Pluton is not currently a threat to software freedom
mjg59.dreamwidth.org
mjg59.dreamwidth.org
The difference now is that Microsoft are saying they will only support machines which have these TPMs, and therefore they can credibly argue in a few years that the only secure PCs (and thus the only PCs that ISPs should allow online) are ones which can produce a remote attestation to prove they are running the latest OS updates (from an OS vendor that is approved by the government).
> If Microsoft wanted to prevent users from being able to run arbitrary applications, they could just ship an update to Windows that enforced signing requirements.
The trap hasn't been sprung yet, but those are the teeth, yes. Then say goodbye to Tor, E2E encrypted messengers, unapproved VPN apps, and bittorrent clients that don't check a Content ID database.
That's a reason to worry about Windows 11 requiring a TPM, rather than a reason to worry about Pluton specifically. But even so, I don't think it's an especially realistic one - outside extremely constrained setups, it's very hard to make remote attestation work in a way that gives you any meaningful guarantees (eg, simply forward the challenge on to a machine that is running the "approved" OS).
> The trap hasn't been sprung yet, but those are the teeth, yes.
Again, something they could just do today while zero people have Pluton.
If Microsoft want to lock-down the entire x86 market, they can do that now. They don't need to wait years for everyone to shift to new hardware that has Pluton in it.
I was imagining something like that would be possible (for people with enough tech knowledge), but it's good to have it confirmed, thank you. There would presumably be a cat-and-mouse game of the "approved" OS trying to detect if it was being co-opted into such a scheme.
> They don't need to wait years for everyone to shift to new hardware that has Pluton in it.
As you say, I'm more worried about Windows 11 than Pluton, but presumably the "importance" of Pluton is part of Microsoft's excuse for not supporting non-TPM hardware any more. Once Windows 10 is out of security support (for home users at least), it will be easier for Microsoft to claim that non-TPM Windows devices are de facto insecure.
Which only means that programs can choose to not service devices without TPM - things like Netflix/Streaming Services and online competitive games, although it might take 10 years with the amount of people that will be unable to upgrade to 11 or upgrade their computer to one with a tpm at all. With computers become more and more about browsing the web, and especially with the chip shortage, people aren't upgrading their hardware as often.
But those "programs" could include "an online check made by your ISP, mandated by your government". If your computer doesn't pass the check, it won't be allowed online. What good is a phone call if you're unable to speak?
> it might take 10 years
I think more like 5, although the government might start slowly, like only preventing non-TPM devices from accessing "sensitive" online services, e.g. banks or anything that requires a payment.
The next step would be connecting the "online check" with a biometric ID, enforced by the device. Every time you unlock your device, it would request from the government a random ID that is included in every packet sent, and those IDs would be tied to your legal identity in a government database.
Letting someone else use your device would be similar to letting someone else use your car, in that you are responsible for whatever is done while you are logged in, unless you report it stolen.
if that occurs, is that really of microsoft's doing, or of the government and all the other companies that are complicit? I can plausibly imagine a future where microsoft stays its course (ie. it doesn't lock down the x86 platform), but companies still force you to use locked down devices by forcing you to use mobile apps to do online banking. You already sort of see this with messaging apps, where a few (eg. signal) are mobile-only.
Signal has clients for Windows, Mac, and GNU/Linux.
But the general point is taken. For example my HOA requires payment via Zelle, and my bank requires that I use their mobile app to make Zelle payments. I can still run their app on CalyxOS just fine via microG, but I feel like microG is something Google would find a way to shut down if it were to hit some critical mass of adoption.
> in that you are responsible for whatever is done while you are logged in, unless you report it stolen.
This is only really true for insurance purposes - for stuff like red light cams, the tickets are invalid if you weren't the one driving (which is why some newer ones snap temporary pictures of people in the driver seat in case they end up running the light).
It is much more thinkable, however, especially in 5 years, perhaps after a (false flag?) cyber-attack takes down an electricity grid in some country, that a government could prevent "insecure"/"unpatched" devices from going online. This wouldn't require any personal information to be shared with the government (at least, no more than current ISP data retention laws already require), and Microsoft would be all too happy to build support for this right into Windows for free, as it would make it harder for "unapproved" operating systems to be used in that country.
> the tickets are invalid if you weren't the one driving
I guess what I meant was "the government will punish you unless you can prove someone else was using your device" so you won't be able to escape prosecution by sharing a device and saying "I can't remember who was using it at that time". Similarly, I believe in some jurisdictions a car owner is expected to know who was using their car at any given point in the past so that speeding tickets can be assigned to the correct person.*
Anyway, I can imagine the law going further and matching the dystopian vision of "The Right to Read", which includes this passage: "Of course, if the school ever found out that he had given Lissa his own password, it would be curtains for both of them as students, regardless of what she had used it for. School policy was that any interference with their means of monitoring students' computer use was grounds for disciplinary action. It didn't matter whether you did anything harmful — the offense was making it hard for the administrators to check on you."
* "It is also illegal [in the UK] to decline to provide the driver's details, whether it was you or another person." https://news.jardinemotors.co.uk/how-to/speeding-fine-faqs-w...
