> A rationale for this is presented in Appendix A Strength of Memorized Secrets.
The relevant part of which reads:
> The minimum password length that should be required depends to a large extent on the threat model being addressed. Online attacks where the attacker attempts to log in by guessing the password can be mitigated by limiting the rate of login attempts permitted...
>
> Offline attacks are sometimes possible when one or more hashed passwords is obtained by the attacker through a database breach. The ability of the attacker to determine one or more users’ passwords depends on the way in which the password is stored. Commonly, passwords are salted with a random value and hashed, preferably using a computationally expensive algorithm. Even with such measures, the current ability of attackers to compute many billions of hashes per second with no rate limiting requires passwords intended to resist such attacks to be orders of magnitude more complex than those that are expected to resist only online attacks.
Which means that an attacker now knows that moving "only numeric" to the beginning of their attack sequence may be a viable strategy. Whereas if the rule did not specify, the attack would not be able to make assumptions about the character set.
The only thing prolonging your account at that point is the service's rate-limiting, assuming a naive "enter this password in the login field, try it, repeat."
Weak passwords can be fine, provided rate limiting is extremely aggressive. You can adjust this based on access e.g. your admin account might be locked under stricter heuristics like a single attempted login outside your geographic region (Live mail does this to me sometimes). In this case the user might even have the correct password, but if something else doesn't add up then you can block.
On a few sites I've actually used old student ID #'s - easy to type and reasonably long, with the exception of one, all are 6+ characters.
Far too short.