The redacted lawsuit: Solarwinds board of directors sued by shareholders
github.com
github.com
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20220101181934/https://www.nytim...
> (i) used weak passwords for its software download webpages such as “solarwinds123”
> (ii) did not properly segment its IT network
> (iii) directed its clients to disable antivirus scanning and firewall protection on its Orion software
> (iv) cut investments in cybersecurity
> (v) listed its sensitive and high-value clients on its webpage for anyone to see.
I, for one, am shocked!
I think (hope) the importance of secure software may finally become better respected by companies. Seems ransomware is now only the beginning, since you'll later be sued as well!
Humor me: Why is this bad? I would naively expect software downloads to be almost-public, possibly actually public but non-functional without a license key or such. Unless they did something separately bad like baking private keys into distributed software, I can't see where this hurts anything but already-weak security by obscurity.
Until recently I was a pen tester and (just a guestimate) 9/10 clients that I do testing for don't properly segment IT networks, use weak passwords for things they shouldn't, and list sensitive and high-value clients on their webpage (they are trying to draw other customers in).
I'd like to clarify two points:
1. It doesn't matter how much money you spend on security - there will ALWAYS be a way for attackers to get in. E.g. Log4J issues recently. There is always gonna be another zero-day or a new email phishing payload or a new NSA hacking tool leak and at most a big company can pay a lot of money and hire a lot of engineers to Reduce the chance of something bad happening.
2. None of these practices are really that unusual (I've seen plenty of software that recommends to tell your AV to ignore it.) and actually managing and knowing about every single credential/password etc in a corp network is almost impossible. Usually things like the FTP server with a weak password get set up long before the company hires their first security engineer, and then refuses to make changes to existing stuff that would take a lot of time and effort.
I do feel that SolarWinds is on the hook for this, especially egregious is (iv cut investments) because of their exceptionally high value clients and the level of access they get into client environments.
However, I don't think it would have mattered much how much money they put into their security team, the team that ran the operation was likely a state-sponsored team and they probably had the funds/people/time to crack such a juicy target regardless of how difficult it was going to be.
Exactly this is the problem. And exactly this shit needs to stop asap!
What you're basically saying is: "Software can't be secure at all. So what's the point?"
This line of thinking is completely flawed.
Software is in the end a mathematical construct and can be even proven secure (according to some arbitrary formal definition of "secure"). That's only a matter of the amount of money you're willing to throw onto this problem in the long run!
Starting to jail the people actually responsible for all the daily IT security nightmares (those people are not the developers!) is the only way to get to an end with all the madness modern software development is.
As long as the "bugs are an ordinary part of software" attitude prevails nothing will change. But this attitude can only change if the responsible people start to feel consequences for creating one tire-fire after an other—and getting away with it every time.
-What did their ISO-27001 and SOC-2 reports look like? Do they actually mean anything?
I'm really curious what other restricted software/technology was in this policy.
Moreso, when a company has demonstrably bad security habits, would you want to insure their clients?
It is a bit like home owners insurance companies that won't insure your house if you have a fireplace, or extend liability coverage if you have a particular breed of dog or exotic (and dangerous) pet.
Blacklist an entire company's products? That's the weird part. Solarwinds had a pretty bad issue, but Microsoft has had plenty with Windows throughout Windows' lifetime (probably more than Solarwinds). Why is Windows not blacklisted? How about Apache?
It seems like they added Solarwinds just because it hit the news.
1. This action asserts derivative claims on behalf of SolarWinds against current and former members of the Company’s board of directors (the “Board”), for their utter failure to implement or oversee any reasonable monitoring system concerning [redacted] cybersecurity risks fundamental to SolarWinds’ only line of business. [entire sentence redacted]
2. Paragraph 5 is redacted entirely, but paragraph 6 states "these warnings underscored the specific and heightened risk." Does that mean that paragraph 5 contained notes from previous warnings that were ignored? If so, that's very interesting.
3. Paragraph 7's last sentence on warnings is redacted, and paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 are redacted. Paragraph 11 starts by saying that oversight failures were at play. Perhaps people inside were both warned and ignored warnings prior to the attack taking place?
The rest of the complaint contains a very similar pattern: large swathes of redactions in and around failures to monitor the situation and failures to account for risk exposure.
Paragraph 79: "By utterly failing to implement or oversee any reasonable monitoring system concerning the Company’s cybersecurity risks, SolarWinds’ Board disabled itself from being informed of mission critical risks at the Company and breached its fiduciary duties to the Company and its shareholders."
Yikes.
[0]: https://github.com/jaybobo/jaybobo/blob/main/docs/solarwinds...
It is a tale as old as the information technology industry
I suspect what happened here is they were told of the issues and added them to their risk register them promptly forgot about them. By doing so they accepted the liability if those risks ever became realized which would open them up to a lawsuit like this.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-26/everyt...
This one took a dive after their breach and kept going down. Experian, as a different example, has been on a tear for 10+ years with only smaller transient dips, despite millions of consumers injured.
The board is responsible for what the company is doing; not for the actions of every single employee, but for setting policies, make sure they are respected, hiring competent people etc.
Today the SOX is already holding the CEO and the board personally responsible for financial reporting. I think it is criminal responsibility there. It is not much different to hold them responsible for the results of the company, especially if any of the accusations can be proven.
The interesting part will be the effect on changes in the way tech companies are managed. For example in some very large companies most people are hired based on criteria that don't include skills; for example in my company IT people are hired without any IT interview, they get points (in US) for race and gender, outside US on gender. If something happens and these people blow up some FDA regulated products (most of our products are FDA regulated to some degree), is the board be personally responsible for a situation they created? I bet they are.
There are also many companies where policies exist on paper, but nobody is respecting it. The ISO 9001 certification is famous in parts of Europe, it is mandatory for some IT companies but it is just a bunch of paper in a closet that nobody ever read. Is the board responsible for such a situation? Of course it is. Board members are not appointed only to have friendly meetings talking about golf, with people being board members in a dozen of companies and doing just golfing and board meetings, but to top level set the directions for the company. If you set the company on self-destruct, they should be held responsible for it.
I was thinking about white males being privileged and it sounded ridiculous ( as a white male). Did you mean the opposite for diversity on the workfloor?
> but it is just a bunch of paper in a closet that nobody ever read.
ISO certification mostly means that there are standards in place. Once it's implemented, you shouldn't notice it.
It's pretty important as soon as you want to do business with the governement.
In US if you are a black female if you apply and you can read and write, you are automatically hired. If you are a white male, you will not be even interviewed and if you are already in the company you will never get a promotion.
In my (IT) department the past 10 year history is 10 to 1 promotions for female versus male. Over 40% of the organization is female (it was over 90% male 10 years ago, there are still some men left from old times) and in management it is over 60% with the target of 70% female. Unrealistic for a pure IT company, but very achievable for a very political non-IT company.