Electronic warfare history of the Battle of the Bulge
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As an aside however, when I saw this topic, I immediately thought of Steve Blank's website, who goes into quite a great deal of depth on the history of Electronic Warfare and how Silicon Valley rose from the WWII infrastructure created for it. He has a number of articles here: https://steveblank.com/secret-history/ If you like this topic, you'll find those to be a good read.
I wonder how many people realize that artillery shells in WW2 had bloody vacuum tubes in them, or that the US had targeting computers for their naval AA guns that (combined with proximity fuses) lowered the average the rounds per kill from a few 1000’s to under 100… by the end of the war US naval AA could shoot down a Japanese aircraft with an average of 30 rounds fired.
The Brits weren’t too shabby either, Bletchley Park the Chain Home early warning radar and much more. In fact the Brits pretty much invented modern radar…
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-controlled_intercepti...
The truth was that Germans really didn’t managed to compete with the Allies when it came to technology despite the popular depiction of them in some circles of popular culture.
They Nazi’s “dejewification” of science and the pursuit of “German science” reeked havoc within their scientific community breaking down the scientific method and its core institutions and many of the scientists from the Great War and interwar period who remained either weren’t supporting the German war machine or were actively sabotaging it.
It was an incredible achievement to fit a battery and some glass vacuum tubes into a device that would be fired out of a gun at 1000G.
I would also attribute some success to the Allied choice of pragmatic effectiveness over technical superiority most of the time. This allowed the effective arming of a huge force over a huge area with adequate replacements, whereas the "superweapon" approach fell to limited availability of parts and special alloys (due to Allied targeted bombing!). And the V2 program was a huge waste of resources for Germany. Good for the subsequent American space programme, though.
Otherwise, I strongly agree with you.
It’s probably the main reason for why the US has dominated the electronics industry through the 20th century. The miniaturization required and the ability to mass produce electronics required the development of new production techniques. The proximity fuse was the first use of PCBs in mass production.
...or Japan.
However they did tried to avoid them being captured by the Germans.
The proximity shells for AA guns were so sensitive that they with the help of targeting computers allowed the Brits to essentially neutralize V-1 attacks as they could effectively shoot down all incoming V-1’s.
Back at Metrovick he worked on high power radio transmitters, one he designed for the Rugby Radio Station [3] became the basis of the one for the Chain Home system and he was in charge of production of them by Metrovick.
Because he spoke German he was a member of the Allied Control Commission immediately after the war and went round all the German electronics companies to find out what they had been doing. He found that he knew all the senior people who had been working on competing technology from when they had been students together.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metropolitan-Vickers [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technische_Hochschule,_Aachen [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rugby_Radio_Station
The Brits didn’t had the industrial capacity to produce jets in large numbers and for the US the early jets were a logistical nightmare.
Early jets couldn’t fly off aircraft carriers in fact it would take quite a while for the navy to get jets working and for close air support the navy still had prop aircraft until early Vietnam.
Jet bombers weren’t viable during WW2 and the limited range of jets their fuel, landing stop and other logistical requirements meant that it was far harder to support them from frontline airbases.
So it’s more of the case that the US simply couldn’t use the jets of the time effectively if they could they would’ve built more of them and some even earlier than 43-44.
The Me-262 was built in relatively large numbers but did absolutely squat to change the tides of war as the Allies found a very simple solution to go after the air bases.
Unlike most prop aircraft of the time that could take off and land in a field and could be serviced in a barn jets needed proper runways and maintenance facilities.
As for the above examples - Nazis were a bit behind on jet engine technology, and most importantly got lost in trying to get some super weapon while their designs and production lines were hamstrung by stupid ideas
The UK couldn’t have afforded an expanded post-WWII atomic program at the level the Soviets eventually fielded, at least not while transitioning back to a civilian economy. The US could and did.
The big challenge for the UK to meet at the time was decolonization, a challenge they met with aplomb and whose successful achievement was and is under-appreciated by the global community.
