Because for a long time, libraries have been advertised as building blocks that you can quickly integrate into your own application without having to understand in detail how the library works. This assumption has been pretty crucial in the cost/benefits calculation for using libraries vs writing functionality yourself.
Now that internet security is becoming an ever more serious topic, this assumption might be less and less viable to hold. We've walked back on it to an extend already with the current best practice of "you don't have to understand how it works, but at least update frequently".
However, it might as well happen that this is not enough to keep security issues from happening. Things are already moving in a direction where it's absolutely expected that a developer understands and takes responsibility for every line of code that is included in their prodiuct, whether they wrote it themself or not. But if that happens, it will fundamentally change the way we deal with libraries and how software ecosystems work.
Yes, free software devs can smugly repeat their stance of "it's a gift so don't complain, no guarantees about anything" - but if everyone took this serious, no one could use free software for anything critical, so the free software movement would be mostly dead.
> now that they're decided they have stricter requirements for that need?
I think what made the log4j vulnerability so dangerous wasn't the ability to load arbitrary code via JNDI on it's own (even though that was certainly a horribly overengeneered and dangerous feature). The main vulnerability was that log4j was accepting substitution patterns in the "parameters" section of a logging command, the main purpose of which is to accept untrusted input. There has been at least one other CVE which exploits this without needing JNDI at all.
"Don't trust user input" hass been a fundamental rule of security for a long time, and it was reasonable to assume the log4j authors were aware of it. So the current situation is not that requirements have suddenly became stricter, it's simply that log4j broke a fundamental assumption about its API.
(I'm also pretty sure that while the JNDI thing was an unfortunate feature and was "working as intended", the "substitutions in untrusted input" part was likely a honest bug and never intended like that)