Look How Big Is My Team
nicolasbustamante.substack.com
nicolasbustamante.substack.com
It was awful in a big company, though. We were always short-staffed on everything we did. The CEO chronically underestimated how much work went into maintaining existing products or even just extending them. He wanted to treat every new initiative like a mini-startup that could move fast with small headcount, which led to tens of isolated teams building products that were incompatible with each other and not communicating about it. Coordinating with other teams would slow you down, so it was basically forbidden. But then our customers expected things to work together, so we had to scramble to re-integrate everything before it shipped.
Taking vacation was difficult because it could mean 20% of the team was gone, which would have measurable effects on delivery. Every time someone left it was a scramble to re-hire and re-train because it left such a huge hole in the team.
Hiring too many people is a problem, but trying to keep teams artificially small is also a problem. The hard part is knowing how close you are to "too big" or "too small", which is rarely obvious at the time.
> Coordinating with other teams would slow you down, so it was basically forbidden.
Are you sure team size was actually a factor? I've seen rules/cultures like these before and they always end in disaster, regardless of team size.
Small teams that actually coordinate, on the other hand, seem to do just fine in my experience. In fact, one of the biggest problems with oversized teams is the combinatorial explosion of communication channels https://project-management.info/number-of-communication-chan...
Now I'm seasoned with enough experience to know that no matter what the "best practice", some companies out there will screw it up.
Whatever past successes I experienced in teams I was a part of, I was wrongly attributing to these various rules of thumb (such as team size).
One of the expected outcomes of Agile is that the business has to acknowledge some of the realities (logistics) instead of just living in a fantasy word where how they think things works is real and if things aren't happening then it must be someone else's fault.
Anyway what they said is they had about 8 projects and 3 teams, some of which worked on the same projects, some which only worked on a subset. Rather than trying to juggle all 8 products, each sprint was about one product, and the product owners had to thumbwrestle over whether the next cycle was one (or possibly two) of theirs. Pretty much you could only count on 1-2 sprints a month, unless you were involved in some high visibility mandate.
But at the same time, old projects still existed as an ongoing concern, just with intermittent attention.
50-100 seems like the sweet spot for having enough coverage in responsibilities and spreading risk. But maybe we'll get there and it will still feel like we don't have enough people.
Honestly that sounds as bad as a skeleton crew of 1-3 people.
The reality is that oft-hated word bureaucracy is what's needed. A hierarchy.
Using a military analogy: "teams" of 2-3 ppl, 2 teams in a squad, 3-4 squads in a platoon, 3-4 platoons in a company, etc, etc.
Each of those entities in the organization should have a lead. Someone who's responsible for their group's performance.
Now you can stretch this, and minimize paperwork to expand say, a squad to 10-12 people (instead of the 7) but that either requires a talented squad lead, or some stuff gets ignored (ok for short term, not good long term).
If you have large loose teams without a hierarchy it's madness
> Controlling headcount expansion when experiencing fast growth is challenging. Targeting an efficient number of teammates is tricky because it's difficult to know and test when fewer people can achieve more.
This is really challenging, but one thing to keep in mind when planning headcount is that product usage and business revenue can scale very, very quickly once you find product-market fit, but there’s a slow maximum rate you can find, hire, and onboard more (good) people; especially good managers.
At Notion we were too cautious about adding engineers because we over-valued the efficiency of the small team, and under-estimated the difficulty/low rate of growing the team. This caught us by surprise - we thought we had a good trajectory figured out compared with our business growth, but at a certain point the growth ate through the headroom in our systems, and we spent most of a year on reliability instead of features. We fixed the problems, and have been hiring aggressively since that whiplash, but it still feels like we lost a lot of time chasing efficiency instead of starting hyper growth hiring.
That said, hindsight is 20/20. If you start aggressive hiring as soon as you see some market fit, and then growth tapers off, you can burn both your efficiency and runway on a “false start”. But even if you’re right to start, you’re going to hit the “good problems” of hyper growth next. Maybe it’s part of the hyper growth territory to feel a year behind hiring until suddenly you double the team in a year from 300 to 600 engineers like we did at Airbnb and then all the culture falls apart and suddenly you’re in the Warring States period.
Another strange ration was a CEO at a tier 1 automotive supplier telling us he was looking at engineering as a percent of sales (or revenue or similar). We were above the industry average which seemed to indicate spending "too much" on engineering. My first thought was that a lot of engineering (vehicle specific calibration and software tweaking and integration) was on a per-vehicle basis, so that metric could be improved by not taking the smaller production programs. DUH. But as a leader it makes sense to grab all that business, including the less profitable projects. Maybe those are even a basket of programs with one OEM negotiated all at once. Who knows.