Well now you hit the nail on the head. The issue hasn't been technical for a long time but rather one of "image". People have to still believe they have freedoms and whatever curtails them is for their own good. As long as you're given a good reason to submit to extreme measures (9/11 made the Patriot Act acceptable), or they happen slowly enough that you can't really see a boundary being crossed, these measures will eventually be put in place. And nobody will see a huge difference because they won't remember a time when it was hugely different.
Please drop the hyperbole, there is already enough of an impedance mismatch here. We're talking about slow moving ecosystems, and social normalizing of new technological restrictions. The current locked boot mess has taken oven twenty years to develop since the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance was founded. The pace of change accelerates, but five years won't even make remote attestation available in browsers. I'd say it's at least 15 years until a significant number of websites would require it. Using it for network access control would take further technological development (probably on the corporate side), and then some kind of crisis to drive ISPs/governments to demand consumer implementation. It's worrying because it's a step on the slow monotonic authoritarian march, not because the sky is falling right now.
What if I had told you 5 years ago that in 2020, people in Western countries would be forbidden from leaving their homes without permission, and would have to show a digital pass on their phone to be allowed to go into shops?
The technology for remote attestation already exists, and it would take less than a year to roll out checks for it across all ISPs in a country. As you say, it would need some sort of crisis for a government to demand it, but an ill-intentioned government with an offensive cyber-war capability could manufacture that crisis tomorrow if it wanted.
We already have authoritarian Western nations like Poland allegedly using cyber-weapons against opposition politicians[0]. I don't think that claiming existing technology could be used in 5 years is a claim that "the sky is falling right now". The main thing holding back such a scheme is that it would force a lot of legitimate users offline, which is why I think 5 years should be enough time to make those affected users a small enough minority that a government could ignore them.
[0] https://www.euronews.com/2022/01/05/polish-watergate-tension...
When predictions of our future read like dystopian science fiction such as Stallman's "Right to Read", 1984, etc. the only course of action is to educate the masses and strongly oppose any further progression down that path.
Well I'm coming from a USian perspective, so that prediction wouldn't have come true. But really, trying to contain contagious disease is a societal response with longstanding precedent, and implementing a digital ID like that is technologically easy (at minimum, it's just showing fields from a database). If you had predicted these actions because of a pandemic, it would have been plausible.
Meanwhile if you had predicted similar digital passes in 2000 it would not have been immediately plausible because very few people were carrying around a computer in their pocket. That had to be developed first by private industry, wanted by the consumer market, and the idea of having "apps" for various facets of your life socially normalized, before it could come to pass.
> The technology for remote attestation already exists
What do you mean by technology ? Yes the concept exists, and yes some implementations exist, and yes some are in the hands of consumers. But I wouldn't say the "technology exists" for general web browsing, in that it's available for a single actor, even controlling both ends, to decide to start using remote attestation.
> The main thing holding back such a scheme is that it would force a lot of legitimate users offline
Yes that is one aspect. Another aspect is the lack of implementations for companies to use to start demanding its use. Another aspect is that there has been no application of it to network access control. Yet another aspect is that the government does not understand they have this lever to pull until the trail is blazed by industry. In Y2K authoritarian government went "find a way to stop bad communications on the Internet" and their underlings went "uhh pull the plug?". In Y2020 there are many companies selling carrier-scale TLS MITM and other DPI gear.
All of these things take time. As I said, it has been over 20 years since the TCPA was founded, and you can see where we are. You can directly translate your arguments here to arguments about secure boot in 2000, and yet governments in 2005 were not trying to prohibit computers without secure boot. We had to take a long roundabout trip through a new device type of phones/tablets (for RA this could be security keys) for it to become palatable.
Only now that the market has gotten there on its own would it be plausible for a government to prohibit any device that isn't locked down with secure boot. Even so, it wouldn't be currently advantageous for the more totalitarian countries to mandate this, since they do not fully control the device's manufacturers. That is another progression that will take time before it's ready to click into place.
It also makes it harder to spread awareness of the threat, since the really concerning implications sound farfetched. Not thinking about it too hard, why would anybody buy a computer that restricts what they can do? Well, the Market finds a way.
This has already happened for mobile banking apps on Android: Many of them already use SafetyNet with hardware attestation. The only reason not all of them do require hardware attestation is that not all of the older Android phones support that, which is exactly the situation Microsoft wants to change for TPM. And increasingly, other apps seem to be starting to use root detection and safety net for frivolous use cases such as McDonalds.
Best we can do is start educating people now.
To me, the platforms are simply improving security and slowly jettisoning older systems which cause security issues. We don't allow TLS 1.1 for a reason.
At some point, even ISPs might require remote attestation to allow you to connect your device to the internet. The IETF is already working on standards for the attestation of network devices[0][1].
I speculate that there will temporarily (perhaps similarly to iOS jailbreaking, which is not available at this time for the newest devices/iOS version[2]) be exploits allowing you fool the attestation by e.g. redirecting it to another device as the author suggests, but the end effect will be that vast majority of people will be effectively confined to a walled garden and even determined hobbyists will only be able to use their general computation capable devices to access all content (or even connect them to the internet) some of the time.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-n...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=IOS_jailbreaking&...
