Why class societies are the rule, not the exception
futurity.org
futurity.org
This may be an argument for the superiority of militarist states (e.g. Assyria, Prussia), but it's anachronistic for the study at hand, which deals with the type of situation prevailing in e.g. the pre-civilization and pre-organized army Neolithic.
I'm generalizing here, but there's so much we don't know about those times...
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjourna...
The crucial idea:
> Our simulation results support the hypothesis that socioeconomic stratification may have spread due to its effects on the demography of small groups—i.e. by demic diffusion—rather than cultural adoption. [...] In variable environments, stratified groups migrate more and are less likely to go extinct than egalitarian groups.
The main contribution of the paper seems to be the identification of a survival advantage for unequal societies in unstable environments.
To make this more concrete, imagine two neighboring villages A and B, hit by a catastrophic crop failure that has reduced harvest by 50%. In village A, there is a strong ethos of equality; the dwindled resources are divided equally, and basically midway through winter everyone dies of starvation.
In village B, the inhabitants strongly believe, on the contrary, that tradition (gods, spirits, ancestor cults etc.) orders the elevation of some above the others. The favored individuals get their normal full share of the reduced harvest, and the un-favored get none. This results into an immediate 50% mortality; but the favored survive through the full winter.
After a series of adequate harvests, the B population increases enough to split off a migrating group that takes over the (now abandoned) site of village A. The ethos of inequality is taken with them, and thus spreads at the expense of egalitarianism.
- village A invades village B for food (the fact that out-of-touch aristocrats occasionally send an army of unwilling soldiers at the gates of A is another possible reason)
- village B consumes more food than village A, simply because aristocrats like to eat, so it starves first
- in village B, servants die of starvation, the ruling class is incompetent to feed itself
- villagers of village B simply walk by foot into village A, leaving their oppressors to care for themselves
- there's a revolution in village B, making it, effectively, a village A2 (possible catalyst: shortage of food)
in other words, i don't think that's why. however, i haven't read the article, so maybe their arguments are more convincing than yours.
The reason this may be important, in my view, is that it offers a model for what may have happened in the Ubaid period, when previously egalitarian agricultural societies became gradually more stratified, and finally transitioned into the beginnings of our civilization.
The traditional, Marxist explanation is that agriculture generated a production surplus, which was illegitimately seized by upstart elites. This paper's alternative model indicates incipiently hierarchical societies might actually have had a survival advantage, under the conditions of the period.
If we're talking hierarchy generally rather than (more) distinct classes - which are not prone to (positive) change - I'd concur that it is more successful in general. For the reason of being able to emphasize the collective needs I suppose, though a question of mapping talent to positions remains (and unmapping).
> unequal sharing of scarce resources created more incentive to migrate in search of additional resources.
In other words, societies where some have less encourage the lesser havers to move in search of better opportunities. So you are right, with the added benefit that even in other times, the lesser are encouraged to migrate and spread.
Now, how do are you going to convince koreans that sleeping under a fan isn't going to kill them?
Raw numbers collected over decades of research disprove this handily. While working hard is a factor, there are other phenomena which will just as easily impair upwards social mobility. There's a reason they call it "poverty trap"
For an introduction, take a gander at Gladwell's books.
http://monkeysuncle.stanford.edu/?p=541
Pinker’s term: “The Igon Value Problem” is a clever play
on the Eigenvalue Problem in mathematics. You see,
Gladwell apparently quotes someone referring to an “igon
value.” This is clearly a concept he never dealt with
himself even though it is a ubiquitous tool in the
statistics and decision science about which Gladwell is
frequently so critical. According to Pinker, the Igon
Value Problem occurs “when a writer’s education on a
topic consists in interviewing an expert,” leading him or
her to offering “generalizations that are banal, obtuse
or flat wrong.” In other words, the Igon Value Problem
is one of dilettantism.
As for the Horatio Alger "myth", the modern incarnation is the internet startup. Look at YC. There is just no dispute that smart people working hard can put a few million in the bank after several years of all out toil in the Valley.This statement is either utterly nonsensical and backed up by nothing or it's circular in nature (i.e. "How do you know they're hard working and smart? Because they put a few million in the bank", "Why were they able to put a few million in the bank? Because they're hard working and smart").
I suppose it depends on what you mean by success. But by the most common definitions (e.g. being rich) hard work isn't the main factor or even required at all (e.g. inherit millions from your parents requires how much effort? Basically not dying).
I watched my dad hold down two jobs and come home and work into the night providing his family with the things we needed. The first career job I had made more than he's ever made in his life and that job was mostly standing around.
Sadly, how we really wish things were has nothing to do with how they actually are.
I can "work" very hard pushing stones uphill like Sisyphus, and I probably won't get rich as a result.
A major reason why inequality exists is because the work ethic required for long-term thinking and planning is a model of behavior which children acquire from their parents through learning, observation, and imitation. Children from families where parents do not consider long-term goals worthy of pursuit are hugely disadvantaged.