I very much doubt it. Law enforcement doesn’t seem too concerned about regular old HTTPS.
I wonder why?
I wonder why?
NSLs: https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters/faq
Dragnet/Geofence warrants: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/google-tracked-his-bike... and https://www.logically.ai/articles/geofence-warrants-on-the-r...
Dragnet/Mass-surveillance keyword warrants: https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/10/04/googl...
Dragnet/mass-scanning of online storage: https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/12/20/googl...
PRISM: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program)
RAMPART-A: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAMPART-A
Forced backdoors into "encrypted" email: https://www.theregister.com/2020/12/08/tutanota_backdoor_cou...
And who knows what else is still secret. A good rule of thumb is that if something's in the "cloud" or hosted on someone's computer that you don't directly control, you should assume that LEOs have access to it.
When all the data is centralized, you don't care about the end-point encryption. All you care about is having access to all the databases.
Edit: "Officer."
It's a catch-all term for all the law enforcement people. There's now so many organizations that can get your data through warrants, and some even without warrants, so that's a convenient term to use. And especially if you're not a citizen/resident of the US since the Fourth Amendment does not apply to you. But it's not like the 4A has stopped them or slowed them down anyway.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_enforcement_officer#United...
The USG doesn't need to (and doesn't bother to) break HTTPS for domestic LEO, because existing mechanisms are easier and approved by the courts.
No, read my comment again. Every one of the links shows a completely legal way to grab someone's data from any company. The whole point of my initial comment was to point out that legal system is so well primed against any privacy pushback that it's irrelevant what data is encrypted in transit. All the repositories and databases are just one NSL away. And NSLs are so easy to get that you don't even need to convince a judge to approve one.
From EFF: https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters/faq
>By using NSLs, the FBI can directly order companies to turn over information about their customers and then gag the companies from telling anyone that they did so. Because the process is secret, and because even the companies can’t tell if specific NSLs violate the law, the process is ripe for abuse.
>A judge does not have to approve the NSL or an accompanying gag order.
>Over 300,000 NSLs have been issued in the past 10 years alone. The most NSLs issued in a single year was 56,507 in 2004. In 2013, President Obama’s Intelligence Review Group reported; that the government continues to issue an average of nearly 60 NSLs every day. By contrast, in 2000 (the year before the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act that loosened NSL standards), 8,500 NSLs were issued.
1. HTTPS relies heavily on DNS. It’s as secure as DNS is. Nuff said.
2. As has been said, there’s law enforcement can get the logs. Not hard.
3. The way the web currently works strongly encourages users to wear a “name tag.” It’s hard to take that name tag off. HTTPS doesn’t help with that.
HTTPS is very important, but has much narrower scope, and chaotic implementation, than most people realize.
I don't think this is true: HTTPS (and TLS >= 1.3) provide a suite of protections that mostly address perceived weaknesses in DNS (ECH, ESNI, CT logging, HSTS, etc.).
As for DNS itself: DoH and DoT is widely available, and my understanding is that all major browsers currently support one or the other. I've been using outbound DoH for at least two years at this point via Pi-hole.
I interpreted "law enforcement doesn't seem to care [...]" as a claim that domestic LEO has meaningfully broken HTTPS on general traffic, which I don't believe is the case. But if you meant that they don't care because they have legal access mechanisms that already suit their purposes, then I agree.
Peer to peer or end to end encryption removes this trivially easy access, which is why they don't like it.
How is https communication not end to end encrypted? And what’s the difference between subpoenaing a server vs an end user? The server is just another person/organization.
Edit: Re-reading this I guess you mean that having a centra server acting as a middle man would probably not be end to end which I agree with. I thought you meant user <—-> server wasn’t end to end.
Generally, “end to end encryption” refers to client to client encryption, where the sever routes data but can’t read it.
That would cover any use of encryption. E2EE is a term used where there is a distinction to be made between access by users at the ends of the system and some other part of the system. Originally used to cover the encrypted email case where there is a lot of "middle" in the form of email servers and a small amount of "end".
The term is often used incorrectly these days for marketing purposes. TLS could be used in an E2EE system, but it is normally not.