The eng spend could benefit you later down the road so it's perhaps naive to say it's bad to be above industry average
Depending on what your team configuration is, the way of communication changes. With senior engineers the communication is minimal but with junior team member configuration the communication increases. Similarly, the cost structure(implicit and explicit) also differs between these two configuration.
So suggesting a single prescription is not viable. The reality is very different and needs to be looked at on a case by case basis.
Back in the 90s, I always wanted to be in a small startup that was mostly open source or maybe part of a software developer guild that pooled resources with other startups. Then every time a startup won the internet lottery, it would invest the proceeds into the local community or pay into UBI.
But even today, there's no way to come up with the roughly $24,000 per year it costs to live in the rural US, so we all still work for the mega corps in one way or another, saving for a day we might free ourselves which never comes.
Don't you think there are more and more developers - for now the most elite ones - who manage to live out of contributions from grants or github sponsoring?
There's good stuff like Y Combinator, and I was excited when it started because it seemed to grok that the fundamental problem in startups is that first $10,000. But (and this may be a controversial opinion) I feel like they fell into the same trap that every other incubator falls for, which is catering to elites. Now it seems to be a bit gamified, filtered through the lens of a certain youth demographic pitching to wealthy investors for large sums of money ($125,000), like the show Shark Tank.
I would very much like to see something that looks more like the grant system you mentioned, where small amounts of money could be obtained with relatively few hoops or strings attached. I've had countless times in my life where $5,000 or $10,000 would have given me the runway that I needed to finish a project and make money. But the money never came, so those all ended in failure, and a person can only fail so many times into midlife before playing the game itself feels like failing. If I knew in the 90s what I know now, I maybe wouldn't have chosen tech as a career.
The flip side is that I've survived on almost nothing for so many years, that I feel a calling to work towards providing income to everyone, everywhere. I think that's something we can manifest if we go back to first principles. I'd propose studying the history of such attempts and discovering which steps of the process were sabotaged by external pressures, then routing around that interference. Basically a startup working to solve the problem of income. The fact that this sounds at least a little preposterous seems more like of a failure of capitalism to me, than something fundamental.
A practical attempt at this might look like building solar farms to power cryptocurrency mining, to route around the problem of energy markets not buying alternative energy from homeowners at the going rate. Every market has that kind of defect that can be exploited. But they're difficult to see when we're at the losing end of the bargain as consumers, or dependent on the cashflow they generate as employees.
I might be slightly bitter after watching no movement on this in over 25 years, so please take what I'm saying with a grain of salt. I'm also super-optimistic about stuff like solarpunk :-)
I feel like they had a small team that didn't innovate for 20 years. Whether they were 10 employees or 10,000 they were due to have someone figure out a better way.
Counterfactuals are fun!
Once Facebook Marketplace came in and essentially wiped away all those roadblocks. Facebook has its own share of problems but those are mostly with the people who are still using it and the ads. The marketplace product works pretty well.
Remember, Craigslist predates the cloud by a decade or so, so standing up their service would be a lot easier today than when they started. How much time of those 50 people was spent on procurement, to the opportunity cost of having a modern interface/other upgrades.
If the goal is to get another round of funding from, or bought by someone with tons of cash but lazy in the diligence department -- then it can definitely "work".
It worked and the place got bought out lol. Business was shit though.
The "library" backed out onto the Big Boss' office and he didn't like the noise. Oh, I forget, of course he sat with us lowly minions at the coal face of open space, and it definitely wasn't his office. Except it was. And he didn't like the noise.
I bet Coinbase has better customer support. Customer support for a financial institution can be 1000+ people, which inflates numbers but has a huge impact on the customer.
Imagine you deposit 10k and your balance isn't showing up. A company with 150 employees is going to try to use the same (potentially broken) automated systems to help you. It can be really comforting to know there is a human on the other end looking at your account and saying, "yeah that doesn't look right, let me fix this for you."
I have no experience, but whenever I read about coinbase support, people are crying how horrible it is. Reading only now, people are calling it The Worst they ever encountered. Anyone with experience here?
- Consumer-level users
- Business users
- Cloud developers
- Ecosystem platform partners
- Outsourcing partners
- Lawyers, for formal complaints and civil violations
- Law enforcement, for criminal violations
- Government support, with special clearance and security training requirements
Then if you do 24/7 global support, you need to replicate that support expertise across multiple geos trained to triage and hand issues off across TZs and languages.
So who _generally_ gets the bad support experience? It's often the small-potatoes consumers, because those complaints have the smallest business value. But who generates the most noise? Small-potatoes consumers, because there are thousands upon thousands of them, and some will start social media accounts, blogs, and groups JUST to complain about the support.