Wreaked havoc. It also "reeked" (stunk). So what you said, while it was a mistake, it was also perfect.
So if you want reads, you gotta share natively on whatever platform you like to use.
The pros use a strategy where they write long cornerstone content then post insightful abstracts on various platforms natively. Super pros use interns/agencies to do the chopping and sharing.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1475994609549557761.html
Paper mentioned in the last tweet:
The Unseen Fight: USAAF radio counter-measure operations in Europe, 1943 to 1945 by William Cahill
https://www.aerosociety.com/media/15088/2020-06-36-bs-rcm-op...
Source:
Javascript bookmarklet to hide all images from current webpage?
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3623640/javascript-bookm...
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0610penny/
There are some lessons here (in the OP's submission and the discussion about penny packets) for software engineering projects.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJCF-Ufapu8
Bonus: It includes interviews with Albert Speer.
More info about the series: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Secret_War_(TV_series)
Which tends to suggest not to look for better generals, but to push the decisions downwards and "outwards" (ie transparency - so that everyone has access to all data used to make decisions)
Does the UMC think that marines should take one set of orders and then ignore any counter-marding orders? It's probably not what that term means.
Traditionally command / management has had three goals
- co-ordination
- resource allocation
- decision making in uncertainty
The first one is useful, but even in slow moving environments like business it's almost impossible to imagine up then down orders being more effective than horizontal. This is the meaning of your slogan and modern military have learnt this lesson well.(maybe the battle of Jutland ?). It's very dubious any major enterprise has learnt this lesson but I will take suggestions. (Just to expand on this - many business claim to push decisions down to lowest level. As do many militaries. In my experience this is really relegation by negligence - that the upper levels simply do not have the mental bandwidth / time / reporting chains to interfere. For example look at how empires before the age of telegraphy ran themselves - the Satrap was empowered to make wide ranging decisions - but as soon as communication went from weeks to minutes Prime Ministers and Presidents interfered all be time. If your CEO could interfere in your weekly stand up meetings, trust me he would.) This is the essential difference between some new model of organisation (cf Norwegian Mission) and the current one which is just the central office has not automated away your decision making power yet. See Amazon warehouses for an example of how oddly effective that has been (to date)
Resource allocation is mostly what we are talking about here. This project gets funding this does not. The failure here was a failure to appreciate the extreme value of anyone doing radio jamming versus that bomber squadron, abs the failure to appreciate the bulge was a counter attack. I am not sure any other system of command (distributed / bottom up / democracy) would do much better. Something tells me a software model of the whole "system" set up and distributed to all decision makers (voters?) would allow a sensible discussion. Not sure it would make a better army. But if it did that army would be terrifying.
And decision making in uncertainty is covered above I guess. It is IMO the only truly valuable thing for a hierarchical organisation. And it is so horribly dependant on the taste and capacity of the apex of the organisation.
None of these are easy fixes - this is very very much a 20/20 hindsight example - and yet we have to ask does software and the internet open up how we organise large groups of people into new forms. We have run armies and civil services like this for tens of thousands of years. Is it how we should arrange a 21 C business ?
Starter for ten: if every body in a SV start up got even shares - that is hiring the fifth person meant your shares went from 25% to 20%. Even founders. Would SV grow fast through automation or through hiring? What other minor changes to incentives will massively chnage how we organise?
I suspect we need to revisit Roald Theory of the firm
AI may hold the promise of faster, cheaper and better, but that remains to be proven by metrics applied to its implementation into existing business processes. Or at least fielded prototypes integrated into existing operations that demonstrate such dramatic improvements.
The graveyard of failed IT implementation is strewn with program corpses wrapped in winding sheets/business plans that promised “drastic” improvements.
To overuse an example, logistics is the latter - the software tells each person what box to move to where and when. Decision making is removed.
I call this an immutable company - software is released once and that is the company. another release is a new compmay.
Now imagine taking this to other organisations. Civil service seems a likely area for much more restricted decision making - can't you imagine how much Congress would like to precisely define what civil servants can do - down to daily activities?