How can ISPs do anything close to this when they're not even concerned with how many devices you have? ISPs just do not connect individual end user "devices", they connect subnets.
> content providers may refuse to serve you
Providers of Hollywood-copyright-mafia content like Netflix have already been demanding hardware DRM (at least for high resolutions) for years.
Providers of public ad-supported content like YouTube care about maximizing views above everything. They'll happily serve a 4K stream to a Windows 98 machine if it can connect with modern TLS somehow. YouTube isn't even trying to fight youtube-dl all that much, there was an attempt at throttling recently but it was very quickly defeated. Heck, YouTube Music on the web does not use DRM at all, and that's all music-copyright-mafia content there.
Unfortunately that's not guaranteed to always be the case. The "Trusted Computer Group" already have ways for network operators to answer "Who and what’s on my network?"[0], and it's possible to set up an IPsec VPN between your device and the ISP where the key is only known to the TPM on your device.[1]
Of course the user could try to proxy requests from an "untrusted" machine to a "trusted" one, and piggyback the connection, but I imagine that applications which allow this won't be allowed in "secure" app stores, and "secure" operating systems would in any case firewall off packets coming from "untrusted" machines in the first place.
[0] https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/trusted-networ...
[1] https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/Trusted...
There are way more android and apple devices online than PCs. No ISP would do anything for PCs alone and if they did, I could easily turn my PC into an "Android Tablet". So Microsoft would have to get Google and Apple behind the same plan and then phase out all existing devices and force all ISPs to implement this. This would yield a huge public outrage because the first states to follow would be China et. al., where remote attestation would enforce you to install the latest government, ahem, upgrade, to your device. Of course the US government and various European nations would very much like to follow suit, but they would be slower than China and then look like they follow the authoritarian path a bit too closely.
Remote attestation will be sold to streaming providers so they can extend their DRM to cover unpatched systems. Maybe multiplayer games will follow. This ain't gonna happen at the ISP level.
On a side note: Microsoft already starts patronising users e.g. by blocking access to security tokens from nonelevated processes. I hate it when my os starts messing with my freedom to develop sth on top. It all comes in the name of security but will in the end effect freedom.
This is merely another battle in the war on general-purpose computing.
They will build their kingdom piece-by-piece, and under innocuous-sounding adjectives such as "safety" and "security".
Each of these pieces may look innocuous and perhaps even helpful, but don't lose sight of their ultimate goal.
Once all the pieces are in place to achieve total lockdown, there will be no going back.
Articles like this that say "it hasn't happened yet" and try to spin a positive narrative are not showing the big picture. Arguably, Big Tech does not want you to see the big picture.
Maybe they could exploit a buffer overflow or other such bug, but if our opponents are so keen on adopting "secure languages", that path to freedom is going to close too.
When governments were scared that encryption was going to be used against them and wanted to ban it, we should've realised that the same situation could apply to us. I'm not at all arguing in favour of such bans, but the underlying message was just as applicable.
Also consider: the fundamental parts of a computer are still analog. Hardware bypasses, 3d-printed micro-circuitry, modified components or distributables, who knows? In my estimation, the cat and mouse game will continue for quite some time.
There used to be debates about whether face recognition should be allowed at all. In 2017 an executive order rolled it out at airports, where it's now used by the CBP and some airlines. The TSA is now considering using it. The debates are over, it's happening and there are now articles about how convenient it is to board without a boarding pass. The definition of normal continues to shift slowly towards universal surveillance. Every little increment is enabled by a few years of the previous increment being normalized and a morsel of security or convenience.
Soon even buying a PC without a TPM will become very hard - if we're not already at that point ? (What are our options these days ?)
A bit long but I didn't get bored
[0]: https://www.eff.org/wp/trusted-computing-promise-and-risk
Unfortunately a lot of intelligent individuals are perfectly content to help the corporations and governments tighten the nooses on everyone, including themselves, in return for $$$. They've convinced themselves that they are doing good.
I predict that this will blow over, and won't be a big deal in a few years time once FOSS drivers for what is effectively just a new breed of TPM are released.
If in five years, it turns out I was wrong, I'll eat my hat. Although defining "my hat" by then might be difficult, as it'll probably be subscription based.
And non-x86 systems? Wasn't there a line of MS Surface devices where secure boot could not be disabled, and users were stuck with Windows? It feels careless to only care about x86, especially as other platforms proliferate.
In any case, lockdown is not the only threat that Trusted Computing presents. Remote attestation itself is dangerous. If we remove our x86 blinkers and look at the mobile world, we see it's already happening, with countless apps, including ones important to modern day life such as banking, refusing to run on rooted phones.
You may say, "Oh, I will use my x86 desktop system at home for Free Computing, and allow phones, consoles, tablets, surface devices, etc etc, to become locked down." Like the old free speech zones, this is a toothless freedom, tamed and neutered. The user-empowering Free Software you will write will have no users - they will be on locked devices.
