If we adopt the rule that the next person to be served is the most recent person to join line, it's inevitable that a second line will form with people waiting to go to the first line and if someone tries to go to bypass the second line and go directly to the first line, the crowd in the first line will direct their rage at this person and compel him or her to queue in the second line - it's just as if there were only one line and the person had cut in that.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182781
The whole article is embarrassingly bad, a bunch of stuff that sounds clever at first but wasn’t seriously researched or even pondered. Like the requirements to develop resources you buy or the incentive effects of paying off malicious behavior.
I've got to ponder the to do list example though.
As for the to do list, to me that suggestion amounts to nothing more than splitting my to do list into two, a "to do now" list, and a "to do eventually" list (well, I would call it a "two do" list), where I just move items from the second one to the first. That might have some value, but it's not a mind-blowing reversal of logic.
If it's orderly, they kind of queue in the middle. If it's not, you'll have a large brawl as people try to get in front of each other.
People who arrive join the front of the queue, and are either served next, or someone else joins in front of them, pushing them back. When they're position 2 in the queue, they will only be served if 2 people are served and 0 arrive (low probably). If another person arrives, they're now position 3 in the queue, so 3 need to be served before any arrivals (even lower probably).
At some point, they decide the probability of being served drops low enough that they give up and leave - this will usually happen quickly.
The only way to 'game' this system is to look up the street and join the queue when it looks like nobody else is coming. If many people try to do this, then those people will be waiting forever (both want to join last - stalemate), and anyone who doesn't employ the tactic gets served.
Those who don't really want your product don't wait in a line for it anyways - the length of the line itself is a natural filter for availability of the good.
Basically - has satisfaction actually gone up if those who would be extremely satisfied by your product no longer receive it, and random folks who may or may not want your product do? I'd bet money the answer is a solid "NO".
I feel like I missed something.
The thing we are trying to optimise is not length of que, but how long and how reliable it is to get served.
Under the old system you may have had to wait 10 minutes to get served BUT you knew before you started queuing it would be about 10 minutes (and thus could make an informed choice) and you can clearly see your progress in the queue and if you are patient you will be served.
Under the new system it now may take you 1 minute to get served or 1 hour. Or you will try multiple times and never get served. And you will have no indication before you start queing how successful you will be.
Any UX designer would easily tell you which of these systems is going to piss people off more.
# For those who end up going home
For those who end up going home, a traditional queue is still more efficient.
In a Landsburg's queue, if you decided to go home, it must be that there has been too many people joined the queue ("the queue got full"). *Their arrival takes time*. You would have waited for quite some time when you decided to bail out.
A traditional queue, on the other hand, allows those who end up going home to choose to do so immediately upon arriving at the scene. You arrive at the scene, look at the queue, judge that it would take unacceptably long period of time before you can get served ("it's currently full"), and decide to go home. You never join the queue. You wait for zero seconds.
# Arranging early arrivals is important
*Filtering for fans.* In the book _The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life_, Landsburg himself stated that some businesses would prefer to serve fanatic patrons over mediocre customers. In an ordinary queue, customers can prove their loyalty by *arranging to arrive early*. On the other hand, by attaching the probability of getting served directly to the probabilistic nature of when one arrives, a Landsburg's queue does not allow/support proving patronage with early arrivals.
*An ordinary queue is an auction.* One of the main arguments that Landsburg proposed is that an ordinary, first-in-first-out queue is inefficient because it is not a market. I disagree to some extent. Let's re-examine the act of arranging early arrivals. By arriving early, you sacrifice the liberty of arranging the day's tasks liberally, often risking postponing a couple of other chores to the next day and/or losing opportunities for spending the morning somewhere else. This *cost of flexibility and opportunity* is a bid[^1] for guarantee/priority of service. Yes, it's still not a market where you trade spots in the queue, but its auction-like nature makes it a much closer implementation than Landsburg's queue.
[^1]: Well, it's technically a payment, since you don't get your money back should you lose the auction (i.e., decide to bail out from the queue). However, since it's not a game of chance, I can't call it a gamble either.