I think there may actually have been a warrant for some part of the access, idk.
I'm not saying it doesn't happen but it would be quite a scandal to find that the government was performing warrantless exploitation of citizen's personal devices. Maybe someone can correct me here and show that this has been the case.
And what's the incentive for someone to tell us, if they are? Become another Snowden or Assange or Manning? Not a very compelling outcome...
The prosecution and police can't simply use inappropriate evidence. In some cases it's possible (and worth the effort) to do 'parallel construction' by getting a warrant for some other evidence confirming the same thing, but it's not something that can be done at scale without it being obvious.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Foreign_Intellig...
[1]: https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-crimin...
Anything that can make your life harder will do. They can find something that:
- will put a you in a difficult position with friends and family
- break trust in a business relationship
- destroy your reputation in regard of the public
- trigger costly investigations from a 3rd party
- pressure you and take your energy, moral, money, time and health in the process
Wouldn't this likely mean US is much better than other countries to hide such scandals? E.g. maybe because they spend more money on it?
It could also mean that US media cares less about this than Israel media ([1]). Maybe Israel media has significantly more investigative-journalist manpower than US media. This way we, US citizens, would have fewer people researching such scandals.
[1] EDIT: By "cares less" I meant, as in, US media finds such stories less profitable and thus deprioritizes.
* Belief in national security.
* Unable/unwilling to bite the hand that feeds
* Silenced through lawsuits, threats of lawsuits.
* Corporate decisions.
...
It’s perhaps a bit broader than your definition there, but illegal exploitation and subsequent whitewashing of personal data by law enforcement is common enough that is has a name. Parallel construction. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction
Another point. For me, being caught zero times doing an illegal thing is a world apart from being caught one time. The chances on you being caught the only time you ever did s specific illegal act is so small that you pretty much go from assumed innocent if you’ve never been caught, to probably guilty if you’ve been caught even once before.
(That’s not an “assumed innocent “ in its legal context, I 100% agree a court should assume 2nd, 3rd, and 100th time convicted people are “innocent until proven guilty” and the prosecution should need to bring a strong enough case ignoring previous conviction to get a fair judgement. But if you’ve been caught using illegal methods before, I’m going to assume it’s something you have convinced yourself is ok, and you’ll do it whenever it suits you so long as you consider the chance of getting caught is low enough.)
Edit: I just want to point out there should be court cases about it, but they should be focused on repercussions for the offending officers instead. With a model where illegal police behaviour is punished by releasing a defendant doesn't actually punish the police and forces the non-police individual pay for illegal police behaviour by being put on trial.
In my opinion, it doesn't matter whether the country used an 0day or not when it's willing to actively, warrantlessly wiretap its citizens en masse. And the fact that the NSA is at this point known to have spent enormous money and effort to insert NSA-designed vulnerabilities into commonly-used cryptographic systems means it's pretty hard to believe it didn't use them — and if that's not an "0day," what is?
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encry...
A key quote, among many:
"Independent security experts have long suspected that the NSA has been introducing weaknesses into security standards, a fact confirmed for the first time by another secret document. It shows the agency worked covertly to get its own version of a draft security standard issued by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology approved for worldwide use in 2006.
"Eventually, NSA became the sole editor," the document states."
Emphasis mine.
Then, there’s also a group of countries that simply cannot afford / don’t have the people to do these things.
How do I know? Consider the usual suspects for these operations: the US, Israel, Russia, and China. For every single one of them, we also have examples of their work that got leaked or otherwise exposed.
What are the chances that Belgium happens to be the country that manages to run such a program and keep it secret? Or Equatorial Guinea?
Then, there’s also the growing list of known customers of NSO: if two dozens of them decided to buy this software, chances are they do not have homegrown solutions with similar capabilities. Nor does it seem as if there were any other sellers at NSO’s scale. Meaning: if we successively learn about all of NSO’s business, we might be getting close to knowing everything there is to know about the sector, with the exception of the large countries mentioned above.
> At least a dozen U.S. National Security Agency employees have been caught using secret government surveillance tools to spy on the emails or phone calls of their current or former spouses and lovers in the past decade, according to the intelligence agency’s internal watchdog.
> The practice [...] was disclosed by the NSA Office of the Inspector General
[0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-surveillance-watchdog...
One is a case of employees abusing a system for personal gain. Another is establishing a system of abuse in service of the security service. Absolutely night and day in terms of the implications, even if in both you have people with access to private information.
The NSA employees weren't trying to advance the goals of the State by stalking their exes.
100% sure that they have spy software, of course, bought abroad. Equatorial Guinea has oil money and it is one of the most authoritarian countries in the world.
There are certainly plenty of states that cannot afford these programs, or that may choose to spend their resources in other ways, but the big powers are more than willing to assist when their interests align. I think the case of Denmark shows that it's very difficult to anticipate when interests will align, because we sometimes don't even know the identities of the people whose interests matter.
Remarkable claims need remarkable evidence. Where is this democratic country that is run by people who appreciate rule of law?
The power of states must be reduced at this point.
Implied is the statement that the end justifies the means. But how do you weigh the proportionality of measures taken? Do you adopt a utilitarian point of view, looking at, say, deaths prevented? Is anything game, or should agencies be expected to uphold a code of conduct, bill of rights or exclude entire categories of information? How do you assess what is or isn't a threat to a country and thereby something it needs to be protected from? What is a country - the president, the party, the government, its citizenry, businesses?
Second, with the popularity of invoking "national security" as an authority argument, how can these agencies ever be accountable? Who watches the watchmen? Are we to trust agencies reporting on the number of e.g. terrorist incidents prevented, especially if the information sources are opaque and there's an obvious conflict of interest?
Third, given the existence of programs like MK Ultra and Cointelpro, is it really safe to say agencies won't try to overreach? With examples like the Stargate program ("Men Who Stare At Goats"), should we have faith they know what they're doing?
While I don't agree that there was an implication of the end justifying any type of means, it seems we have already taken a utilitarian point of view. In short, the intelligence community is not allowed to circumvent the constitution and relevant laws (i.e. deprive citizens of their established rights); this is largely in part from the Fourth Amendment (unlawful search or seizure). As legal precedent is an inherently moving goalpost vis-a-vis judicial interpretation, this is a continuous battle in which citizens are aided by transparency and scrutiny of ongoing government programs.
One need not look any farther than the Snowden cases to realize that there is still a strong clinging to this ideal of public transparency, as well as the mountain of evidence that the government ought to be audited to prevent, or at least cease, illegal operations such as PRISM. Judges watch the watchmen - largely in closed-door FISA court hearings, it seems. This bothers me.
However, to think that there is zero benefit to these programs is parallel to naively thinking they are wholly good. I'm willing to wager that there are physical / kinetic and digital events that occur every week which would terrify the average citizen. Transparency is good, don't get me wrong - but there is only so much that some can stomach before feeling ill.
Stay involved in local / state / federal politics. Make noise about things you feel are unjust. Asking good questions is a good thing, but action is what makes the gears turn.
> Stay involved in local / state / federal politics.
Not an option for me - I'm geographically challenged. One thing to be envious of with the American system is you guys can affect a great deal, from judge and sheriff appointments to the president. Your post is a good reminder not to take it for granted.
No, everybody does most definitely not do this! That is just not true.