The main issue these days is driver support. The PC platform was an anomaly in backwards compatibility, at least historically. I'm not arguing that it's going to be easy for FOSS. It's going to be an uphill battle, regardless of how locked down they are (and I'm just arguing that they won't be that locked down—see the recent M1 Macs for an example; Apple could easily have locked down those systems in exactly the same manner as iOS/iPadOS devices, but chose not to).
Linux drivers for Qualcomm SoCs don't have extensive ACPI bindings at this point in time though, making the use of a separate devicetree necessary for full functionality. This will be mostly ironed out with time I suppose.
Those are hardware dependent platform devices. Qualcomm didn’t have another option. (Nor do other manufacturers really)
On x86, a virtual PCIe bus abstraction is heavily used, which is not the case for those SoCs.
(And well, if Linux wants to boycott full support of their SoCs, their choice. They just can’t blame Qualcomm anymore at that point.)
Another thing of note is the use of a PEP (power management plug-in) in the OS instead of having power management done in AML. The ACPI spec allows a manufacturer to do this. It isn’t used only by Qualcomm, but is totally unsupported on Linux today.
> PEP (power management plug-in) in the OS […] ACPI spec allows a manufacturer to do this
Doing management in AML is almost the whole point of ACPI. Microsoft pushing this PEP thing into the ACPI spec is bad. This is the "letter" of ACPI now, unfortunately, but it's very much against the original "spirit" of ACPI :/
For PCIe indeed, but that’s not when the issues are present the most. There’s no standard register interface for integrated GPUs, modems…
> but it's very much against the original "spirit" of ACPI
Yup, it’s what Device Tree does too however, shifting this to the OS.
Another downside is trying to have a good driver-less boot scenario when PEPs are used, for the system to be able to go far enough until drivers can be installed. (N/A to Linux which is hostile to not in-tree drivers, but very much a concern on Windows)
The ideal scenario would be Apple pushing their hardware in the server space; that might create an internal incentive for apple to get Linux running decently (or at the very least make Darwin a new competitor in the datacenter).
All Windows RT devices (32-bit Arm desktop Windows). Not only Secure Boot was locked down there, but apps had to be signed by Microsoft.
64-bit Windows on Arm adopts the security policy of x86_64 Windows, which means that you can turn off Secure Boot on production hardware. (and run your regular apps too)
This is not the end. They'll keep pushing, as slow as they need to, with Windows 11 being the next step. They didn't suddenly lose the incentive, they just met resistance.
In my particular case, I stopped upgrading Windows around 7. It is only last year that I decided to upgrade and that was also the year I moved to linux as my main driver. I am not an average user, but I am not kernel contributor either. I am just a guy, who wants some stuff done on a PC I own.
And that might be part of the issue. People need to feel the pain from the devices they have been sold so that they can learn why freedom and ownership is important.
The trend for security in desktop computing that's pushed by these large companies is to, over time, approach similar levels of lock down that mobile devices currently have. Both Windows and macOS are approaching the iOS security model that depends on manufacturers blessing what software can run on their products, and banning software they don't want users to run.
For example, with Defender on Windows and Gatekeeper on macOS, developers need to buy certificates from Microsoft and Apple's partners in order to distribute and run their software on users' desktop computers. If developers want their software to run on Windows or macOS, they need to remain in good standing with Microsoft or Apple. If Microsoft or Apple decides they don't like you or your app, all they need to do is to revoke your signing certificate, and Defender and Gatekeeper won't let your software run on Windows or macOS. That, or they can choose to no longer renew your certificates after they expire.
so shouldn't we be protesting against the systems that are locked down, instead of protesting against largely non-problematic implementations? For instance, with secureboot you can load your own keys, and the TPM isn't some sort of coprocessor that has access to your entire system.
>If Microsoft or Apple decides they don't like you or your app, all they need to do is to revoke your signing certificate, and Defender and Gatekeeper won't let your software run on Windows or macOS.
I'm not sure about gatekeeper, but at least on windows smartscreen can be disabled. I understand how having a gatekeeper sucks, but I also understand the problem of malicious software, which gatekeeping partially mitigates. In the end the fact that you can disable makes it a non-issue for me.
This is what Android has taught us.
Also, smartscreen is not a naive block of unsigned code. Code blocking is reputation based, and people disabling smartscreen and running a binary contributes to that reputation. Which means that people like gp are actively helping by continuing to use Windows and running safe-but-unsigned apps. So, to reiterate, not an issue.
That's been said for years, and hasn't held true. I can boot a Linux kernel on my M1 macbook. Apple could easily have locked it down in exactly the same manner as their iOS/iPadOS devices, yet chose not to. I can still install whatever I want. The default state of the system has a locked down root volume. And the default behaviour is not to install untrusted software, unless you jump through a couple of hoops. Those are good defaults. Those are damn good defaults for most people. If you're running untrusted code in your webbrowser all day long, you want your base system to be as unmalleable as possible, and as untrusting as possible to third party code. But I can still work around that with almost no hassle. Homebrew still installs software as easily as it used to nearly a decade ago; it just might need the occasional --no-quarantine flag for unsigned software.
Even recently they appeared to have actively assisted in the running on non-macOS operating systems on their hardware: removing the requirement for kernel images to be in mach-O format[1].
