Cryptographic key exchange protocols traditionally rely on computational conjectures such as the hardness of prime factorisation to provide security against eavesdropping attacks. Remarkably, quantum key distribution protocols like the one proposed by Bennett and Brassard provide information-theoretic security against such attacks, a much stronger form of security unreachable by classical means.
This is not wrong, but in my opinion quite misleading. QKD is no replacement for asymmetric cryptography since it requires exchanging a secret key before the communication can take place. This makes it functionally equivalent to a symmetric stream cipher. So why do you mention prime factorization and cite RSA? The security of QKD should be compared to that of the best symmetric algorithms, not that of asymmetric ones.
I have seen this pattern in many talks and papers from the field. Maybe the issue is that the QKD community seems to have almost no overlap with the IT security community. In my experience, QKD people almost never talk about how you would actually use and/or attack a system in practice.