't understand and magic commands and high level abstractions for interacting with them, and introductory material telling me "this magic command is all you have to do! look how much you don't have to worry about!"
But I am worrying about it. And that's why I love when people write these "hard way" guides. So thank you for that link.
On the server where I need to run that site, I just transfer the tar, load the image and run the docker image. It's so straightforward I much more prefer this way than being dependant on external registry sites for deployments.
.wh. files? S_IFWHT? Never heard of 'er! Layers as tars that need extracting? #gzipallthethings (what is that you're saying? gzip is slow?)
They did add mime types for layers, so in theory you could do something better, but that's not going to happen because it's not backwards compatible.
docker save <image> | ssh <remote host> docker load
`docker save` archives the entire (often huge) image. `docker-pushmi-pullyu` uses an ephemeral registry as an intermediary, so it only needs to transfer layers that have changed. It saves me a lot of time.
Is that where you got the names from or somewhere else? (the blast-from-the-past aspect of seeing those names again has got me wondering about the etymology in general :)
Someone else I knew made .deb packages, which might have been smarter, since there were some hosts we didn't containerize (mainly ones that handled routing and such; I know now we might have been able to get away with doing it, but at the time I didn't and I thought it might be too much hassle for an already complicated project)
From the linked website "Skopeo is a tool for moving container images between different types of container storages. It allows you to copy container images between container registries like docker.io, quay.io, and your internal container registry or different types of storage on your local system". Perhaps redhat plan to roll up skopeo functionality into Podman at some point?
https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/skopeo-10-released#:~:text=Sk....
a docker push/docker pull can skip layers that already exist.
docker run -d -p 5000:5000 --name registry registry:2
https://docs.docker.com/registry/#:~:text=The%20Registry%20i....
I ended up replacing it with AWS ECR. We only have a couple of container repos so ECR only ends up costing a few dollars per month. Not local, but very easy and almost free.
But I do it for Docker. I have overall the sense that Podman is trying to accomplish feature parity with Docker but isn't there yet. Feedback on this formulation?
So according to your update it's still not ready. Podman-compose is just a shell wrapper that translates compose yaml into podman shell commands. Which is why it will never really work imo because it's a hack.
We really need some OCI way of declaring containers. Recently apko[1] was announced but it's for apk systems so I'm not sure how it helps me on Fedora.
I think the idea was that you should be able to use the Kubernetes format spec to specify podman Pods. But I have yet to see that work. Until then podman is just something I use locally, but I still need docker to help my devs. There is no way I can force podman on them.
Isn't Docker Compose the exact same thing though?
But my experience with podman-compose has been that it's not ready, mainly for more complex compose setups with different network access. I think that is what Pods are perfect for.
docker-compose2 has a bug with Podman right now, but a fix went into upstream this week to fix support.