According to LastPass, they don't have access to the master password // presumably it's not stored on their side. Is that accurate..?
Thanks
According to LastPass, they don't have access to the master password // presumably it's not stored on their side. Is that accurate..?
Thanks
https://web.archive.org/web/20150629081250/https://forums.la...
Here's the archived phpBB login page. It asks for your LastPass login and password (not your forum account, your actual LastPass login and actual LastPass master password):
https://web.archive.org/web/20150717071236/https://lastpass....
Here's a past HN discussion from the time with some guesses at how such a phpBB login using the master password could, theoretically, be implemented without knowledge of the password. Note that this doesn't imply it's possible to implement it in a way that would be resistant to their web server (running phpBB!!!!) being compromised: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16016171
But during the heartbleed attack when their systems were shown to be vulnerable, that was one of their arguments as to why it wasn’t so bad.
LastPass is full of clowns. There's already two examples of their cavalier approach to what should be simple security in this thread and I'm pretty sure there are more.
Just the other day a co-worker brought up this idea as an offhand remark. After bouncing it off those present, it took him all of twenty seconds to see why it might do harm and will do little good.
You'd think a password manager would employ some security minded people who could shoot down ideas that bad immediately.
Any hash upgrade mechanism can be abused by a (possibly MITM) attacker to change a user's password while leaving you and the user none the wiser that specifically this occurred. If you need to lock someone out while their phone is beeping at them over their bank account being emptied, while not even making it look like their password was changed, that sounds like a fun way.
Lastly it's virtually the same as plaintext, since any salt will be known by even just a passive attacker. A true MITM won't even have to brute-force the hash.
Conclusion: Might do harm, will do little good.
Now, the fact that they have a web-based vault access requiring entry of your master password? Pretty bad, considering you can't disable it, and it's automatically activated even when just using the browser extension (at least as of a few years back, when I asked them to fix that.)
It’s a combination of people being very bad at generating, remembering, and entering passwords plus generally being unwilling to wait minutes or even seconds to generate the hash on their local computer.
I mean, technically this is true, but it's also true if you have the ciphertext of the stored-password database, which is sort of LastPass's entire job. ;)
The only thing that might make it harder to brute force the master password with the latter than with a hashed password database is if the key derivation algorithm differs.
But I think your blanket statement is sort of misleading. In principle, if you trust someone with your encrypted password storage database, you should trust them with a hash of your master password; both serve as brute forcing oracles.
d9afca35a87a2af4168500640fcf2370
Password is 16 characters long, all lower case, no numbers, no special symbols.
Please tell me the password.
I use 64 character passwords, or if there is a length limit, always the longest possible. That’s the beauty of using a password manager :)
Aesop, my author, makes mention of two mice and they were sisters dear 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
70 and little effort
Still a no-go for plain old brute forcing all a-z combinations. But, if your password is some combination of actual words, common keyboard sequences, or anything else in a password dictionary, it's cracked pretty quick/cheap.
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/10041298/how-to-recover-...
But can you show me the way how you'd go on about this? Really curious.