When I was a student in the 1990s, I was taught about hypothesis testing (and all the hassle of p-fishing etc.), and about Bayesian inference (which is lovely, until you have to invent priors over the model space -- e.g. a prior over neural network architectures). These are both systems that tie themselves in epistemological knots when trying to answer the simple question "What model shall I use?"
Holdout set validation is such a clean simple idea, and so easy to use (as long as you have big data), and it does away with all the frequentist and Bayesian tangle, which is why it's so widespread in ML nowadays.
It also aligns statistical inference with Popper's idea of scientific falsifiability -- scientists test their models against a new experimental data, data scientists can test their model against qualitatively different holdout sets. (Just make sure you don't get your holdout set by shuffling, since that's not what Popper would call a "genuine risky validation".)
The article mentions Breiman's "alternative view of the foundations of statistics based on prediction rather than modeling". Breiman does make a big deal of evaluation on holdout sets; but his "prediction" idea isn't general enough, since it doesn't accommodate generative modelling (e.g. GPT, GANs). I think it's better to frame ML in terms of "evaluating model fit on a holdout set", since that accommodates both predictive and generative modelling.