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Comment by pessimizer | Hacker News Reader

Count me as a P-Zombie. I think the reason that consciousness is a hard problem is that it's largely used as a word referring to nothing in particular, and as such can be argued about endlessly.

The real problem is locality. Why am I located in me instead of in you? Why is it so much easier for me to see out of my eyes than it is for me to see out of yours? What's the connection between my perspective and my body?

The idea that self-awareness/consciousness ("I am me") is the big problem is weird. I have no problem locating that in the material world. If I program a computer to poll all of its peripherals, report on its RAM and processors, and adjust how it runs its programs based on that, that's as much self-awareness as I have, if not more.

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> What's the connection between my perspective and my body?

Your body is doing the experiencing. It is what's perceiving.

Your mind is just your body's UI for the world and your body is the user.

The interesting bit is not the sensory input. We mostly know how the sensors work and how they are triggered.

The fun question is, what exactly is connected to those sensors and experiences them and where is the location of that thing?

It's like we're sitting with a VR headset in our brain, playing that game we call life. But, where exactly are we and how is that headset connected to our sensors?

> The fun question is, what exactly is connected to those sensors and experiences them and where is the location of that thing?

Again, your body.

Think about it. Your body is experiencing what your brain has generated out of your sensory input.

You don't need a homunculus, you are a body. You are your body and there's nothing else to you.

For me it's worse. I don't think theres any reason to identify my perspective with any homunculus. It's watching somebody play a game, not playing it. My question is this: I "know" there are a lot of games being played - why am I watching this one?

It's the one your body generated. Your body took all its data, generated your mind out of that and experiences your mind. For anything else to happen, you'd have to pipe the signal of your mind (that your body generated) into someone else's brain.

It's like you're asking why is this computer that I generated this data visualization from this data on this computer displaying this data visualization on this computer. Umm, because that's what you asked it to do and that's the default? For anything else to have happened, you would have had to redirect the output to a network and then go receive it on a different computer.

What does it mean for a body to be "mine?" As a materialist, I accept that my body is an assemblage of physical influences. I have no reason to doubt that it has as much self-control as water flowing down a hill. So - does water flowing down a hill have a perspective? Where is it located? It doesn't have a nervous system to blame things on. Is it infinitely divisible? Is it distinct from me? If I pour water from one cup into another, can I say that I'm any less the water as I am my hands, even though I'm controlling the water, getting feedback from the water, subjecting the water as much to my nervous system as I am subjecting my hand itself? What about when I shake your hand? What if I'm blind and I ask you what you can see, then react based on that?

Don't gish gallop.

> What does it mean for a body to be "mine?"

You are your body.

> So - does water flowing down a hill have a perspective? Where is it located?

Why would it? Does it sense and produce a mind? Not that I'm aware of. You could go the pansychism route if you want though. See David Chalmers or something.

> can I say that I'm any less the water as I am my hands, even though I'm controlling the water, getting feedback from the water, subjecting the water as much to my nervous system as I am subjecting my hand itself?

According to enactivism, no. [1] In general, see embodied minds theory. [2]

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enactivism

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_cognition

I'm not intending to. I wasn't proposing all of that as separable questions. I was proposing it as a series of statements that I have no material means to say anything about.

> Why would it? Does it sense and produce a mind?

I don't know what a mind is supposed to be in this context, or its importance. I don't identify my perspective with my thoughts. My thoughts are something a body does. My perspective is just my location. After death, my thoughts will cease. My location will not change.

I cannot guess what point you are trying to make here, but I do know that 'location' is not a synonym for 'perspective'.

If you are going to ask questions, you should at least be able to justify their relevance, if asked.

And then step into the Star Trek transporter. :)

You're obliterated, then perfectly reassembled on the other side. Is that still "you", "subjectively"? Should you or others even care about that question? And, if not, damn, that's ego-killing af.

My answer is yes but it depends on your theory of identity. Unless you're positing a soul or something though, your answer is probably going to have to be yes.

Or even without transporters: what evidence do I have that the me that ended this sentence is the same me that began it? If anything, I have material evidence that it isn't.

Yeah, you need a theory of identity to answer your questions, first year philosophy sutff [1].

1. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/

Exactly. But having a theory of identity is just a declaration that you subscribe to one, not anything meaningful.