[1]: https://twitter.com/marcan42/status/1471799568807636994
Yes. That is in fact the problem. They shouldn't have the ability at all. Given the ability it will be done, it is only a question of when and why.
Corps have this ability already and are building in tech to make circumvention even more difficult. We are one update away as it is now.
And as for barring it legally, remember that there are valid uses for locked down systems. It can be a useful security barrier.
> That's been said for years, and hasn't held true.
It certainly has. Unsigned binaries were recently deprecated entirely on M1 Macs. Microsoft even released versions of the Surface that can only run Windows and only run apps blessed by Microsoft. With each iteration on these products, the screws are tightened a bit more.
Software freedom is not just about being able to run Linux. Most Mac users buy Macs because of macOS and its integrations, running Linux doesn't help them out. Software freedom on macOS definitely does, though. As it stands, that freedom has been chipped away at with new releases of Apple's software and hardware.
For example, I'm the author of several open source utilities for macOS. Users had no problem using the utilities a few years ago, but because they're unsigned or not Notarized, macOS tricks users into thinking that they're either broken or malicious. Even self-signing the apps has macOS treating them as if they're radioactive. Users don't understand the scary signing and certificate alerts, so they end up thinking they've downloaded malware. The solution to this is to pay Apple $100 every year, and then regularly have them scan and approve of the apps via Notarization. That's antithetical to software freedom. Regular users who want to use un-Notarized software are left frightened and without having their needs met. Software freedom is important for everyone, not just developers and power users.
It's easy to argue "give me software freedom or give me death!" if you're a technically competent user that probably won't fall for a trojan, but what about everyone else? Don't you think there's a reasonable argument to locking down systems to improve security? To be clear, I'm not arguing for sacrificing software freedom wholesale for security, only in default configurations.
So why would a company want total control on its ecosystem ? Because government don't want social unrest. So if you can ensure your platform is free of "terrorist", then you can discuss with government better. For example, if you're secure, you can position yourself as a reliable player on banking, e-health, etc. That is, you gain a very strong position to shape society in ways you're interested in. Don't forget that big companies have the power to do that and that those who command them are not required to be benevolent. They are private companies so there's no oversight on which interest they serve first.
It's not all doom and gloom though . As computer gets into our lives, more and more government and parliaments will become aware of the issue and there will be a place to fight for our rights. It's already the case.
The only thing that matter is : a computer is a general purpose machine and must stay a "general purpose" machine.
Fully agreed. This is the most important point. No company or vendor should prevent me from running the software I want, in the way I want, be it modified for my own purposes or not.
Sure, if you only look onto the security side it may be more secure if you can only run approved software, but it is in no circumstances okay to reduce the freedom of a user on his/her private machine. (In a business setting it makes sense to only allow software approved by the IT-Department)
I'm far more worried about companies locking things down due to legitimate concern (security) with malicious intent.
Than being arrested for being mistaken for osama bin laden because I decided to grow a beard.
I'm not sure what the "crack down" is when you can disable it fairly easily.
>So why would a company want total control on its ecosystem ? Because government don't want social unrest.
You'd think that if they want to suppress uprisings, the mechanism they use to do so will be slightly more robust than a setting in the developer options.
>The only thing that matter is : a computer is a general purpose machine and must stay a "general purpose" machine.
How is this related to what we're talking about? What gatekeeper/smartscreen is doing is effectively operating a whitelist system. The platform itself is still open, and you could still do whatever you want before. What's more is that you can disable the system, so I'm not seeing what the issue is.
Except bins signed by self-signed certs are still treated basically the same as unsigned binaries were before.
But it doesn't really make sense:
- All the technical work to restrict users could certainly be done in one release: it's not that hard.
- As to market acceptance, I don't think any of the changes re: binary signing are "getting users used to" being restricted.
So, requiring signed binaries doesn't appreciably make the technical or market challenges of restricting unapproved apps easier.
> Even self-signing the apps has macOS treating them as if they're radioactive.
I appreciate that I can both benefit from PKI attestation of apps (for a small degree of protection against malware), and I can override it and run unsigned stuff.
> That's been said for years, and hasn't held true.
Oh hell yes they did. Look at Intel Boot Guard and all the stuff around that.
what am I looking for? It looks like you couldn't load third party/modified firmware with that enabled? I suppose it's strictly more locked down than being able to flash whatever firmware you want, but was there a sprawling scene of modified firmware around at that time? Or did everybody essentially run the stock firmware?
...or the fearmongering from up last year regarding TPM and windows 11. People were going hysterical over the thought that TPM might be used for DRM, not realizing that they're already running hardware that does exactly that (intel SGX, amd PSP).
I did look into what an upgrade to add a TPM would cost. I was looking at over $400 for a like motherboard to support TPM (without an actual TPM chip), but I'd also lose SATA channels I currently use. At the point of having to replace a motherboard, it starts looking attractive to do a full rebuild, but that's difficult with supply shortages and inflated costs currently.
Part of the reason for this "fearmongering" (if it's fair to call it that) is that Microsoft has released little information about Pluton, besides a press release. Plus, it's not like the fears are completely unfounded based on Microsoft's messaging; Microsoft's press release says Pluton is based off the Xbox[1] (and this paywalled article mentions the same thing[3]), and they've previous said the major goal of the Xbox security system is piracy prevention [2], i.e. DRM. However, I agree with the overall conclusion of the main article that it's probably not much worse that what already exists.
