I suspect these methods of communication remain because of their robustness against attack and simplicity to implement. It's a guarantee that even if all the modern networks go down, commands can still be issued from anyone, to anyone using off-the-shelf hardware.
Its funny how hypnotic the word "modernize" is; totally divorced from any measurable success outcomes. More efficient? Possibly. But as we learned with COVID; when you stress an Efficient system, it breaks. Militaries tend to be pretty highly stressed; and it would be best if they don't break.
One thing is for certain: There is much the maintainers of these antiquated systems could learn from more recent engineering practices; but there is just as much we could learn from them.
Simple systems fail expectedly, complex systems fail catastrophically.
https://www.theregister.com/2020/06/03/kubernetes_b_21_bombe...
> The B-21 is expected to fly in 2025
Yep, and if there's any single salient characteristic about Nuclear C3, it's redundancy. Normally the launch crews, subs, command posts, bombers, tankers, and strategic reconnaissance aircraft would get their message over secure terminals, but there are many other ways to get a valid EAM (to include via voice transmission).
There's a famous (and perhaps apocryphal) story about Jimmy Carter touring the SAC underground. He supposedly told the senior controller he wanted to talk to the boys in the launch control centers, so they set up the circuits and told the crews to STAND BY FOR A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
This caused quite understandable consternation, as the crews were certain most of the comms networks had been taken out and the nation was somehow in the midst of a general nuclear exchange (though their detonation detection systems were not sounding). A voice message from the President never occurred again.
I'm specifically talking about these unencrypted parts:
1. The number of "Skyking do not answer"s indicates the severity of the message.
2. The fact that it is known that messages to Skyking are for a nuclear force.
I wouldn't want an adversary to know when or with what severity I am commanding my nuclear force. It leaks significant information that an adversary can use, for instance, to judge your response to some action the adversary took.
I seriously doubt that the people directly wielding these weapons actually want to use them. A small information leak indicating potential escalation like this, while still hiding exact deployment orders, may actually be desirable.
I agree, but I would argue you could decouple notifying the world and notifying your force, but perhaps that would remove the teeth behind the message. And further, it could be entirely possible they've already decoupled and Skyking is just theatrics
Usually (when the primary potential enemy is an opposing superpower held in check via MAD), you either want exactly that (as a palpable thread signal to get the other side to back down in an escalating crisis, or as the palpable absence of such a signal when you are just doing routine exercises) or MAD has completely failed and we’re all going to die.
If you make the communications mostly continuous, then real messages are lost in the noise.
2. SKYKING is a group callsign for any aircraft operating under the SIOP (if you don't have the action word on your list, the message isn't for you). I saw a talk from a former U2 spy plane pilot that mentioned receiving a SKYKING message to alert them they had been detected by hostile forces.