Telegram, the most popular messenger in urban Ukraine is by default plaintext db
twitter.com
twitter.com
The real problem is what Moxie doesn't want to tell you is that they want to release a private untraceable cryptocurrency called MobileCoin [1], which not only the majority of the coins are owned by the founders. [2][3] so basically orchestrating a pump-and-dump, this coin (like Monero) enables these dark net criminals, scammers and extremists to fund their operations anywhere in the world and it is totally untraceable.
Now I see why Moxie is out there hyping the Signal / MobileCoin pump-and-dump scheme again?
[0] https://www.theverge.com/22872133/signal-cryptocurrency-paym...
[1] https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360057625692-In...
[2] https://mixin.one/assets/MobileCoin-Whitepaper-EN_FINAL.pdf
[3] https://github.com/UkoeHB/Mechanics-of-MobileCoin/blob/maste...
It might as well be plaintext.
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/02/08/can-t...
[2] https://cellebrite.com/en/cellebrites-new-solution-for-decry...
And never forget Telegram's promise to cooperate with Roskomnadzor in the name of fighting 'extremism' (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/telegram-rus...).
I am not even looking at Cellebrite’s plug all the way from 2020 (because https://signal.org/blog/cellebrite-vulnerabilities/).
So Signal's "encrypted" database is literally marketing. It doesn't prevent anything. Cellebrite can access it, as can another app with the right series of zero days.
Signal's encrypted database is as secure as Telegram's plain text database, because both require privileged access, and Signal isn't more secure (the encryption has been pwned by multiple companies).
Signal may be liable to receive those warrants from Russian gov, though I'm sure moxie will publish and mock each one. With Telegram, all you need is to hack a server and/or send an agent with a $5 wrench to one of the guys who runs it (or just ask nicely, they are cooperating after all).
On the other hand, Signal's "E2E" encrypted chats regularly have critical bugs such as those that send private image content to random people on your contacts list, an utterly inexcusable error that suggests poor engineering standards. [1]
I think I'll take audited E2E encryption over E2E encryption that fans out private images at random to your contacts.
[1] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/signal-fixes-...