[1] https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2022/01/04/ces-2...
[2] https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/chen/
I realize it was only introduced as of ~2012 and it's been 10 years, but I'm not sure we can draw a conclusion on this one just yet. Windows 11 took a huge leap in that direction so for all I know it might take another decade; it certainly doesn't look like they've given up on the idea of locking down the desktop just yet.
I might look into it, as it sounds like an interesting rabbit hole.
seriously? 10 years is an eternity in tech, and if they really did lock down the desktop a few years from now with some new system (eg. pluton), I'm not really sure that you could say "I told you so" or "TPM caused the platform to be more locked down". It'd be like predicting some sort of smallpox attack by china in 2010, then claiming you got it right in 2020 because of corona. The only plausible scenario where you could plausibly blame TPM/UEFI is if OEMs suddenly decided to remove the ability to add user keys and/or disable secureboot.
Maybe if you're talking Java versions, but not in the desktop OS space. (Look at so many old machines running Windows 7 or earlier right now, and look at long old OSes are officially supported, and how long they're still used afterward.) And besides, even if it was, this wouldn't mean anything. Look at the whole Default Browser fiasco that happened in the last few months. Microsoft went back to engaging in practices they had already settled with the Justice Department two decades ago.
Also look at how they finally made Windows 11 64-bit-only. And even now it still runs 32-bit programs, just the OS is 64-bit. It took two decades after 64-bit CPUs came out to get to this point.
They take their time and meander, and it takes a while. Possibly due to corporate sluggishness, possibly due to wanting to boil the frog slowly, possibly due to wanting to test the waters for a while... who knows why. But speed isn't the main criterion.
see: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29860320
>They take their time and meander, and it takes a while. Possibly due to corporate sluggishness, possibly due to wanting to boil the frog slowly, possibly due to wanting to test the waters for a while... who knows why. But speed isn't the main criterion.
But in this case it's not really boiling the frog because it's not really getting worse? All we know so far is that it's TPM but it's easier to update. I suppose this could be used to oppress users by patching jailbreaks faster, but the security benefits at least makes it plausible that they're not doing it as some sort of plan to oppress users.
Since they are not going to do it anyways, they are no worse off, and the customers get a legally binding guarantee resolving their concerns, and it provides just cause to the good actors in Microsoft management to head off or remove any elements besmirching Microsoft’s reputation.
Sounds like all wins to me and it is what any B2B contract with Microsoft would do (well in the contract rather than publicly) if they wanted that guarantee so it is not even a particularly novel legal request.
You only condone the poisoning of the well because you take for granted the pro-socially minded developers willing to sacrifice their time and effort to draw clean water for you.
Think of where we'd be if we didn't need to run to stand still.
> You only condone the poisoning of the well because you take for granted the pro-socially minded developers willing to sacrifice their time and effort to draw clean water for you.
If you're referring to my comment about drivers, then I'd like to remind you that a large amount of work done on the Linux kernel is paid, and isn't performed by volunteers.
And as for those that are volunteers, I don't take them for granted. I regularly donate to various FOSS projects. Related to this context, I'm currently a patreon supporter of marcan42's port of Linux to the M1 Mac, and have donated several hundred euro to OpenBSD over the past two years (not including donations from my hosting provider openbsd.amsterdam, which I'll plug here).
Let me also apologize for my manner. I'm inept at expressing what I think is important without alienating those that might be most receptive to it. Truly, I wish I could have said what I needed more gracefully. I didn't mean to give offense.
The specific functionality of remote attestation is so that a remote party can demand you prove what software you are running, and make it so that you cannot lie. Right now you're free to answer whatever you'd like, while running whatever actual software you choose, as long as you stick to the protocol. Protocols (especially well-defined open ones) are our traditional way of mediating between parties with mutually diverging interests. Remote attestation throws away such neutral mediation, making it so that the more powerful party can dictate what software the less powerful party is running.
One implication of a usable implementation of remote attestation is that a website could insist that you are running a certain OS, web browser, etc, and become unavailable to you otherwise. For example, banking websites have a clear path to doing this in the quest for their elusive "security". They already do similarly invasive things that alienate a small portion of users (eg complain about a device being "rooted", blocking VPN/datacenter IP ranges), and so it's a reasonable assumption that they'll adopt such technology for the same regressive goals.
And once it starts being a de facto requirement for users to have such functionality and it becomes easy for developers to use, it will trickle down to lower stakes websites - think anything that currently sees fit to harass you with a CAPTCHA. It's not simply Big Bad Microsoft that will push this onto us, but rather the entire market will gradually shift for "security" (ie corporate whims).
Will Free Software and the Open Internet still exist? Of course! Remote attestation does not prevent you from running whatever software you like on your local computer. But it will further bifurcate the Free user-representing world and proprietary WebTV land - imagine not being able to do online banking or shopping from your ergonomic desktop system, and having to do it from your phone that you also have to upgrade every two years. And the idea that some day ISPs will mandate this type of technology to connect to their network is far fetched, but still within the realm of possibility.
