Yeah. But who will China sell its goods to? Last I checked, Russia has 144M people and EU / US / Japan have 1B+. Of course, China has a large domestic market but exports are still ~20% of GDP for them.
The EU is already dependent on Russian natural gas and middle eastern oil so they will be forced to accept the new trade rules even if under protest.
There is a possibility that the commonwealth countries along with the US might be able to put up a good fight but the current state of anti colonial rhetoric from within most commonwealth countries will most likely push the current leaders of these countries out of power and one by one they will join the rest of the world...The sun has been setting on the British Empire for a while now.
Themselves? Allied nations? Other countries around the world? Your entire discussion centers around this idea that all resources and all things are made in these non-western countries. It's a faulty assumption. China is dependent on imports as well - remember the rolling blackouts shutting down factories in China when they stopped coal imports to teach Australia a lesson and then Australia just sold the coal elsewhere? [1]
Europe is "dependent" on Russian gas but those who are in charge in Russia really like that European money and their vacation homes. Long-term Europe is just fine here because they can just build alternative energy sources (warming planet may make much of Europe even less dependent on Russian natural gas for heating). It doesn't help them today but if the costs are too high there becomes a point that it's either not worth it, or liquified natural gas products from the US become attractive. It should go without saying that the oligarchs in Russia who run these companies... like not having their villas in London confiscated due to "sanctions". There's an upper limit on the maximum pain (outside of actual war) that either will inflict upon the other.
The EU dependency on Russian gas thing is yet another overly simplified boogeyman like the US Dollar Reserve Currency status. What is actually concerning is Ukraine and how serious Putin is about invading and starting a war and whether or not he stops at Ukraine or does something drastic. I don't think the EU will be able to coordinate an effective military response which may lead to the block dissolving, especially if Putin does something crazy like invade Poland or some NATO country that isn't "important" - will the West really go to war? If Putin gambles here I don't think nukes will fly. So now Russia gets to fight a conventional war in Europe without existential risk - it's a great move for him geopolitically and strategically. EU member states such as France and Germany (the former is the only one that appears to have the ability to even fight) would basically go into a "save yourself" mode and start acting independently when push comes to shove. Outside of the UK most of the rest of the EU is far too small or useless to do anything. Americans are much more willing to fight in Europe than Italians or Spaniards are and I don't think we'd even send ground troops unless we're in an actual World War III scenario which nobody in the West wants to engage in, hence the stronger Russian upper hand here. Though I wouldn't put it past the U.S. to take a chance to really screw with Russia here in the meantime. [2]
I wonder how that happened. Interesting coincidental timing.
[1] https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/05/china-power-supply-crunch-re...
[2] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10331843/New-Russia...
one of us will be eating crow soon enough.
You may be interested to know that some time in the last decade the Russians clearly signalled they would be prepared to use nuclear weapons in Europe. Brilliant play since they know the US sentiment around preparedness to enter another conflict that isn’t theirs.
By simply signalling they forced the US to consider other options hence the decisions to deploy tactical nuclear capabilities not subject to the same rules as strategic nuclear weapons. And last I heard they were deploying these tactical capabilities to a sub class also responsible for SSG.
I’m very curious to understand whether Russian simply signalling in the way that they did has caused the US to strategically compromise their second strike guarantee. That would mean that by simply introducing the idea they have let the US take the mutually assured destruction elements off the table that made it so risky to begin with.
* To your point (let me know if you disagree) I think that the MAD concept can be overcome and we'll see countries figure out strategis around it. What if you had World War III and... just nobody fired the nukes? New York City is bombed, Moscow is invaded, whatever and the countries just don't do the doomsday? What if we've taken MAD for granted and it turns out it's not even on the table?
* > Brilliant play since they know the US sentiment around preparedness to enter another conflict that isn’t theirs
Many wars and conflicts begin because of miscalculations. I think on Putin's part for Russia this could be one of those. I mentioned this in another thread but the U.S. just spent 20 years at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, people dying, IEDs, terrorists, all of that stuff and if you turned the TV off you'd have no idea these wars were going on. America spent 20 years doing this stuff in two countries and not a single American day-to-day really gave a crap. While it may be the case that America is not willing to fight in Eastern Europe, I think that this is one of those potential miscalculations and it's certainly an unknown variable. Hell, even if the American people were not being drafted the US military is certainly actively strong enough to go toe-to-toe with Russia or anyone so we could yet again have a military at war but not a people. Just some food for thought. Even with Biden (smartly IMO) actually getting us out of Afghanistan, the left and the right were crowing about it. Might be more willingness to fight then one might think and this could lead the U.S. to another direct conflict with Russia this decade. [1]
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american...