[1]. https://www.amazon.com/Instruments-Darkness-History-Electron...
Just to piggyback on what everyone else has said:
1. The other more experienced units in the area absolutely knew without a doubt that the Germans were on the run and that they were going to be crossing the Rhine any day now. The commanders of those units were overconfident [1] and forgot that war is a democracy, and the enemy gets a vote too.
2. The 99th had set up pre-planned artillery targets. So all they had to do was call the artillery unit and tell them what fire-plan to execute. A significant time-saver when presented with oncoming tanks.
3. They had also dug their foxholes correctly (by The Book), so they had protected positions they could fire from. This also gave them concealment, making them more effective when they did open fire.
4. Redundant communication wire was run, in case it was cut by incoming rounds/shells. The importance of being able to coordinate efforts with easy and reliable communication can't be overstated.
5. The VT Fuses were present in theater, but had not been authorized for use until this battle for fear of duds being found by the Germans and sent for analysis and reverse-engineering. The shells equipped with the VT fuses would explode at a predetermined height above the ground, so they made sheltering in foxholes and behind walls mostly ineffective. They really were a game-changer, and the Allies were right to withhold their use until truly needed.
If you ever get the chance to visit southeastern Belgium, you should. There are a number of excellent museums in the Bastogne area, and pretty much every town has an M4 Sherman tank on display. Plus the beer, fries, and waffles are excellent.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Elsenborn_Ridge
[1] I am of the opinion that the 101st Airborne gains ground by becoming trapped and forcing the rest of the army to go rescue them. As happened in Bastogne.
They want to get rid of Warthog because it was a suicide plane from the day it was delivered, it's just that congress either pushes continued use of the inadequate plane and only allowed option at one point was to go with JSF, because it was the only plane in this weight class they were allowed to procure.
There were at least few attempts to build a better plane than A-10 for the specific use case where it's actually good (shooting at lightly armed forces) without much of the unnecessary price tag and maintenance, but all got shot down by bean counters.
It's a shame this is presented as a twitter thread.
Not a topic hijacking, but indirectly meeting a need that hasn’t been met by anyone posting an article addressing the Twitter thread issue as it has evolved over the last several months. This discussion has the benefit of a concrete example. Perhaps someone could post an article that focuses just on Twitter threads and the discussion can continue there?
Yes, this is an extremely common complaint which has taken so many HN threads so far off topic that it just needs to stop. Nothing so repetitive is interesting. Some people choose to post great content in a series of tweets—for whatever reason. It's the way the world is and complaining about it on HN doesn't help.
We specifically changed that guideline to say "article or website formats" in order to clearly cover this case.
Ehh? At a minimum, WWII was when cryptography and code-breaking became popular. The Battle of Midway was an overwhelming American victory because the USA effectively hacked the Japanese codes and reversed the trap.
Thousands of code-breakers were employed to try to crack the Enigma machine, and only one exotic project by Mr. Alan Turing (THE Alan Turing, the father of modern computers) was able to break it.
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While radios existed in WWI, they were still somewhat exotic. By WWII, every single tank, ship, and airplane was equipped with radios, and those communications were 100% the target of many exotic attacks.
England experimented on new forms of Radio, such as RADAR. Germany began to use radio-guided missiles (the V1 "Flying Bombs" were radio-guided by Morse Code... primitive by today's standards but obviously open to electronic attack if you could just figure out the codes).
WW2 was the start of electronic warfare on every front. Radio-guided weapons, jamming, radar, even cryptography and information security.
Sure: these electronics in WW2 were pretty bad by modern standards. But they were still electronics and computers and integral to both the Pacific and European theaters. I'd argue that cryptography and code-breaking is one of the highest forms of electronic warfare, its practically the invention of the information-security fields (HTTPS, SSL, TLS, etc. etc.) that we use to... well... chat on Hacker News, among other things.
A (very important) father of modern computers. Canonization is unnecessary.
[0] https://www.aerosociety.com/media/15088/2020-06-36-bs-rcm-op...