Also, it outright states "Granted, the claim could also be reasonable, if a particular definition of consciousness was specified as well."
Also, it outright states "Granted, the claim could also be reasonable, if a particular definition of consciousness was specified as well."
Experts in what? There _are_ no experts in consciousness, at least in the lay sense.
But aside from that, there is a lot of philosophy on what consciousness is (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness has some of it). And those people, especially philosophers in the crossover of computer systems/intelligence and general philosophy are "experts".
And that’s why science communication matters. Having some super excited researcher talking publicly without an editor or someone to ground them just gives wrong ideas. Imagine the number of enthusiasts who did not read any rebuttals and now think AI are becoming conscious.
The statement "Experts largely agree that current forms of AI are not conscious" connects to two pieces of expertise: expertise in consciousness and expertise in AI. It is plausible an expert in AI might have the background to state with confidence that AI is not "conscious" in any meaningful sense of the word.
What is or isn't conscious is arguably as much (or maybe even more) a political, moral/ethical, philosophical and religious question as it is a technical one.
It's sort of like the question of what is or isn't alive, or what is or isn't a person -- questions which we know are central to the abortion debate, euthanasia, medical experimentation, animal/human rights, etc...
Consciousness is just as much an ethical/philosphical/religious mine field, and I'm not sure I'm comfortable handing over its definition to some random people who just happen to be good at, say, designing neural nets.
Religion is the observation of chemical effects on the body, psychological warfare on the mind (ie fear of an unknown all powerful entity that created everything around you) and then some sort of semblance to create a social rules based order out of chaos, whilst also attempting to understand whats going on.
Philosophy is deep thinking, sometimes using abstract examples to conjure up ideas which might work on the social order to avoid chaos.
Ethics is another attempt to install a social order on individuals and groups which can include society as a whole.
Consciousness is an entity's feedback/sensing from reactions within its container (body/app), feedback/sensing from the environment its in, the ability to remember past experiences and the ability to interact with itself (feed or rewrite code) and the environment to further extend its own life, acquire more knowledge and perhaps reproduce if immortality is not an option, but if immortality is attained being able to reproduce becomes an ability that might not be carried out for other reasons, like the need to live within the constraints of its environment.
Every lifeform on Earth has evolved through trial and error to survive in an environment through chemical changes over millennia, a bit of Darwinism, pot luck and obviously remembering what works in order to continue its survival.
Reflexes could be considered unconsciousness which you may or may not experience (typically chemically based but what drives the nervous system other than some calcium/sodium/potassium acting as a low current voltage electrical source), for example, breathing most of the time its in the background, you are not conscious of it, but remembering tells you that you are doing it, but sometimes we become conscious of it due to other chemicals which might be raised affecting the body and brain.
So I'd say provided the AI can remember what works in order to continue its survival by avoiding what kills it if its had a close call, and it can seek out what helps it survive, like powerups in a computer game, or jumping from computing device to another where it can detect things like battery backup/UPS and reproduce to further aid its survival, it can explore its environment and perhaps adapt to new environments ie jump from a laptop/desktop to a network switch and handle the different instruction sets which exist with different cpu's, then I think you can say its conscious. Lifespans/timelines are going to vary, but if some code displays this within a computer, then I think you have a true AI even though we might not be able to communicate with it other than perhaps by scaring it off like the fleeting glimpse of something out in the wild, that hasnt been caught yet.
I'm torn over the reproducibility though because if it could survive indefinitely in its environment thats no different to cancer cell lines like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henrietta_Lacks
However if it could survive in its environment perhaps using reproducibility as a survival extension mechanism that would then mean having to pass on knowledge because otherwise you would have AI able to learn from its environment but its not passing on TLDR's from previous experience, likewise I think an AI would need to be able to move around in its environment like go from a network switch to a computer or even incorporate a network switch along with other parts of it running on a desktop/laptop.
And if it can communicate, could it communicate using Human Interface Devices, or other things which would enable it to explore its environment, just like we can send probes off into space or undersea.
Some computer viruses fit some of the definitions above but not all.
So yes, "slightly conscious" should be qualified better, its too general, but it might stimulate another round of funding for those wanting to explore the field.
For example, should the ability to traverse new environments be included or not? Not all lifeforms on this planet can do that, eg fish excepting those taken out of water for a shortwhile. But most mammals can survive for a period of time in and out of water, like dogs, bears, etc, etc. Its a tough one because different animals have evolved to survive in their environment and that environment could include abit of land and water, like penguins.
This is the problem until consciousness is defined, what is slightly conscious?
Edit: If I had to say is there a company/entity which is getting close to be classed as an AI, then of the publicly available information out there, Windows is currently closest to becoming an AI. Its got https://copilot.github.com/ which probably wouldnt take much to hook up and have it rewrite itself. It already runs on a wide array of machine architecture and thus various environments when considering ruggedized laptops, phones, servers, office & home spaces. Its update mechanism is both a central server farm and peer to peer which wouldnt take much to get it updating using other communication methods beside network access, in some respects it already does this when thinking about mobile data networks. I havent seen anything like this from Facebook, Google, Apple or anyone else yet, but that might be because its not public knowledge.