Umm, no. Having a theory of identity allows you to deduce the answers to your questions.

Based on an arbitrary choice. I can deduce as many answers to my questions as theories of identity that I can count. None of them will give me any insight into the question of subjectivity.

If it's an arabitrary choice then the problem is entirely you.

A copy is a copy. The copy remembers everything you remember. The copy can spend your money. The copy can have sex with your spouse. Is the copy "you"? Technically no, but it doesn't matter because there are no transporters.

But you go to sleep every night. Is the person who wakes up "you"? Many of the atoms in the person who woke up were in that person's stomach, and many of the atoms in the person who went to sleep are in the air. Does the difference from the transporter thing matter? No reason it should. The person who went to sleep is not here. The one who woke up can spend that person's money, wear that person's clothes, remember passwords. Close enough is close enough.

You might choose not to spend that person's money, next day. But they won't be needing it, and you do. So, no problem.

If you perceive a problem, you are just tying yourself in knots, and are guaranteed to make no progress.

Here's a thought experiment. You're going to use a Star Trek teleporter-like device to make an exact copy of yourself. What are the odds that you end up being the copy? Or rather, what should you believe the odds are that you will be the copy?

Of course, I, the original, will not be the copy, but if I go in knowing I'm not the copy, the the copy will come out knowing he's not the copy. Thus, you should go in believing there's a 50% chance you are the copy, and then both the original and the copy will come out with a logically consistent belief.

A good way to know for sure would be to use a sharpie to draw a mark on the inside of the particular chamber you step into before the machine is activated. Then, after you are copied, both people will have the memory of drawing such a mark. But the copy, who just materialized in a second chamber, will be surprised to find that there is no mark in front of him.

I understand that. It's my body that's doing the thinking, and my body that's typing this comment. The question is why there's some sort of proximity that I have with my comment that I don't have to yours.

I can't conceive of how there couldn't be. Your body gets sensory input, generates your mind and then your body experiences your mind. How could that possibly be dislocated from your body... The very idea is nonsense.

But this is dualism. I don't accept a difference between mind and body as a materialist.

edit: I can use a computer to remind me to use a computer to remind me about something. I can lose the use of my hands and eyes by severing biological wires. I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and the computer. I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and you, other than distance and mechanical connection (which we currently have, with some latency and signal distortion.)

> But this is dualism

No, you cannot deduce dualism from what I said. You filled in assumptions that aren't present and which I don't assert. It's just physicalism (materialism is an outdated term[1]) but would also work for neutral monism[2].

> I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and the computer. I can't pinpoint a distinction between me and you, other than distance and mechanical connection (which we currently have, with some latency and signal distortion.)

What? Maybe you need a psychiatrist now? This sounds like dpersonalization or derealization.

1. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

2. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/

Don't diagnose me, I'm not saying anything that alarms me, causes me discomfort, or makes me enjoy life any less. I just don't hold to the idea of "myself" being a cause as axiomatic. You're free to express the distinction between my control of the computer and my control of my hand, but don't call me crazy, it's rude.

"What is the difference between the speed and the car?"

The car is a thing, like your body. The speed is what the car is doing, like your mind is something your brain is doing. No problem, nothing to accept.

My own mind is something I am doing, just as I am typing just now. It should be obvious enough that neither is something you are doing.

I simply don't subscribe to self-causation.

OK, don't.

"Causation" is purely interpretation; the universe has nothing to do with that. People invented causation to help understand the universe, but there is nothing fundamental about it. So long as you think you need causation of any kind to understand consciousness, you will get nowhere.

> The question is why there's some sort of proximity that I have with my comment that I don't have to yours.

Because it expresses your thoughts. Your mind has access to them in a way that it does not have access to anyone else's thoughts.

In particular, that access includes memories of having them and taking the actions necessary to post them. If you lost those memories, and your words were not identified as being yours, you would no longer regard them any differently than you do anyone else's (it is not even certain that you would agree with them.)

Note that the above statements involve no presupposition of materialism, but they are consistent with it. In particular, from a physical point of view, it is obvious why one would only have privileged access to one's own thoughts and experiences.

Is a computer going to ask why am I operating on this specific CPU and not on the other CPU that is located in a server rack 2 meters away from it?

To be honest, I don’t get what you are really trying to understand or find out here.

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