But just be be sure, we should ask legal!
Log4j2 partially exists because of pushback on adding features to v1
Honestly the biggest problem of package managers is finding a reputable package that one can trust.
The best one can do to aid this situation is reviewing, vetting and warning of which packages that can be trusted and not. Automatic scanners to find code smells and vulnerabilities.
“Security rating: 2/10, This package seems to use JNDI loading, are you sure you want to continue (y/n).”
Logging as it's understood today should ship with most STD libraries. Things like logback an log4j really should just eventually be rolled into the std.
---- This wasn’t a process failure, the vendor did everything right. Mozilla has a mature, world-class security team. They pioneered bug bounties, invest in memory safety, fuzzing and test coverage.
NSS was one of the very first projects included with oss-fuzz, it was officially supported since at least October 2014. Mozilla also fuzz NSS themselves with libFuzzer, and have contributed their own mutator collection and distilled coverage corpus. There is an extensive testsuite, and nightly ASAN builds.
I'm generally skeptical of static analysis, but this seems like a simple missing bounds check that should be easy to find. Coverity has been monitoring NSS since at least December 2008, and also appears to have failed to discover this.
Until 2015, Google Chrome used NSS, and maintained their own testsuite and fuzzing infrastructure independent of Mozilla. Today, Chrome platforms use BoringSSL, but the NSS port is still maintained.
Did Mozilla have good test coverage for the vulnerable areas? YES.
Did Mozilla/chrome/oss-fuzz have relevant inputs in their fuzz corpus? YES.
Is there a mutator capable of extending ASN1_ITEMs? YES.
Is this an intra-object overflow, or other form of corruption that ASAN would have difficulty detecting? NO, it's a textbook buffer overflow that ASAN can easily detect. ----
[1]: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/this-shouldnt...
If we can't find a way to pay Google, there is no hope for some random developer in Nebraska.
Security teams are stuck with securing the tire fire; they didn't choose the library or platform. If anyone should be advocating for supporting open source, it's the developers who benefit by using open source libraries.
Githubs of the world could just gate downloads, pull requests etc. behind a payment to see what is the real valuation of open source software; I imagine it'd mostly settle around $0 excluding couple of big projects.