I think this is a good take, though depending on your domain and the maturity of your security program you eventually reach a point where the blast radius from misconfiguration becomes manageable through mitigations you have in place.
Past that point, it’s daisy chains of exploits as you say. It’s not uncommon for sophisticated attackers to sit on a number of 0-day exploits until they find a venue to deliver them. This is one of the reasons the Log4j announcement was scary—it opened up a venue to a wide variety of applications and infrastructure that were previously protected through other means.
> But overall, we're far from perfection. Solid configuration and code takes thought and planning - two luxuries rarely afforded to product teams when the business is screaming for release.
I’ve found a big part of a good security program is helping an organization calibrate it’s actual risk appetite. If business ending events are known and understood, everyone should know in what cases a security issue becomes a blocker.