Of course I could be wrong — consciously or unconsciously I could simply be voicing my own bias. But I think at some level people prefer a simple narrative with a hero and a villain regardless of whether the narrative is true.
Of course I could be wrong — consciously or unconsciously I could simply be voicing my own bias. But I think at some level people prefer a simple narrative with a hero and a villain regardless of whether the narrative is true.
Rational, yes, but rational only in the sense of "the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay liquid".
My experience is many MBS and finance people, during 2003-2008, knew that a ton of debt was garbage, that LTCM's blowup in 1998 showed massive structural weakness that was never repaired, and that a crash was going to come SOMETIME.
But the problem is that the rational decision in such a market is to keep investing and making money on the irrational rise, because no one knows when the crash will come or how bad it will be. It's actually rational to keep buying trash debt when the crash timing is unpredictable.
In the end, the finance people were actually correct to keep buying –– the gov't (that is, me you and every US taxpayer) bailed them out, and most of the traders did come out ahead after a bit of time.
I worked on a prop trading desk with some housing bears, who made some significant gains with shorts. While they understood that certain markets were overheated, I don’t think any of them suspected the breadth and depth of the crash that was coming. While their models were better than the other guys, in the end they were really wrong too. Just less wrong then the guys who went long.
The GFC was not a crisis of credit or trash assets. It was one of liquidity and hidden interconnections. (In America.)
If you look at how those supposedly-toxic CDOs actually paid out, including the CDOs squared and synthetics and whatnot, the ones rated AAA, the ratings agencies were--by and large--on the money [1]. The AAA tranches paid out AAA cash streams.
The problem was market participants took this to mean they'd behave like other AAA assets in all capacities. Including liquidity. That was a bad assumption. When people are scared, they'll trade for Treasuries. Not the thing that by all reason should pay out like a Treasury, and in fact, with the benefit of hindsight, did.
To the extent there was high hooliganery afoot, it was around e.g. CDSs written by non-bank actors, e.g. AIG. Which was a result of the liquidity problem described above.
[1] There is an obvious asterisk here in the endogeneity of the bailouts and these assets' performance. But given the pattern holds across borders and industries, irrespective of bailout intensity, the hypothesis that tranching works carries more weight.
There are a lot of people talking of the problems and reasons behind "investing in Growth" that we have seen the past few decades instead of investing in Value
I've been working in investment banking for a very long time now and this is simply not true. The whole trading floor knew exactly what they were packaging and selling and how this would eventually end.
Kitchen conversations prove everyone knew months before the crash.
JumpCrisscross did make the interesting point that the “bankers were selling crap” narrative about the crisis is often overstated - the real reason that the situation was a crisis was the cascading liquidity issues, not so much defaulting debt.
Would it be correct to say the really bad actors at the margins caused a cascade of events that snowballed and caught the people making good-faith decisions?
The bad actors being the people who did not do proper underwriting and verification (“liar loans” or “stated income loans”), and they did this intentionally under the guise of plausible deniability because they were earning profits on volume rather than quality.
> The bad actors being the people who did not do proper underwriting and verification (“liar loans” or “stated income loans”)
It's funny that somehow people want to hold people who lie on loan applications blameless. Aren't the victims of the bad underwriters the people they sold the loans to?
"You should have known I was lying and not lent me the money."
(I don't deny that predatory lending exists, but I don't think it was a major contributor to the crisis. I think home buyers and underwriters colluded because they were afraid of missing out on a hot housing market. And for many years this had been the right decision. And back to my original point, when it became the wrong decision, people looked for a simple answer, preferably a one in which they were blameless.)
But I expect better and more from professionals working in lending operations to do their due diligence and verify incomes. I believe I read about underwriter who were simply signing out stamping that they verified the loan application, but did not actually check anything, committing fraud also.