One caveat here is that if the remote attestation is only over the contents of the Pluton chip itself, then it cannot be used to dictate what software is running on the main system. I have no idea if this is the case here or not, but either way the integration of the chip onto the same die as the processor does not bode well for future development.
Furthermore, I do not believe the claim elsewhere in this thread that you could proxy such requests, as a secure remote attestation design involves the attestation result being used to generate a decryption key (eg a TLS session key) that does not leave the trusted software environment. So the system performing the attestation is unable to simply relay back what it has learned. There might be design shortcomings that or implementation bugs that allow for doing so, but the straightforward goal is to close those over time as for any vulnerability.
But ARM systems sure did. Remember the whole "OEMs are required to make their ARM Windows devices only trust Microsoft's signing key, and not let the end-user turn off Secure Boot or trust any other keys" scandal?
How did x86 not become more locked down as a consequence of this?
You can disable all of it (on some devices only!) but the war is already lost: most people are not going to do it, so distros have to pass through these hoops.
Wanna bet that by 2030 there will be atleast one major commercial bank that enforces attestation on it's E-Banking features even on desktops?
I genuinely wonder if Microsoft will put any people on this for Linux. They purport to 'love it', but aside from a few Embrace Extend and Extinguish[0] strategies like Edge, WSL, VS Code etc. I haven't seen anything that made me jump out of my chair in amazement.
Maybe they'll surprise me.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embrace,_extend,_and_extinguis...
Is there an easy way to disable TPM / Intel IME / Intel SGX / AMD PSP ?
(I'm only aware that Dell can disable Intel IME on request... but only if you're a company buying a large amount of PCs ?)
In theory you can. In practice, programs will refuse to run if you do this: https://www.techspot.com/news/91138-valorant-anti-cheat-syst...
That goes for Secure Boot too, btw.
1. Xbox Security, https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/chen/
2. Azure Sphere (derived from Xbox) with Microsoft Linux kernel, OE/Yocto runtime and QEMU emulation of Pluton for CI/CD, https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/seay/
3. DMTF SPDM (PCI device firmware attestation to SoC/RoT), https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/plank/
Nov 2020 Intel announcement about Pluton, https://itpeernetwork.intel.com/intel-and-microsoft-plan-to-...
> Secure platforms anchor on a hardware Root of Trust as the foundation. Given Intel’s diverse ecosystem, our vision is to offer multiple Root of Trust options that ensure isolation of resources, keys and security assets. The partnership with Microsoft to offer Pluton will further broaden the choices available to our mutual customers.
Hopefully a future Intel SoC will include an optional FPGA-based RoT where customer hardware owners can load the open-source firmware of their choice.
Edit: Pluton will be included in upcoming Arm laptops with SoCs from the Qualcomm-Nuvia (former Apple M1) team.
This is sarcasm, right? It must be sarcasm.
Maybe I'm out of the loop but I would guess that hell would freeze over before Intel releases something like this, let alone an FPGA Root of Trust.
AMD provided a custom (expensive) SoC and RoT to MS Xbox, now being generalized with MS Pluton in 2022 Ryzen CPUs (and some future Intel CPUs). Intel already offers custom CPUs to some large customers. If a security-sensitive automotive or robotics customer needed an FPGA RoT, and the market opportunity was sufficiently interesting, Intel has multiple options for meeting that requirement.
> This is sarcasm, right? It must be sarcasm.
Intel at least left open the possibility in their press announcement. AMD did not, but they have purchased Xilinx and TSMC is building a US-based fab in Arizona, with "secure supply chain" FPGAs high on the list of early product candidates. It's up to customers to bang on Intel/AMD doors and show demand for FPGA RoT chiplets that support OSS gateware.
Thanks but I'm good, I'll just take your word for it.
I'm sure Intel can materialize FPGAs when the contract warrants it. It doesn't follow that because military or corporate contracts exist consumers will somehow directly benefit.
Another candidate for "Open RoT" is Google's OpenTitan, https://opentitan.org.
Open-Source FPGA Foundation: https://osfpga.org/
> Pluton validates and boots Security Monitor
> Security Monitor validates and boots the Linux Kernel
> Application Signatures are verified by SM and Pluton before Linux Kernel loads an application
I'll take that any day over ms+Intel releasing a t2-equivalent + SB combo as required in all new certified laptops and people realising too late.
On the other hand, on PCs with Pluton chips they can change their minds any second.
Specifically secure boot is what makes it so that "your" computer is unwilling to run software that has not been approved by the company that made it. This has existed for quite some time, and is responsible for the locked down mobile ecosystem as well as the inability to remove the Intel ME and AMD PSP embedded malware from recent PCs.
Remote attestation has not been widely implemented yet, but will make it so that remote services refuse to work unless you are running only software that the service approves of. I'm not sure how much Pluton moves the needle forward, but any amount is not good. If remote attestation comes into full effect, many websites will only be usable on newer computers and websites will be able to forcibly disable software the website finds objectionable, like say Adblock.