But in the end, they're still small potatoes to the people at the top of the success/service or sales orgs, who look at churn numbers and say, "oh, we lost $xM in business in the consumer segment because our service locked them out of their accounts, but we have a single $xxxM customer who thinks our UI needs more polish, and also they heard about NFTs and want to trade them. so we want eng to prioritize those things over fixing the consumer app, and we'll hire x support reps to get the consumer first-response time down, then lay them off in a reorg after a couple of quarters. and now who wants whisky????"
So you wind up with a large support team, "good" metrics, a customer base of small users who are mad all the time, enough Tier 2/3s to handle the small enterprise customers' needs, and enough managers to run interference with large enterprise customers to buy time for engineers to show up to calls so the big fish feel heard.
Amazon also has a lot of contractors, but IIRC most of their warehouse employees (the vast majority by number) are FTE. Also I think Amazon has many multiples of Microsoft’s “employees” as a result.
For sure software has big margins but I think there is a lot of nuance lost when looking at these gameable FTE counts
- Mckinsey Revenue: $10.B, Employees: 30.000 -> Revenue per employee: $333K
- Accenture Revenue: $50B, Employees: 674,000 -> Revenue per employee: $74K
That's actually not the conclusion. They suggest looking at ARR/FTE.
> 10 devs keeping the lights on has a better AAR
If the 15-member team is adding value alongside the maintenance, that will surely be showing up as increased ARR. If the increase in ARR is > 50%, the 15-member team will be doing better in ARR/FTE.
I don't still get your objection to the point made in the article.
No, and this I think is the root of my point. Anything not producing AAR yet (e.g. developing a new product) has no impact on your AAR, but adds headcount, thus skewing any insight AAR/FTE would give.
This line lead me to believe otherwise. I agree the trend is more valuable, but still has issues (e.g. months- or years-long projects will have no value until they are released)
I dislike the VC model because there is huge pressure to keep growing even when it doesn't make sense or sells out potentially bigger but non-monetary ambitions. For example Twitter received incredible pressure to be as big as Facebook which turned it into a generic walled-garden ad-selling media app, away from the potential to be message-plumbing for the Internet.
A fact often ignored is that big startup success didn't raise a lot of money. Before their IPO, Shopify raised only $122.3M, Google raised $36.1M, Linkedin $103M, King $43M, Datadog $147M, Tableau $30M, and ServiceNow $83M. They all built massive businesses without a lot of cash infusion.
I think it might be restating the obvious to say that a company pulling in 100M+ is no longer a startup, it's an established (even if relatively new) company in aggressive growth mode.
I joined my last company about a year before they raised a Series C that brought total funding to $95M, and I think that by almost any other definition it was a startup before and afterwards.
(And it was enough of a startup to do a "hard pivot" to something largely unrelated when the pandemic destroyed its core business model, instead of shutting down.)
Yes $100M is a lot in absolute terms, but depending on what you're trying to achieve, how many people you need to achieve it, and what your timeline is, $100M might not be so crazy in context.
But even more valuable is tracking change in headcount Q/Q. And yes, growth and success is reflected in head count. Of course there is always a bump up after they get the big A round or B round, but now they have investors looking over their shoulder to make sure they keep an eye on cash flow.
Do you remember what was the reasoning?
Might signal unsustainable overwork, inability to scale / manage a "real" business / no real barrier to entry.
So if you have a core tech product and that is scaling, then fantastic.
The classic success case was WhatsApp: 19 billion dollars (jeesus wow) for a basement full of people.
Me reading that as I'm casually walking by FTX Arena, Miami right now.
Also here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Mythical_Man-Month
I'm also surprised at how little uniformity there is across companies. You would imagine sizes of teams would follow some ratio related to revenue, or percentage of all IT, etc. They don't. So the size of the IT Security Team, or Change Management, etc, vary wildly. Even for similar companies in the same industry.
Me: (Cloud Strife voice) Not interested.
Based on a true story.
However the article hints at what's really going on: in many startups the objective is to cash out before the question of profit has to be addressed. Many of these buyouts are "acquishutdowns" - the product has zero value and is shut down after a short transition, while the customers and staff are really what's being bought. In this sense the startup functions like an expensive recruitment agency or an inefficient version of the footballer transfer scheme.
In those cases it's advantageous to hire even if there is nothing profitable for the employees to do - because it increases the buyout value.
I guess you're talking about "acqui-hire," meaning the acquisition of teams of 10-40 people for ~$25m. My broader point is that many startups scale to hundreds of employees, buying growth, but remain poor businesses. Headcount is a vanity metric similar to likes on social media or fundraising.
In my book, revenue / employee is much more meaningful than profit / employee, because profit is arbitrary to a large extent.