The unfederatedness of Signal seems to be a HN phenomena. Though someone did make a feature request that could be something that's kinda middle ground and seems more in line with Signal's philosophy[0]. Personally I think Signal works so well because you don't have to worry about servers, domains, and whatever. It just works. Exactly like texting. It's for the masses, not us nerds. I want to see Matrix grow, but I don't see it being usable by the masses anytime soon.
[0] https://community.signalusers.org/t/signal-airdrop/37402/8
No, it's as huge issue. You cannot trust yet another walled garden. Especially when there's no way to verify the servers.
Signal is vulnerable to timing correlation. An observer on the servers or on network devices nearby can easily infer the social graph of users: at what time they communicate, with whom and how often.
This is not a minor issue. Quote from the former CIA director: 'We kill people based on metadata'.
Wrong. Do they all use the very same server? No, and therefore timing attacks are still there.
> it's very clear that Signal is the best game in house
Wrong. There are protocols designed to provide good security in the first place, like Briar.
> Timing attacks aren't solved by federation btw
Also wrong. Federation makes timing attacks very difficult, especially when servers are delocalized because it increases the amount of access required by any global observer.
I'm going to stop replying. You clearly are not familiar with the topic.
Just look at how much information they hand over to the feds:
https://signal.org/bigbrother/cd-california-grand-jury/
I'm not sure what you mean by walled garden, but I assume you mean that you can't setup your own servers and join the network? What's stopping a federated network from forming a cartel and blocking small players, or servers they deem morally objectionable?
I've never really understood the argument. Just because someone hasn't done something doesn't mean it is a walled garden.
That's not true, see the other reply.
Well, this is a good question. Telegram is an allround day-to-day messenger with channels, massive groups, broadcasts etc that also works as a login provider while Signal is a research project to create a secure messenger and also something about crypto coins ;-)
Yet, while Telegrams encryption scheme has left a lot to be wished for and their communication has been arrogant:
- Signal has had more than one really bad security problems like remotely exploitable XSS in desktop app and that rather long time span when Signal sometimes sent images to wrong recipients
- Meanwhile Telegram hasn't seen such problems since they were starting out
And WhatsApp? Why it is even mentioned in a discussion about secure messaging after all the blunders they've made I don't know:
- Sending deliberately unencrypted backups to Google with the intention that Google could datamine them.
- Lately there has also been talk about "filtering content on the edges". So much for E2E-encryption when the endpoints report your content through a separate channel.
I believe in Signal and E2E-encryption, but, as I have said a number of times and a number of ways before:
There is a lot more to security than just cool algorithms and buzzwords.
All the E2E-encryption in the world doesn't save you when the service provider gets away with the abuses WhatsApp have been caught red handed with and no algorithm saves you when you can get remotely exploited by receiving a message.
Some might think I am extremely pro Telegram. I have one place where I want a lot less of it:
It really scares me when I see police use it. For any kind of communication that needs to be super secure: stay far away!
You mentioned only unencrypted OS backups (which were a major issue, but also industry standard, affecting everything but Signal which takes a severe usability hit over it, and apparently fixed https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/chats/about-end-to-end-encr...). "Filtering content on the edges" is a whole debate but not something that ever materialized.
It sounds there's a list, what are the others?
They can't read message contents.
There is no point of even looking into Telegram's code - it is not encrypted. Why would researchers waste their time?
Encrypted one-to-one chats is not really a feature. It is rarely used since parties need to explicitly request such session. And even than it's clunky as hell.
WhatsApp is a Facebook product and obviously cannot to be fully trusted. However, I'm still really happy that nearly everyone in my country is using something this secure. There's no point in having the perfect system if nobody uses it.
[1] Brazil politicians' Telegram 'hack' of 2019
https://www.wired.com/story/brazil-hacker-bolsonaro-car-wash...
[2] Iran Telegram 'hack' of 2016
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-cyber-telegram-exclu...
[3] Israeli cryptocurrency executives' 'hacked' on 2020 including their Telegram
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-news/.premium-exclu...
[4] Moxie Marlinspike of Signal app on Telegram
https://twitter.com/moxie/status/1474067549574688768
Hack is in quotes because all involve SMS interception.
They're a russian-HQ'd and staffed company which alone makes them suspect, and the government seems to have no problem with them, which doubles the suspicion given it's a perfect tool for anti-government groups and terrorists and if the FSB couldn't read everything, they'd be harassing the company, its founders, etc.