A lot. They only need to wait for Pluton enabled PCs to reach critical mass. Compared to TPM's, Pluton is inside the chip thus not vulnerable to bus tampering and is not a standard but a "product", meaning Microsoft will have the ability to make changes without intervention from other companies.
- Microsoft is fucking us over that hard
- Libre software FTW
- Libre software UX sucks
- Repeat
When will the cycle end?
This has always been true and while it's better this iteration of the cycle, it's not great.
But have you actually used Windows in recent times? The UX has gotten infinitely worse since XP. Mac OS has changed about as much as the popular open source DEs, but Windows is infinitely worse. I can't stand using it. The taskbar is garbage, the menus are garbage, the discoverability of anything is the worst it has ever been.
I can't imagine they're ignorant to the fact that Desktop UX is no longer a differentiator for them. The only lock-in they have is in business environments, for which there is zero competition at their price point.
It's inevitable that the host OS gets locked down. The runtime has moved to the browser and cloud. It's just a matter of time.
Probably because the developers write software for the most popular OS and not because Windows did something well.
The main thing that comes to mind for me is that since this is integrated into the CPU itself, now 'things' can be strongly and directly tied to the CPU instead of a separate TPM or some collection of hardware identifiers. Was this already possible on x86? My mind immediately went to "this will be used for tighter DRM"; I feel like content owners would like this a whole lot.
I'm so unbelievably sick of this 'security by corporation, it's what's best for you so accept it bullshit.' I really am.
No I don't want proprietary internet enabled hardware on my PC monitoring my software, no it does not make me feel safe and secure, actually, go fuck yourself and whatever marketing bullshit you spew to make this desirable for consumers. I'm honestly so fucking done with this kind of shit.
Good news! Pluton is not internet enabled and can't monitor your software.
I liked TPM with my own keys. This just seems a bit 'extra' in all the wrong ways.
Then, consider supporting the alternative approaches to security: https://puri.sm/posts/the-future-of-computers-the-neighborho...
it is not CURRENTLY a threat, but it builds up to be a threat in the future if we do not stop and/or constrain it.
( fine print: we haven't switched the electricity on yet)
edit: asterisks are somehow omitted
If Microsoft says Windows will only support has with this tech enabled, and since almost every computer on the planet runs Windows, vendors must adopt this tech or go out of the market.
In other words, Microsoft is positioning itself to say to all market players to play by its rules or go out of business.
This is a perfect way to establish control over the market without establish itself as a monopoly, thus not attracting attention from regulators.
This seems to be the biggest issue - hardware locked into requiring Windows to be up to date.
MS can of course ship firmware that's independent of the OS, but knowing MS - they probably won't.
Though having a blob firmware from MS embedded into the CPU itself feels kind of weird. A better way to do it was some third party handling it or requiring that firmware to be open source for example.
The thorniest question I think is around TEEs. You either trust ME/PSP/mobile TEEs for their explicitly mentioned uses (fTPM, SVM, Remote attestation..) or you think they should be even more sandboxed or perhaps shouldn't exist at all. I'm all for the middle ground/option here where the user is in control, thought others may disagree. Remote attestation could be a case where the user is losing control, so preserving user control there is important.
I don't like the edit at the bottom where the author's like: oh yea, of course this could be a massive issue against FOSS but we should just assume that vendors will think it's impractical. I've seen how banks react to rooted phones, even when rooted to heighten device security--and I've switched banks before because of it. They don't care.
The banks not much better. All banks in my country have dated late 90s-looking websites with not even UTF-8 encoding (so you can't send an email with a comma). They are barely usable on desktop. I'd have to make my own client or at least whip up a lot of magic CSS to get it to be mobile-friendly and would even still need to include QR code scanning as it is so ubiquitous that no one would let me fiddle with adding their account numbers.
Unlike right now, where all x86 chipsets have backdoors, and all new ones have “Trusted” computing features which you cannot say No to.
They ameliorate a lot of low entropy problems for passwords and can improve security. I can't imagine a proprietary one being mandatory. My banking app uses the mentioned remote attestation so I can't use it on my less-Googled Calyx ROM. I just think that's stupid instead of very strong warnings.
(Reversed much of it a long time ago --- and remembered it was specifically coded with Windows in mind, with certain assumptions about various things.)
What about trying to secure your software without building the infrastructure for an oppressive dystopian future? Too much to ask?
It's not a matter of security, it's a matter of monopoly. Since forever.
To Microsoft, security is an excuse for a land grab.
They're a lot like the common politician who smuggles horrible laws into relief bills or trade treaties. UEFI (especially on the ARM platform) and intel ME are to examples of this.
Despite the fact I in a way do think tpm like components are a good thing.
Fact? Based on what evidence?
people are either on macOS/android/iOS or chromium OS
it's not YOUR OS, it's their product, you not forced to use any of their products
linux and voila, you got your freedom back
Apple silicon Macs have the main CPU cores fully in control, with zero external peripherals having full DMA access to system RAM (everything goes through IOMMU), and have an interesting secureboot architecture that allows different security levels on different OS installations (you can run unsecured Linux side-by-side with a fully Netflix-ready macOS).
I have much worse news about the typical Intel BootGuard'ed PC laptop.