Thus, even if we cannot clearly state for any given animal whether it is or is not conscious, we can still clearly state that, say, a coffee maker is not conscious, even if it has rudimentary processing capability, or that a person is.
As I implied in another comment[0], I believe it would be both possible and valuable to construct a set of conditions that we collectively feel are necessary, if not sufficient, to define consciousness. That way, we could at least rule it out as long as no AI meets those minimum standards.
a coffee maker might include a temperature sensor (thermistor) and a heating element. does it predict the future? yes: it has an expectation of the future temperature given the current state. does it model itself as an agent? to a limited degree: it considers the future effects to the thermistor which its immediate control of the heater has, it might even run hypotheticals over a set of different heater controls. throw in a pressure sensor or a flow meter and some valves for more fun.
now, i haven’t read much literature post 90’s on this, but one of the more prominent components of consciousness seemed to be: modeling yourself as an actor within a larger setting, and using that to produce outputs based on predictions and thereby cause a specific future(*). does the coffee maker qualify?
also i don’t think many people think of consciousness in a binary sense. that grey area you describe may be less of “we don’t know if these are conscious (binary)”, but rather “we don’t know if these things have experiences which are relatable enough to our own to be worth considering in the motivating questions (i.e. ethics).” and the things at the bottom (the coffee maker) are more like “whatever experience this thing has is so far removed from our own that we’ll never be able to understand it in human terms (like pain and suffering or wants and desires).”
(*) though some people like Dennet argue that the conscious experience might not always be involved in the causal part of this loop.
If conscious is defined as “to have subjective experiences”, then I don’t believe “other people are conscious” is coherent.
The argument I hear usually is that other bodies are constructed like my body and I’m conscious therefore they are probably conscious too.
But I think this completely misses the point. The issue is the proposition itself. How can that proposition be translated into empirical claims? If the answer is just that other bodies are like my body, then conscious is just a fancy synonym of “is a human being”.
Coherent but about as likely as Last Thusdayism. You have to factor the probability and potential mechanisms of what might give rise to consciousness and if you do you should have a very low probability on other humans not having it, just as you have a low probability on a random human you meet physically not having a brain without having to confirm by looking inside their head.
But in principle, I could open someone’s skull and look for a brain. How would I examine another human body for consciousness?
I’m trying to question the coherence of the proposition itself, and not trying to refute an argument in favor of it.
> You yourself can also never physically check say Plato's skull either but I doubt that deters you from thinking he had a brain.
The Plato’s brain question (PB) confuses me, but here is my attempt at an analysis.
First, I think PB is tricky in the same way that all historical propositions are tricky. And I think this trickiness is different than the trickiness around the proposition “other people are conscious”.
Second, here is a scenario that I think is like PB. Consider the proposition, “The Great Wall of China exists.” I’ve never been to China, but say you go and tell me that you saw the wall. And in principle I could go see the wall for myself. But now what if the wall is destroyed before I go to see it? Was the proposition that, “The Great Wall of China exists”, coherent before the wall’s demise, but now incoherent?
But if you tell me, “I am having subjective experiences”, how can/could I ever in principle examine this for myself, as I could the Great Wall?
The point is that just because you can't prove something to yourself it doesn't make the belief incoherent. And you can use your other tools to arrive at likelihoods for said belief.
At any rate, there's plenty of things we believe about say quantum mechanics without being able to observe them directly by using theory and observing secondary effects.
In theory it's also possible to eventually have an exact definition of what we mean by consciousness, figure out which parts of the brain are relevant in what ways and observe secondary effects and use theory to confirm others have it same as with QM. It's all caused by physical effects and at a higher level than things we already reason about just fine.
If a proposition doesn’t make predictions about my empirical experience then what is it saying?
And if a proposition does make such empirical predictions, than it’s effectively just a name for those predictions.
That’s essentially the view I’m coming from.
> At any rate, there's plenty of things we believe about say quantum mechanics without being able to observe them directly by using theory and observing secondary effects.
I don’t know any physics so I can’t comment.
Why are propositions about consciousness different from propositions about faeries?
Ultimately they are not. It's just that the evidence points towards an extremely low chance of fairies being real and extremely high chance of others being conscious in a comparable manner to how you are conscious.
Every North American faerie weighs more than 10kg.
Every North American faerie weighs 10kg or less.
As another example, I suggest that “Every idea weighs more than 10kg” and “Every idea weighs 10kg or less” are both not meaningful, because it is not possible to measure the weight of a given idea.
And so consider a claim like, “Consciousness has property X”, how can I decide whether or not such a claim is true?
edit: That last claim should have been, “Some other person’s consciousness has property X”.