Hacker News Reader

Comment by harryvederci | Hacker News Reader

Some interesting parts:

> Every Kremlin ruler knows that one of the quickest ways to end a Russian dynasty or regime is to lose a war.

> In October, Rasputitsa turns firm ground into mud. In March, the frozen steppes thaw, and the land again becomes at best a bog, and at worst a sea of mud.

> The key to thwarting Russian ambitions is to prevent Moscow from having a quick victory and to raise the economic, political, and military costs by imposing economic sanctions, ensuring political isolation from the West, and raising the prospect of a prolonged insurgency that grinds away the Russian military. In this war, Russia might have the watches, but the West and Ukraine may have the time.

View on HN

I knew winter was the gratest defence against the west.

I didn't imagine the spring being the best defence against the east.

It was always both. And General "Winter" is to a huge extend a myth.

Well, General Winter is much more powerful if your equipment doesn't work in subzero temperatures and you have huge supply chain bottlenecks that make it hard to supply fuel and winter clothing.

None of these factors are at play here.

The easiest direction to attack Moscow is from the south. Woods West of Moscow were intentionally left untouched for centuries to be a deathtrap for potential invasion.

Just like the Ardennes Forest was impenetrable and not worth reinforcing?

Probably more of a barrier during pre-modern times.

groups like the mongols easily took rus lands and burned kiev because of their protection against the mentioned problems. Steppe horses and soldiers were good in the cold, their tools were working just fine, and their raiding of cities like kiev made it easy to just not need supply lines.

Mongol horses eat all the food in an area, they have to remain mobile. They were easily defeated (2nd time around) with area and food denial methods like castles.

During WWII, the two rasputitsa/mud seasons generally were the only times the eastern front was slightly quieter and these seasons significantly impacted both sides.

Summer and even Winter generally saw numerous offensives by contrast.

During the first year, in October 41, Barbarossa and operation Typhoon (Battle of Moscow) stopped temporarily in part due to the rasputitsa, and only resumed when the ground froze in early November (incidentally giving time for the Soviets to reorganize the extremely weakened front protecting Moscow).

The soviet Winter offensives mostly stopped around the Spring rasputitsa, Case Blue and other initial battles only started only in late April 42. and after Stalingrad, the Soviet reconquest of the South during the 42/43 Winter stopped again around Spring 43, with offensive operation only restarting in July 43 (Battle of Kursk).

There are of course many other factors explaining these pauses (offensive strength exhausted, over-extended supply lines, etc), but rasputitsa was definitely a factor.

> Every Kremlin ruler knows that one of the quickest ways to end a Russian dynasty or regime is to lose a war.

Romanov dynasty had many wars before being toppled.

The claim is less that every loss (not every war) ends a dynasty than that many ends of dynasties can be traced to lost wars. The loss to the Japanese was a huge factor in the loss of respect at the end of the Romanov dynasty.

The "mud" stood out to me as well, since it frames the timeline as having short term urgency. But I wonder if it cuts both ways.

For example, if Putin occupies and holds Donbas and Odessa, what's the likelihood of Ukrainian forces mounting a counter attack and reclaiming said territory? This puts the onus of invasion onto the Ukrainians, which are more configured for resistance in the first place.

The result could be another "soft annex" similar to Crimea.

A number of analysts correctly predicted before the invasion that the mud thing is overblown. As we can see, most Russian armor movement happens on roads, not on land.

> As we can see, most Russian armor movement happens on roads

That's why they're being annihilated. Moving your forces on roads is something you do after you've secured an area, not before.

Then you haven't spent enough time on /r/ukrainewarvideoreport. There's tons of videos of tanks, artillery and anti-air stuck in the mud, abandoned. It pretty much forces the Russians to stick to the roads, which makes them very vulnerable (they're all lined up and can't escape anywhere because they would get stuck).

Except the Ukrainians didn't bomb them on the roads so how is it a disadvantage if you have the air superiority under control enough that your convoy isn't getting carpet bombed?

Again I invite you to check out the subreddit I mentioned. There's tons of videos of bombed out convoys on the roads. Easily hundreds if not thousands of destroyed vehicles over the last week.

Surely this:

> In October, Rasputitsa turns firm ground into mud.

must actually be:

> In October, Rasputitsa turns mud into firm ground.

No, Rasputitsa is two times per year, in spring and autumn.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasputitsa

Ahh ok, I misunderstood. Somehow I read the two sentences as a see-saw: First the mud comes, then in march the mud comes.. what?

Ye it really confused me too but thinking about it obvoiusly there is a mud gradient two times a year when it freezes some day, is how the next etc.

literal meaning: "messed up paths".

Rains come before the cold

The cycle is dry, bog, ice, bog (summer, autumn into winter, deep winter, spring)

Reply on news.ycombinator.com